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1  
Introduction 
 
Political Style, a Matter of Grave Importance? 
 
 
 
  
2 CHAPTER 1 
 
In matters of grave importance, style, not  
sincerity is the vital thing. Oscar Wilde,  
The Importance of Being Earnest, act III  
  
Abstract 
 
This introductory chapter briefly explains the main topic of the dissertation: political style, 
defined as the entire performance of politicians. As most chapters take the form of 
independently published articles, this introduction shows their mutual relation and the way 
in which they contribute to answering the overarching question of this dissertation: how to 
assess political performance in a way that contributes to our understanding of current 
politics? 
   
1 Main Topic 
 
In the last fifty years, the mediazation of politics has placed an increasing emphasis on the 
role of the entire performance of politicians. In our “audience” or “spectator democracy” 
(Green, 2010; Manin, 1997), it no longer mostly matters what politicians say; the manner in 
which they express themselves—the way they speak, look, and act—has gained great 
influence (Corner, 2003; Corner & Pels, 2003; Edelman, 1988; Pels & Te Velde, 2000; Street, 
2003). In order to understand current politics, we not only have to understand the meaning 
of the various expressed ideas; somehow, we must make sense of what is expressed in the 
images and soundbites that accompany these ideas.  
For instance, in Britain, what does it mean that Nigel Farage drinks yet another pint 
of beer in the pub, in front of a camera? And what does Boris Johnson’s messy hairstyle tell 
us? In the US, why was Hillary Clinton’s presentation in the 2016 presidential campaign 
received as unauthentic? And why is Donald Trump able to get away with every insult he 
makes? In the Netherlands, why did Thierry Baudet start his maiden speech in parliament in 
Latin? And is there a political meaning to Dutch prime minister Mark Rutte personally 
mopping the floor after he had accidentally spilled a cup of coffee? 
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Until now, there has been no comprehensive framework for analyzing political performances 
as a whole. In order to get a better grip on the meaning of the entire political presentation, 
which I call political style, I developed a theoretical framework that can be used to assess the 
performances of politicians. Drawing on Van Dijk (1998, 2015), three dimensions of the 
political performance are discerned; first, the ideational dimension—this concerns the 
traditional field of the expressed ideas. Second, the social dimension—the relational aspects; 
to which group in society do politicians express belonging, and, consequently, which group 
gains power when a politician is elected? The third dimension is the presentational or 
rhetorical: do politicians identify with the people they represent, and speak directly for 
them? Or do they speak of the represented people in a manner that distances themselves 
from the people; speaking with them and over them? 
In order to adequately assess the performance of politicians within these three 
dimensions, it is necessary to have meaningful labels for political style. These were found in 
the concepts of populism, elitism, and pluralism: concepts wherein analysis in this dissertation 
has shown that the shared features of two concepts precisely contradict the third—each 
dimension in a different constellation: 
 
• In the presentational dimension, populism is precisely the opposite of the shared 
features of pluralism and elitism; populists identify with the people rather than 
represent people. 
• In the social dimensions, elitism is precisely the opposite of the shared features of 
pluralism and populism; politicians are either part of the elite or part of the 
people(s). 
• In the ideational dimension, pluralism is precisely the opposite of the shared 
features of elitism and populism; the people are either heterogeneous or seen as 
one. 
 
Further analysis in this dissertation revealed that this grammar of meaning, shared by 
populism, elitism, and pluralism, traces back to the three main tensions in discourse, as 
defined by De Saussure (Culler, 1976; De Saussure, 1916/2015). This explains why populism 
has a partly contradictory meaning; these contradictions are inherent to discourse in general. 
The social dimension of discourse traces back to the tension between signifier and signified, 
which is an arbitrary relation based on power. The ideational dimension traces back to the 
4 CHAPTER 1 
 
tension, within the language system, between multiple signifiers forming a syntagmatic 
relationship. The categorization of groups of signifiers constitutes a tension between a genus 
and the species of which the genus consists. The presentational dimension traces back to the 
tension in discourse use, which exploits the paradigmatic relationship between signifiers. This 
is based on the difference between metaphor and metonymy, based on identification or 
representation. The precise relationship between these is exemplified in Chapters 2 and 4, 
but, generally, the relation between populism and discourse is that in the ideational 
dimension, a populist takes the position of the genus (taking the perspective of the whole; 
the people instead of individuals). In the social dimension a populist takes the position of the 
signified (the powerless, instead of the powerful). In the presentational dimension the populist 
takes the position of the metaphor (identifying with the signified, instead of relating to it). 
This analysis points at the particular link between populism and metaphor, which is examined 
in more depth in chapters 7 and 8.  
Expressions of populism in different dimensions form an inseparable knot of meanings 
that are directly related to elitism and pluralism, of which it is difficult to make sense. 
However, looking at the three concepts in each dimension separately, they form a practical 
set of style labels, as in each dimension they cover all possible political presentations in a 
meaningful way. Their related meanings allowed me to use the three concepts as the core of 
a speech analysis tool, which I developed over the course of this dissertation. As a set of 
related concepts, populism, elitism, and pluralism provide clear yes and no political categories 
within the three dimensions. Based on the discursive elements of the political field, five focus 
elements of political style were distinguished, and then used to compare speech analyses in a 
comprehensive way. Combining the scores of three dimensions and five focus elements after 
the speech analysis allows us to transform the messy knot of meanings into a profound 
insight into the political presentation of politicians. 
By providing insight into the political style concept, as well as crafting a tool for 
assessing political style, this dissertation connects different populism approaches. This is 
described in section 2 of this chapter. Section 3 briefly describes the development of the 
speech analysis tool and summarizes the speech analyses conducted. Section 4 gives an 
outline of the dissertation.  
INTRODUCTION 5 
 
2 Political Style and Populism 
 
Populism is one of the most hotly debated issues in current social science discourse. Until 
now, there has been no consensus on the exact nature of the phenomenon. Some scholars 
see populism as predominantly a set of ideas (e.g., Hawkins & Kaltwasser, 2017; Mudde, 
2004, 2017), others emphasize that it is a (discursive) strategy (e.g., Laclau, 2005a; 
Stavrakakis, 2017; Weyland, 2017), or a political movement (e.g., Aslanidis, 2018; Gerbaudo, 
2017; Laclau, 2005a). Mapping the logical structure that underlies the political style labels of 
populism, elitism, and pluralism, served to reveal a framework that connects the different 
populism approaches.  
Although many scholars acknowledge that there are multiple dimensions to populism, 
no one validates the three frames equally. Simultaneously validating three frames equally is 
impossible, because a coherent definition of populism is only available if the parts of the 
dimensions that exclude each other are completely banned from the definition. More 
concretely: when framing populism as a “set of ideas,” it is necessary to place the anti-elite 
feature of populism—which it shares with pluralism—between brackets. For instance, 
Mudde’s (2017) ideational definition of populism places the spotlight on the homogeneity of 
the people. For this reason, Mudde has difficulties explaining political practices that combine 
clearly populist anti-elite elements (populism in the social dimension) with a pluralist 
definition of the people (in the ideational dimension). Only the social expressions of 
populism that do not conflict with the main ideational frame, such as “democracy following 
the ‘general will’ of the people,” are included in the ideational definition. Müller (2016; 2015) 
also restricts populism to political practices which combine anti-elitism with anti-pluralism—
this logically follows from the ideational main perspective which he uses to study the 
phenomenon. 
On the other hand, framing populism mainly in the social dimension necessitates 
hiding the ideational commonalities of populism and elitism in order to maintain a coherent 
definition. For instance, Laclau and Mouffe’s (Laclau, 2005a; Mouffe, 2018a) definition of 
populism as a social discursive strategy places the spotlight on power relations and 
automatically eliminates from its definition the ideational side that populism shares with 
elitism; a purely homogeneous people cannot be part of this definition, as it would contradict 
populism’s status as an act of unifying the people against the group in power. 
Lastly, framing populism as “presentation” or “rhetoric” necessitates neglecting the fact that 
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populism also shares features with elitism and pluralism, respectively. Hence, only the 
features in which populism differs from both are considered truly populist. For instance, 
Weyland (2017) only considers practices in which the political leader identifies with the 
people as populist. Logically, a presentational definition has to ban leaderless populism (in the 
social or ideational dimension) from its definition in order to maintain internal consistency.  
 Because all dimensions contradict parts of other dimensions, the discussion cannot, 
per definition, be settled; as the semiotic analysis in Chapter 4 reveals, populism has a 
contradictory meaning in three dimensions which is only visible when looking at the 
dimensions separately. My claim is that none of the three dimensions is dominant, as each 
dimension is both the cause and effect of the two others. Hence, populism is simultaneously 
all three dimensions. Designating one dimension as being the most important for populism 
inevitably means neglecting certain aspects of the concept, as not all aspects are coherent 
from only one main perspective. The only way to approach populism more comprehensively 
is to analyze the phenomenon three times, each using a different lens. Subsequently, a 
comparison of the three analyses shows in which dimension a particular populist practice 
expresses itself most predominantly, and in which dimension less so. This multidimensional 
approach makes the logical structure revealed in this dissertation useful for political analysis.  
One application of this underlying core-structure is developed in this dissertation: the 
PEP-index, a speech analysis method that defines the political styles of speeches in terms of 
populism, pluralism, and elitism. Section 3 describes the development of this instrument.  
 
3 The Analysis Instrument 
 
In interaction with the development of the political style concept (see Chapter 2), I 
constructed a political discourse analysis instrument, the PEP-index; the acronym referring 
to the first letters of Populism, Elitism, and Pluralism. The development of the instrument 
and the political style concept went hand in hand; new theoretical insights led to alterations 
in the instrument, while the use of the instrument for actual speech analysis led to further 
theoretical exploration, which again resulted in alterations in the instrument. After using the 
instrument for the analysis of 360.000 words ⁠—spread over 67 speeches and leading to 32 
style profiles of 22 politicians ⁠—the instrument has reached its third and current version.  
The PEP-index permits the structured political style analysis of political performances, 
such as speeches and debates, as well as written performances like party manifestos and 
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other political expressions. Chapter 3 presents version 1 of the instrument ⁠—with the linear 
scale positing populism and elitism at the poles of the scale and pluralism in the middle. 
Chapter 5 presents version 2, in which I substituted the linear scale with a triangular one. 
Chapter 8 presents version 2+, in which the instrument is expanded upon with a metaphor 
analysis tool, used to conduct a metaphor analysis in addition to a style analysis. In the 
following, I briefly describe its development from the unpublished version 0 to the first 
published version 1, and the current versions 2 and 2+.  
 
3.1 PEP-index version 0 (unpublished). 
 
The unpublished version 0 of the instrument discerned only four focus elements (1 The 
people, 2 The elite, 3 Democracy/government, 4 Politics); it did not yet consider the political 
context (Element 5) as part of political style, but instead as a part of political content. The 
latter drew on Ankersmit’s (1996, p. 28) dichotomy of a mimetic and aesthetic approach to 
politics, as explained in Chapter 2. Based on the literature, I formulated for each focus 
element a description of a populist, pluralist, and elitist political style. I integrated the 
descriptions in a digital analysis instrument, using FilemakerPro software. This software is 
mostly used to manage databases for marketing purposes. However, it is apt for speech 
analysis as it is capable of storing large numbers of text and video fragments in a detailed, yet 
orderly manner that permits general as well as detailed analysis.  
In the PEP-index, text fragments can be stored, coded, analyzed, and compared at all 
elements and dimensions. I developed scripts that automate small tasks, such as adding 
values to coded text fragments and style elements, collecting speech fragments with one 
code on one screen, and calculating the average style score of a speech based on sub-scores. 
The semi-automated environment allows an analyst to assess the political style per sub-
element, based on assembled fragments in the coded speech which refer to this specific 
element. After analyzing all sub-elements separately, the average score of the elements 
displays the political style of a speech. 
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Using version 0, I conducted style analyses of 38 speeches, delivered by twenty Dutch 
politicians in 1946, 1971, 1994, and 2012 (Appendix A, speeches no 29 – 67)1. The analysis of 
200.000 words in total (average speech length: 5200 words), resulted in the political style 
profiles of 20 politicians. Together, these profiles demonstrated a meaningful representation 
of the post-WWII Dutch political landscape; politicians from parties that the literature 
generally portrays as populist ended up at the populist end of the scale (PVV, SP, BP). 
Additionally, mainstream politicians in 1946 and 1994 were assessed as less populist  than 
mainstream politicians in 1971 and 2012 (see Figure 1.1); this was also according to 
expectations as the Dutch political climate in the ’70s and after 2000 is generally 
characterized as more populist than in the other examined decades (Aerts, 2003; De Liagre 
Böhl, 2013; Den Hollander, 2000; Koenis, 2014; Te Velde, 2010). 
Although the style profiles generally made sense, the instrument had demonstrated a 
shortcoming in its use. It regarded the political context not as part of style but of content; 
however, fragments referring to the context appeared stylized. For instance, in a 
parliamentary debate in 2012, the differences between Dutch prime-minister Mark Rutte 
(Speech 29) and his populist opponent Geert Wilders (Speech 59) were clearly a matter of 
style. Both politicians described the same political crisis, the difference being that Wilders 
exaggerated this crisis, whereas Rutte provided a positive perspective on it by emphasizing 
that economic circumstances are always fluctuating and that the measures taken by the 
government would “help to make the Netherlands stronger.” Wilders, on the other hand, 
overstated the crisis and personally blamed the Dutch prime minister for everything that had 
been going wrong in the Netherlands. These speech fragments stylized the political context as 
much as they stylized the element of the political elite.  
The literature confirmed the need to include political context as an element of 
political style; for instance, Moffitt acknowledged the performance of “crisis” as a feature of 
populism (Moffitt, 2015). As further indication, social identity theory has defied the 
distinction between content and style centered politics (see Chapter 2). Although adding 
political context as a fifth style element only defines twenty percent of a political style, 
Chapter 7 shows that it can make a difference: Boris Johnson’s more populist style during 
the Brexit campaign in 2016 can be largely attributed to this fifth style element. Additionally, 
Trump’s style change⁠ described in Chapter 7—from populism to elitism ⁠—began with 
 
1  All references to speeches in this dissertation are to the numbered speeches in Appendix A. 
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changes in his depiction of the political context. In order to assess the precise role of the 
five elements, the PEP-index saves the attributed styles of both the five elements and the 
three dimensions separately. In the long run, after having analyzed a cumulating amount of 
speeches, it will be possible to assess the distinctive roles of the elements and dimensions in 
both political style in general, and in specific styles such as populism.  
 
3.2 PEP-index version 1. 
 
From the interaction between the actual use of the instrument and the theoretical 
development of the political style concept, a new version of the PEP-index emerged. Version 
1 not only differed from version 0 in including a fifth focus element; but it also granted the 
three dimensions more theoretical ground. During initial speech analysis three dimensions 
had naturally arisen, as it appeared that the same style expressed itself in distinct ways within 
one element. For instance, the people can be expressed as an idea (good/bad, one/ divided 
etc.), or as a social position, by expressing to be part of the people or not. While analyzing, I 
had made a provisory division of the dimensions into value, position, and communication. 
Figure 1.1 The political styles of twenty Dutch politicians between 1946 and 
2012, analyzed with PEP-index version 0. 
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Practically, this categorization worked well; however, it lacked a theoretical ground. Van 
Dijk’s three dimensions of ideology provided this theoretical base (see Chapter 2, and Van 
Dijk, 1998). The three dimensions differed in detail, which resulted in changes in the 
instrument.  
By 2016, when I had reached this stage in my research, current political events urged 
me to shift my focus to timelier issues, and away from the longitudinal research of the 
political style in the Netherlands as of 1945. Instigated by the political success of Donald 
Trump, I used PEP-index 1 to assess the political styles of three American candidates in the 
primaries of 2016 (Trump, Clinton, and Sanders), as described in Chapter 3. The article, 
published in August 2017, assessed the political style of Trump as populist, of Sanders as 
mixed populist-pluralist, and of Clinton as mixed pluralist-elitist. Academics welcomed the 
article as a useful contribution to various topics: such as the analysis of American politics 
(Norris & Inglehart, 2019, p. 80),  the academic discussion on differences between 
mainstream, right-wing, and left-wing populism (Ekström, Patrona, & Thornborrow, 2018, p. 
3; Font, Graziano, & Tsakatika, 2019, p. 17; Miró, 2019, p. 12), and the definition of political 
style (Crosby, 2019, p. 3; Van Krieken, 2018, pp. 132, 152, 231). 
 
3.3 PEP-index version 2. 
 
After the publication of version 1, the instrument progressed further. Smaller changes 
occurred in the names of the labels in order to better fit with the updated content. For 
instance, the second element, politicians, was changed into political elite to better fit with 
social field theory (see Chapter 2, section 5.2). The ideological dimension changed into 
ideational dimension, so as to align with the same change in the populism literature (c.f, 
Mudde, 2004, 2017). For clarity reasons, the communication dimension changed into 
presentational dimension. These alterations concerned only the names of the labels, not the 
instrument. 
A more radical change was the implementation of the triangular scale, following the 
logic of the three dimensions (see Chapter 2). Version 0 and 1 differentiated, on a linear 
scale, between extreme populism, populism, mixed populism-pluralism, pluralism, mixed 
pluralism-elitism, elitism, and extreme elitism (as in Figure 1.1). As mentioned in the 
published article (Chapter 3), it did not contain a mixed populist-elitist style. Because the 
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analyzed styles of Clinton, Trump, and Sanders did not concern the populist-elitist style, it 
had not affected those analyses; however, the combination of these two styles does exist. 
 For instance, the late Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn was famous for spreading a 
populist message while flaunting his (former) professor-title, being well dressed, and driving a 
Daimler. Another populist-elitist style mix was visible in a speech of the Orthodox Reverend 
and parliamentarian Pieter Zandt in 1946 (see Figure 1.1). However, whereas Zandt’s style 
can be interpreted as pluralist, Fortuyn's pluralism is more contested. Although his style 
certainly had pluralist aspects⁠—for instance, his defense of gay rights⁠—it also had anti-
pluralist aspects, such as his critique of the minority rights of immigrants. I reasoned that 
Fortuyn’s mixed populist-elitist style could be understood as a sub-style of pluralism because, 
in principle, pluralism includes all democratic practices (Blokland, 2011, p. 2). If populism 
could express itself in different ways, as explained in section 2, why not pluralism? This 
explanation, however, did not entirely satisfy. In order to gain a better understanding of the 
mixed populist-elitist style, I analyzed the concepts of populism and elitism ⁠—as well as 
various other opposing concepts⁠—with the help of the semiotic square of A.J. Greimas 
(1970/1987). This semiotic analysis (see Chapter 4, and abbreviated in 5, 6 and 8) turned out 
to be extremely insightful. It improved the instrument in three ways.  
First and foremost, it changed the core of the analysis instrument into a strictly 
logical constellation of opposing concepts, which neatly distinguishes what a style is, and 
what it is not. With this, it meets with Sartori’s requirements of unambiguous categories, yet 
it does not oversimplify matters, which often happens in the construction of yes/no 
categories (Sartori, 1970, 1991).  
Second, it gave room to a separate anti-pluralist (mixed elitist-populist) style, which 
solved the problem of opposite styled politicians falling in the same, pluralist category, such 
as Pieter Zandt and Pim Fortuyn; the conversion into a triangular scale clearly delineates 
between pluralist styles and anti-pluralist styles.  
Third, the semiotic analysis showed that the three dimensions of political style were 
much more entangled than initially thought, which simplified the double-layered structure of 
political style. Version 1 (see Chapter 3) acknowledged three parts of political style that all 
encompassed three dimensions. The semiotic analysis led to the merging of the two layers; 
there are no separate three-dimensional styles that cooperate; political style is just one 
undividable knot of three, sometimes cooperating and sometimes conflicting, dimensions. 
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In PEP-index 2, the analyst assigns codes to text fragments based on the description of ninety 
features divided over six styles, as depicted in appendix D.  This is the core of the 
instrument. All features are related to each other, following the logic explained in section 2 
and the next chapter. As an example, the Venn-diagram in Figure 1.2 demonstrates how the 
various interrelated features work in the element of the people.  
In Figure 1.2, every feature is a direct contradiction of the same feature of the 
opposing style (arrow), as well as being a mix of the two adjacent styles. For instance, the 
pluralist ideational feature of the people is a heterogeneous people. This is opposed to the 
anti-pluralist feature of a non-heterogeneous people, which is precisely its negation. At the 
same time, the Venn-diagram shows that this anti-pluralist feature is a shared feature of 
populism and elitism; therefore, a fragment of political discourse is either populist, or elitist, 
or a mix of both⁠—at one element and one dimension.  
Figure 1.2 A Venn-diagram of populist, elitist, and pluralist features, at one element. 
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At the same time, the fragment can have a different style for another element or dimension, 
as is visible in the coding of a speech fragment of Boris Johnson in Figure 1.3. This logic 
applies to all features in the Venn diagram of Figure 1.2 (and of the entire model in appendix 
D). None of the features of the three styles has a strict yes/no divide, because they overlap 
with adjacent styles. Nevertheless, all overlapping features are the negation of the third style, 
according to the structure underlying populism (see section 1). It is the combination of 
shared features with different styles (two anti-styles) that makes a style unique. 
 
Based on the allotted styles of the separate elements, the average scores are plotted on a 
triangular field with populism, elitism, and pluralism at the corners. The program provides 
the styles as a percentage of populism, elitism, and pluralism. The program includes not only 
an analysis instrument but also a database that allows for new comparisons and new 
analyses. Every new speech analyzed with the instrument offers opportunities for new 
comparisons with previously analyzed speeches. Using the same speeches in different 
constellations leads to an accumulation of data, which is efficient as well as insightful.  
In October 2019, PEP-index version 2 contained 32 analyzed speeches (with a total 
amount of 160.000 words and an average speech length of 5000 words), resulting in 22 
political style profiles of 12 politicians, originating from three countries; the US, the UK, and 
the Netherlands. This includes the speeches analyzed in version 1, which were all converted 
according to the requirements of version 2. It also includes two converted and re-examined 
Figure 1.3 A fragment of a coded speech of Boris Johnson in 2016. 
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political styles of version 0 (Rutte 2012 and Zandt 1946), that feature in Chapter 4 and 6. 
The speeches analyzed in version 2 are plotted on a triangular field in Figure 1.4. 
The speech analyses depicted in Figure 1.4 are analyzed in different chapters in various 
constellations. Chapter 5, which is devoted to differences within the populist spectrum, 
compares the speech analyses of Trump 2016, Sanders 2016, and Obama in 2016. These 
speeches are contrasted with the UK populist styles of Johnson 2016-2017, Farage 2016-
2017, and Corbyn 2016-2017, and the Dutch styles of Wilders 2016-2017, Roemer 2017, 
and Baudet 2017. Chapter 6⁠—which focuses on the mixed populist-elitist style ⁠—
complements Trump’s 2016 speech analysis with analyses of speeches delivered in 2017 and 
Figure 1.4 Political styles of three political contexts (the US, the UK, and the Netherlands) 
analyzed in the PEP-index 2. 
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2018. It compares Trump's style developed over three years with Boris Johnson’s styles over 
2015-2016-2017, and Thierry Baudet's styles in 2017-2018-2019, focusing on the differences 
between politicians as well as changes in the political style of one politician over time. An 
analysis not part of this dissertation is presented at the PSA conference 2019 in Nottingham. 
It compares Boris Johnson’s political style with that of Nigel Farage and Jeremy Corbyn in 
2015, 2016, and 2017. Of each politician, speeches delivered before, during, and after the 
Brexit campaign were analyzed and compared.   
 
3.4 PEP-index version 2+ 
 
In order to accommodate secondary analyses on the assessed political styles, I extended the 
PEP-index with a metaphor analysis tool (+). Based on the metaphor theory explained in 
Chapters 7 and 8, the tool facilitates the identification and analysis of metaphors in political 
discourse. Metaphors can be identified and categorized by their target domain; the part of 
the metaphor that refers to what is signified2. First, all metaphors referring to the five 
elements of political style can be identified, after which PEP-index 2+ sorts the text 
fragments containing these metaphors. For instance, all metaphors that are used to signify 
the people are collected for comparison. This way, links between metaphor usage and 
political style can be revealed. This extension of the instrument has been used for the 
analysis in Chapter 8. He re, one populist speech (of Geert Wilders), one pluralist speech (of 
Barack Obama), and one elitist speech (of Boris Johnson) are compared on metaphor usage.  
 
4 Outline of the Dissertation 
 
This dissertation consists of a collection of six articles on the joint topic of political style, 
complemented with an introductory chapter, a theoretical chapter, and a conclusion. The 
chapters 3, 4, 6, and 7 have been published in peer-reviewed academic journals in the 
interdisciplinary field of politics and discourse; Discourse and Society (Sage), Critical 
Discourse Studies (Taylor & Francis), Populism (Brill), and Metaphor and the Social World 
(John Benjamins). Chapter 5 and 8 are published or accepted as book chapters in peer-
 
2  F.i. In ‘Eleonore is the sun’, the ‘sun’ is the source domain and ‘Eleonore’ the target domain of the 
metaphor. See also Chapters 7 and 8. 
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reviewed edited volumes, for which I was invited to submit a chapter after presenting 
conference papers at international conferences (Palgrave and Ediciones Universidad De 
Navarra). Figure 1.5 depicts the relation of the separate chapters to each other. 
 
 
Figure 1.5 The relation between the chapters in this dissertation and the three levels of 
discourse in which political style manifests itself. 
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As a collection of articles, parts of the chapters inevitably overlap. Overlap is particularly 
present in the description of the developed analysis instrument and the core structure 
underlying populism. However, this drawback does not outweigh the advantages of broader 
dissemination and the possibility to read each chapter separately. Chapter 4 is especially 
dense and may be difficult to follow for anyone not specialized in semiotics. Summarized 
versions of this analysis are provided in other chapters, which should satisfy readers more 
interested in the speeches analyzed than in the underlying theory. In addition to Figure 1.5 
that connects the chapters in a graphic, in the following, I briefly describe the topics of the 
subsequent chapters and how they relate to one another: 
• Chapter 1 introduces the main topic of this dissertation and describes the 
development of the political style analysis instrument. It also demonstrates the 
relationship between the independent chapters.  
• Chapter 2 presents a theoretical chapter on political style; it serves to bring together 
the dissertation’s theoretical foundation that is scattered over the separately 
published chapters.  
• Chapter3, published in the journal Discourse & Society, disentangles political style as 
consisting of three dimensions and five elements. Based on this analysis, it presents 
version 1 of the developed analysis instrument for political style. As an example, a 
style analysis of six speeches of US politicians ⁠—Donald Trump, Bernie Sanders, and 
Hillary Clinton ⁠—is conducted.  
• Chapter 4, published in the journal Critical Discourse Studies, investigates the precise 
relationship between the populist, elitist, and pluralist political styles. The 
investigation brings together different approaches to populism by connecting them 
through one shared underlying structure. The semiotic analysis reveals that the 
meaning of populism is locked in a three-dimensional opposition of elitism and 
pluralism. This is useful for political analysis, as the three concepts together precisely 
demarcate if parts of political discourse are populist, elitist, pluralist, or a mix of two 
styles.  
• Chapter 5, to be published as Chapter 14 in the edited volume The Return of Populists 
and the People (in press), presents version 2 of the analysis instrument developed, the 
PEP-index 2. The new version integrates the triangular structure of Chapter 4, 
connecting populism, elitism, and pluralism in a three-dimensional opposition. 
Subsequently, it applies it to the analysis of political speeches of nine American, 
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British, and Dutch politicians, focusing on style differences within the populist 
spectrum.  
• Chapter 6, published in the journal Populism, clarifies how elitist elements are 
integrated into populist discourse by analyzing political speeches that make use of this 
incongruent style. Speeches by Donald Trump (US), Boris Johnson (UK), and Thierry 
Baudet (NL) are analyzed and compared. The populism-elitism mix is easily combined 
with nationalism. Its political significance justifies thoughtful academic consideration 
for the populist-elitist mix, alongside the ample attention for full populism.  
• Chapter 7, published in the journal Metaphor and the Social World, focuses on the 
theory of political metaphor as one expression of political style. Based on classical 
rhetoric and contemporary metaphor theory, the following three main purposes of 
metaphors in political style are discerned: reason-based, emotion-based, and strategy-
based usage of (conceptual) metaphor.  
• Chapter 8, published as Chapter 4 in the edited volume Metaphor in political conflict. 
Populism and discourse, presents a comparative metaphor analysis of three speeches, 
each with a different political style; one populist speech, one elitist, and one pluralist 
speech. The goal is to clarify differences in the metaphors by relating them to the 
political style of the speeches.  
• Chapter 9 discusses the overall conclusions against the background of the academic 
literature on the topic. It establishes the contribution of this dissertation to the 
academic literature and recognizes the need for further investigation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2   
Political Style Theory 
 
Because We Never Go Out of Style 
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Cause we never go out of style.  
We never go out of style.  
Taylor Swift, Style.  
  
Abstract 
 
This chapter presents a theoretical foundation of political style. It summarizes the theoretical 
paragraphs that are scattered over the separately published chapters 3 to 8, and supplements 
it with parts that were omitted due to the word limitations of the host books and journals. 
Political style is defined as a three-dimensional political performance generating political 
meaning. In today’s mediated political environment, it not only matters what a politician says 
(ideational dimension). More than ever, it matters how it is expressed (presentational 
dimension), and what a politician does (social dimension). 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The stylization of political communication has been at the core of politics since antiquity. It 
predominantly has served the purpose of engaging people in politics. In order to 
conceptualize the entertaining aspect of politics, scholars often depict it as a theatre play or 
spectacle (e.g., Edelman, 1988; Green, 2010; Manin, 1997). Voters are seen as the audience 
of the political play, whose role is to “gaze” at and judge the performance of politicians. This 
judgment primarily concerns serious political matters; where it addresses political style, it 
judges the trustworthiness and capability of politicians, rather than the level of 
entertainment. The latter is seldom seen as a requisite for good government; on the 
contrary, since Antique Rome, politicians with an abundant ornamental style have been 
assumed to be frauds. A sober style is usually understood as more trustworthy, although the 
use of a pathetic style—based on pathos rather than logos or ethos—is sometimes deemed 
necessary; for instance, in matters of grave importance, or in order to gain the support of 
the mob (Cicero, trans. 2013; Kennedy, 1999). 
Currently, however, the sober style has fallen out of fashion. Politics has never been 
more entertaining since the installment of Donald Trump and Boris Johnson as political 
leaders in the US and the UK. Although the soundness of their political strategies is highly 
contested, and they are both frequently exposed as liars, their popular support remains 
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broad. In a New York Times article on Trump supporters, entertainment is even shown as a 
purpose of politics: “Most of his supporters say they will stick with him, citing his blunt style, 
which some of them see as a form of entertainment” (Tackett, 2019). In this quote, media 
logic (entertainment) has taken over political logic in the judgment of politicians.  
Another example in which media logic profoundly impacts current politics follows 
from the recorded nature of political performances. Old performances are easily 
recollected, which allows for apparently contradicting ideas, expressed a long time ago, to be 
quickly shared on social media. In the fragmented nature of new media, good reasons for 
difficult decisions and compromises are easily lost. For instance, in the race for the 
nomination of the 2020 Democratic US presidential candidate, older, moderate politicians 
such as Joe Biden are being accused of previously having acted in contradiction to their 
current standpoints (Hook, 2019). Fragments of contradictory performances are forwarded 
out of context (e.g., Flamingo999, 2019); which leaves an image of inconsistency and 
unreliability. In a media logic, compromises are generally ill-advised because they always 
contradict one’s carefully constructed political identity to some degree. Hence, the current 
polarized political climate is—at least partly—a matter of media logic taking over political 
logic, and thereby restricting politicians to performances that are easily understood and 
contribute to a coherent, long-lasting political identity. 
The above-outlined political developments illustrate that it is vital to analyze the 
political styles of politicians in order to understand contemporary, media-guided politics. 
However, up till now, the concept of political style has remained under-developed. 
Illustrative of this lack is the academic discussion on whether populism is to be seen as a 
political style or something else, such as an ideology or political strategy. In this discussion, 
style is sometimes equated with rhetoric, sometimes with discourse, language, performance, or 
with solution style (e.g., Canovan, 2002; Hawkins, 2009; Kazin, 1995; Koenis, 2014; Moffitt & 
Tormey, 2014). Some scholars mainly use political style in opposition to political ideas (e.g., 
Taggart, 2004), and others assemble all approaches to style under the umbrella term 
discourse (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013; Kaltwasser, Taggart, Ochoa Espejo, & Ostiguy, 
2017). However, performance differs from language, and different discourse approaches 
highlight different aspects of populism. This impreciseness obscures the discussion and 
obstructs a consensus on the nature of populism. 
In order to structure the discussion on political style, this dissertation starts with an 
in-depth analysis of the political style concept. It draws on notions of political style 
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developed in democratic theory and representation (Ankersmit, 1996, 2003; De Haan, 2000; 
Koenis, 2014; Laclau, 2005a; Laclau & Zac, 1994; Pels, 2003a; Pels & Te Velde, 2000) as well 
as theories on social style and identity that originate in sociology and discourse studies 
(Butler, 1988; Giddens, 1991; Goffman, 1956; Wodak, 2009). Rhetorical notions of political 
style are also considered (Cicero, trans. 2013; Hariman, 1995; Quintilian, trans. 2002). 
Theories on ideology and ideological discourse are studied in order to demarcate the 
difference between political style and ideology (Althusser, 1971/2008; Freeden, 1996, 2003; 
Gouldner, 1976; Thompson, 1990; Van Dijk, 1998, 2015). Based on these theories, the 
following definition of political style is formulated. The first part is a general definition, for 
which the second and third parts give specifics: 
  
1 Political style is the stylized performance of political agents (politicians, parties, 
and alike) on the political front stage, aimed at filling the aesthetic referential gap 
between the voter and the representative with a political identity.  
2 This performance is conceptualized as a tag cloud of ideological fragments of text, 
talk, image, sound, and action. Rather than ideological theory, the identity of the 
performer is responsible for the coherence of their political style. 
3 Political style encompasses three dimensions, in which different aspects of style 
are expressed. Political agents use these three dimensions in distinctive 
combinations, assembling their own unique political identity. The three 
dimensions are: 
• The ideational dimension (cognition, ideas);  
• The social dimension (group membership and relations), and;  
• The presentational dimension (rhetoric and communication).  
  
Sections 2 and 3 of this theoretical chapter explain the first two parts of this definition. In 
sections 4 and 5, I explain the third part: the relation of political style with the three 
dimensions of discourse. In section 6, I present five focus elements for style analysis. Section 
7 discusses the style labels that best fit with these elements: populism, elitism, and pluralism. 
Finally, section 8 explains the role of metaphor in political style, a key feature of political 
style. Overall, this theoretical chapter collects and rearranges the fragmented presentations 
of the underlying theory in this dissertation, and supplements it with parts that were omitted 
due to the word limitations of the host books and journals. 
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2 Political Style as Performance 
 
The starting point for this dissertation’s definition of political style is Ankersmit’s notion that 
politicians are never identical to the people that they represent (Ankersmit, 1996, 2000, 
2003). According to Ankersmit, there always is an “aesthetic referential gap” between the 
voter and the representative (1996, pp. 49–56). Politicians stylize their performance into a 
unique political identity in order to connect with their own group of people. Ankersmit 
differentiates between a “mimetic” and “aesthetic” approach to democracy (Ankersmit, 
1996, p. 28). A mimetic representation does not recognize the gap between the voter and 
the politician; it focuses solely on political content. This neglect places a mimetic approach 
fundamentally at odds with the representative nature of modern democracies. An aesthetic 
approach, on the other hand, recognizes the gap and acknowledges that politicians stylize 
their performances as representatives.  
As Pels and Te Velde exemplify, the current mediated political landscape encourages 
more stylized political performances (Pels, 2003a; Pels & Te Velde, 2000). Pels embraces 
stylized politics, seeing it as an advantage in an age where politics has become the profession 
of experts. According to Pels, there is no need for the people to understand all the policy 
details, as they can judge politicians based on a shared style and taste (Pels, 2003a, p. 50).  
The notion of the aesthetic referential gap is valuable. However, the difference 
between a mimetic and aesthetic approach to democracy—or between content-centered 
and stylized politics—holds only in theory. Ankersmit admits that a mimetic approach to 
democracy is also a style: one that presents itself as intentionally style-less (Ankersmit, 2000, 
p. 35).  
Ankersmit’s notion of the aesthetic gap reminds of Laclau’s notion of political 
identity. Laclau sees, like Ankersmit, a “gap” between political identities and the people that 
express them. Laclau states that it is not only democracy that is representative, but all 
subjects as well. Laclau refers to Lacan’s theory of the split subject: the representational gap 
exists at the source of every (political) demand because an identity is never the same as the 
actual person. In Laclau’s vision, the institutionalist way of structuring society is as much a 
construction (or a style) as the populist view of the people (Laclau, 2005a, pp. 80–81; Laclau 
& Zac, 1994).  
Laclau’s ideas closely align with social identity theories such as Butler’s, Goffman’s, 
and Giddens’ (Butler, 1988; Giddens, 1991; Goffman, 1956). In these approaches to identity, 
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all humans “perform” their identities on the front stage of social life. In doing so, they create 
their identity in interaction with their surroundings. As a political identity is not principally 
different from any other form of identity, every political performance is creatively stylized. 
Hence, all politicians have political styles on which they can be assessed through a study of 
their performance. Ankersmit’s mimetic style and the Laclau’s institutionalist style can be seen 
as anti-styles, similar to the sober Attic style of Cicero (Cicero, trans. 2012), mentioned in the 
previous section. 
Seeing political style as performance is nothing new; Aristotle and Quintilian—in their 
rhetorical treatises—elaborately addressed the performance aspects of delivering a speech, 
mostly by giving directions on how to improve such performances (Aristotle, trans.1984; 
Quintilian, trans. 2002). Over the centuries, the focal point of rhetoric has shifted to solely 
its linguistic aspects. In accordance with this, contemporary scholars concerned with political 
style have focused mostly on language (e.g., Hariman, 1995; Kazin, 1995). Recently, however, 
Moffitt and Tormey proposed to define populism as a political style in the sense of a 
performance (Moffitt, 2016; Moffitt & Tormey, 2014). Their general definition of political 
style has some similarities with the definition in this dissertation but differs substantially in 
terms of details. These differences are mainly a result of focus; whereas Moffitt and Tormey 
focus primarily on populism and secondarily on political style, this dissertation focuses first 
on political style, and second on populism—the latter being just one of the style labels used.  
One advantage of not focusing primarily on populism is the greater distance from the 
populist phenomenon; a focus on mere populism automatically directs the attention to 
differences from other styles, whereas a broader focus diverts the attention to similarities as 
well. This approach turns out to be extremely insightful, as populism is as much defined by 
its similarities to other styles, as by its differences (see Chapter 4). One important feature 
that populism shares with other political styles it that it is a group style; as Ankersmit (1996) 
has noticed, it functions as a bridge between a politician and a group of people. However, a 
pure group style is utopian, as groups consist of individuals that need systems that reconcile 
group and individual interests. Populism is just one way of mixing three styles (a group, 
personal, and systematic style) in one political performance. More on this later; first, I want 
to address the nature of political style defined as discourse. 
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3 Political Style as Ideological Discourse 
 
According to semiotic theory, not only language provides meaning, the whole social world 
does (Chandler, 2002; Greimas & Parret, 2017). Hence, the entire performance of a 
politician can be seen as a signifier, signifying a political meaning. Performances that have 
certain similarities have the same political style, just like books and paintings are written and 
painted in different styles. Each political style is a specific type of political articulation. 
In its discursive nature, political style comes close to Althusser’s definition of 
ideology as discourse. According to Althusser, ideas do not float around immanently from 
their expressions (Althusser, 1971/2008). Based on Lacan, Althusser argues that the mere 
recognition of a subject—the person generating ideas—is already an expression of discourse, 
as the subject emerges from its entrance in the symbolic order that is constituted of 
discourse (1971/2008, p. 45). Althusser emphasizes the materiality of ideology; ideology is 
present in what he calls “the Ideological State Apparatus.” Althusser’s definition of ideology 
situates it at another level than traditional ideologies; it refers to churches, schools, the 
family, and political institutions altogether. Ideology manifests itself in the mere existence of 
those institutions. Althusser admits that those institutions also produce their own, distinct 
ideologies. He calls the latter “secondary, subordinate, and derivative” of the Ideological 
State Apparatus. As “by-products,” they lose his interest, as he sees them as a “bourgeois 
tactic of dividing the working class at the level of politics” (Althusser, 1971/2014, p. 84). He 
sees these political fights as different from the proletarian fight because the latter aims to 
destroy the entire bourgeois system, whereas political fights remain within it. In contrast, 
Laclau and others defy the possibility of a “proletarian fight”; destroying the system would 
ultimately mean destroying the subject, as the subject exists only within the system (Laclau, 
2014; Laclau & Zac, 1994). 
Like Althusser, Laclau sees ideology as discourse. He further focuses on populism, 
which, in Laclau’s definition, broadly equals this dissertation’s definition of political style; he 
defines it as a specific “mode of political articulation” (Laclau, 2005b, p. 37). Laclau specifies 
this by opposing populism with institutionalism. Populism is on one end of the scale, 
discursively creating an internal frontier between the powerful and the underdog. On the 
other end, there is institutionalism, in which there is no internal divide, only individuals and 
institutions working together to solve problems. This definition recalls Ankersmit’s (1996) 
differentiation between an aesthetic and a mimetic approach to politics. Mimetic politics and 
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institutionalism both focus on the content of demands and neglect the fact that these 
demands are articulated in a certain way. Laclau states that pure institutionalism and pure 
populism are utopian; all politics are populist to some extent, without further specifying this 
in terms of styles or types, as done in this dissertation. According to Laclau, the populism 
concept is inherently vague, and differentiations of it directly refer to various manifestations 
of populism in the political context (Laclau, 2005b, pp. 45–47). So, Laclau focuses on levels of 
abstraction that are both one higher and one lower than the level at which this dissertation 
focuses. In Laclau’s theory, there are no styles—just populism as a discursive act, manifesting 
itself in endless contextual variations. 
Although Althusser’s and Laclau’s explanations of ideology/populism as part of 
discourse are vital, their theories are not of use in further deciphering political style; they 
both do not focus on the level of style, even do not recognize it. For this purpose, Van Dijk’s 
multidisciplinary theory on ideology is useful (Van Dijk, 1998). Van Dijk looks at ideology in 
its socio-psychological function; how do groups emerge and exist. He defines the function of 
ideology as the cognitive interface between group-action and group discourse (Van Dijk, 
1998, pp. 69–70, 2013, p. 178). This definition comes close to Ankersmit’s definition of 
political style as a means of political parties to connect with their own group of voters 
(Ankersmit, 1996, p. 60). Van Dijk’s definition of ideology discerns three dimensions; 
cognition, group relations, and discourse. According to Van Dijk, the cognitive dimension of 
ideology works as a grammar of group discourse and action (1998:32, 53–58, 90, 148–50, 
199). Just as the grammar of a language does not disappear when the language is not being 
spoken or written, in the same manner, the cognitive dimension of ideology does not 
disappear when no one is expressing shared group thinking in discourse or social action: 
“Indeed, there are languages that, as linguistic systems, have survived their users. Similarly, 
socialism as an ideology will still be an ideology even when the last socialist has switched off 
the light.” (Van Dijk, 1998, p. 148) 
Unlike Althusser and Laclau, who only recognize the materialized expressions of 
ideology in discourse, Van Dijk grants the cognitive level an immanent dimension in ideology, 
separate from its expressions in discourse and social action. His choice of labels suggests 
that cognition and social acts exist outside of discourse, as he labels the categories as 
cognitive, group, and discourse. However, Van Dijk’s comparison of the cognitive level of 
ideology with the grammar of a language, recalls De Saussure’s division of language into two 
levels: the language system (langue) and language use (parole) (Saussure, 1916/2015). 
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Transposing this division onto discourse suggests that the three dimensions of Van Dijk can 
be understood as  
 
1 cognition > the mental discourse system 
2 discourse > discourse use 
3 group > social action.  
 
This Saussurian interpretation of Van Dijk’s three dimensions shows that the three 
dimensions work well as dimensions of discourse; dimension (1) and (2) relate to each other 
in the same way as language system relates to language use (Saussure, 1916/2015). The 
addition of a third dimension differentiates discourse from language. Although all three 
dimensions are part of discourse, the system (1) cannot be reduced to its expressions (2 and 
3); it explains them at another abstraction level and adheres to its own, systematic, logic, as 
explained in Chapter 4. 
Applying this to my research, I have labeled the mental discourse structure of 
political style its ideational dimension. The expression of political style in the social world, I 
labeled the social dimension, and its expressions in actual discourse use, I labeled the 
presentational dimension of political style. The three dimensions together form the political 
style of a politician. These labels do not suggest—like Van Dijk’s labels—that the cognitive 
dimension exists outside of discourse; ideas are—in line with Althusser and Laclau—part of 
discourse as well. Nevertheless, they are operating at a distinct level of discourse, abiding by 
a different logic than the logic of the other two dimensions.  
 
4 Three Basic Tensions in Discourse  
 
Before focusing on the three dimensions within political style, this section better explains the 
immanent character of the ideational dimension, in order to prevent misunderstandings. 
Granting ideas an immanent dimension in discourse seems to contend the relative nature of 
discourse; if ideas are immanent, they seem to refer to a truth that exists outside of 
discourse. This, however, is not the case, as it is not the content of the ideas that is 
immanent, but their structure: the ideational dimension can be traced back to one of the 
three major principles behind signification, as distinguished by De Saussure (for a good 
explanation of De Saussure, see: Culler, 1976). The connection between the three 
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dimensions and these three basic principles of signification shows that all three dimensions 
are structural and not based on any pre-given content or truth: 
  
1) The ideational dimension traces back to the syntagmatic relation between signifiers. A 
syntagmatic combination of signifiers categorizes different species as belonging to one 
genus at a different abstraction level. The relationship between genus and species always 
contains a tension, as no species (the part) is exactly the same as the genus (the whole), 
yet all species together constitute the genus, which contains an additional meaning at one 
abstraction level higher. This excess of meaning provides the grounds on which one can 
decide which species belongs to a genus and which not. For instance: no specific dog—be 
it a Saint Bernard or a Chihuahua—precisely fits the linguistic genus of a prototypical 
dog. Yet, a Chihuahua is undoubtedly a dog and not a rabbit, an understanding based on 
the excess of meaning generated by the signifier of the genus dog, one abstraction level 
higher than the different species. The ideational dimension comprises generalizations and 
categorizations of signifiers that are generally accepted as truths, notwithstanding this 
truth is not universal, but just one framing in discourse. 
2) The social dimension traces back to the opposition of signifier-signified. The relation 
between the two is arbitrary and, for this reason, purely a matter of power; it is the 
powerful subject that imposes a signifier on the powerless signified object. Although the 
meaning of this signifier never suffices—the signifier can never be identical to “the 
thing”—the signified object has no power to change the meaning imposed by the 
signifier. An obvious example is the naming of a child by their parents; a child has no 
power to reject this name. It is not until they become a powerful subject themselves that 
they can choose to take another name. De Saussure was not interested in this 
dimension; in his definition, linguistics had the language system as an object of study, not 
the arbitrary connection between signifier and signified. For the broader study of 
discourse, however, it is one of the three central principles. 
3) The presentational dimension traces back to the paradigmatic relation between signifiers. In 
discourse use, a paradigmatic relation between signifiers (all possible meanings of one 
signifier) can be exploited in order to construct a new meaning. This is always the result 
of a speech act, performed by a subject through language use. In this language use, there 
is a difference between metaphor and metonymy; whereas metaphor fills the lack of 
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signification through the imagination of being the whole / the thing (identification), 
metonymy bridges the gap by being adjacent to the whole / the thing (approximation). 
 
The difference between the presentational, social, and ideational dimensions is fluid: the 
three dimensions are circularly related as they constitute each other. All 
metaphorical/metonymical expressions (presentational dimension) have the potential to end 
up as a signifier (social dimension) or genus (ideational dimension). For instance, the name 
Seltzer as a synonym for sparkling water in the US originates in one brand of sparkling water, 
named after the German village Selzer. The brand name Seltzer has been used as a metonymy 
for the genus of sparkling water in general; after some time, people forgot that it was a 
metonymy and started using it as a name for (artificially made) sparkling water. At the 
moment that Seltzer changed from a metonymy into a genus and a signifier, the logic of 
Seltzer changed: it was no longer a deliberate speech act, as its name/genus was accepted as 
logical and natural; there was no comparison with two parts of the metaphor/metonymy, 
different brands of sparkling water were directly categorized as Seltzer.  
The difference between a categorization process and a metaphorical process is 
significant. Research into the neurological processing of conventional and new metaphors 
shows that it takes the brain more time to process new metaphors and metonymies than 
highly conventional ones. For this reason, it is argued that the two are processed differently 
in the human brain; the former process is based on comparison, the latter on categorization 
(Bowdle & Gentner, 2005). This bolsters the argument that the ideational dimension, in 
which categorization is pivotal, works according to its own logic; it uses a different 
neurological process than the metaphorical process, in which an active comparison is 
involved. The question of as to whether an expression is ideational—based on 
categorization— or presentational—based on comparison—is difficult to answer and can 
vary from utterance to utterance. However, undoubtedly, the two logics are different. 
The ideational logic originates in the tension between the whole and its parts. As 
said, this formal logic of categorization does not consist of an immanent set of truths that 
exist outside of discourse. Its placement outside action and time in the discourse system is 
only partial, as the dominant framings in the ideational dimension were once constructed 
through discourse use, such as in the case of Seltzer. This process can be reversed: the 
moment that the logic behind apparent obvious truths is revealed as framing instead of truth, 
the system opens up for change.  
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An example of such a change from obvious truth back to framing is gender, as has been put 
forward by Judith Butler (1988, 1993). For a long time, gender was just a matter of truth: 
you were either a man or a woman, which was seen as a biological fact. Gender was a 
matter of categorization and part of the discourse system rather than of discourse use. 
Today, however, gender has become more fluid, and a matter of discourse use instead of 
system. This is a long process because framings are resilient (for an interesting case study 
into frame changing on the death penalty, see: Baumgartner, Linn, & Boydstun, 2010). The 
structural anchoring of framings in the ideational dimension makes it difficult to change these 
meanings, as these anchors restrict the discourse use to begin with. However, by making 
framings visible, it is possible to change the discourse system: discourse is not static, not 
even in the ideational dimension.  
What never changes, however, is that the ideational dimension adheres to its own 
logic—a systematic logic of categories and generalizations—which partly contradicts the 
logic of the other two dimensions: these other two dimensions are not organized around 
the tension between the whole and its parts, but around the tension between the name and 
the thing, and between identification (through metaphor) and approximation (through 
metonymy), respectively. The three discourse dimensions cannot be separated, nor can they 
be reduced to each other. They construct each other, but also have an excess of meaning in 
each dimension, as demonstrated in Chapter 4. It is precisely within this excess of meaning 
that the dimensions contradict one another. Confronted with each other, however, they 
reveal that they are but framings, not truths, resulting in an opening and the possibility to 
change the dominant framings in the ideational dimension. 
 
5 The Three Dimensions of Political Style 
 
This section specifies how the three discourse dimensions work in political style. The first 
part of political style, the ideational dimension, concerns the—intentional or 
unintentional—expression of ideas: generalizations and categorizations that are presented as 
truths. They can be conceptualized as a tag-cloud of idea fragments. Ideational style differs 
from a traditional ideology in its fragmented nature, combining verbal, visual, and auditory 
elements; there is no strong internal coherence necessary, as the other two parts of a 
politician’s political style—the social and presentational parts—hold the style together. Vice 
versa, the ideational dimension is the interface between the social and presentational parts 
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of political style; it functions as the ideological grammar that guides actual group actions and 
expressions in language. Although the ideational part of political style depends for its 
expression on the social and presentational part, it cannot be reduced to these parts alone; 
the ideational part not only explains the other two styles at an abstracter level. It uses the 
logic of categorization and generalization, resulting in dominant framings in a society, and is the 
basis of common sense. 
Second, the social dimension of political style involves the construction of 
identities; the adoption of a signifier by a subject. This goes beyond the “arbitrary” relation 
between signifier and signified, that lies beneath this dimension. Although the adoption of an 
identity/name is, from a linguistic perspective, free, the social world is also discourse and 
restricted by the discourse system. According to Butler, a social style is not an expression of 
a stable self; instead, “identity itself is instituted through a stylized repetition of acts” (1988, 
p. 519). People do not freely choose these acts because societal discourses and conventions 
restrict them. It follows, then, that the social identities of politicians are constrained by what 
voters accept as fitting. Consequently, politicians sway toward political styles that profile 
them as fit for the role of leader of the country, mostly tapping into stereotypical elite 
identities.  
Besides their self-identities or social roles, people also have group-identities; an idea 
explored by social psychologists Henry Tajfel and John Turner. Group-identities derive from 
the knowledge of being a member of a social group, and an emotional attachment to that 
membership (Ellemers & Haslam, 2012; Turner & Reynolds, 2012). A social group style is 
used to show allegiance with specific groups in society, take a position on the political field, 
and connect the individual with people who share the same ideas. For instance, socialists, 
communists, but also populists, typically profile themselves as part of the common people by 
using a specific language, dialect, or clothing style. For instance, in the Netherlands, the 
former president of the Social Democratic Party, Hans Spekman, always wore jeans and 
sweaters instead of a suit, so as to express that he was a commoner.  
With the help of laboratory experiments, Tajfel and Turner revealed multiple group 
processes, which lead to Social Identity Theory (SIT) and Self-Categorization Theory (SCT). 
For instance, the fact that one belongs to a group (white or black, American or British, 
etcetera) already has the effect of favoring in-group members over outgroup members 
(Turner & Reynolds, 2012, p. 11). Also, experiments suggest that the more a leader looks 
like a prototype of their own group, the more in-group members will see them as 
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charismatic (Turner & Reynolds, 2012, p. 11). For political style, it follows that there are 
electoral benefits to stylizing one’s political identity as belonging to a large, dominant group. 
These insights into social style demonstrate the usefulness of distinguishing group identities 
(group style) from self-identities/social roles (individual social style). These are two different 
functions of the social dimension of political style, which politicians can use differently.  
The third part of political style is the presentational dimension, which involves 
the rhetorical presentation and the persuasion function of political communication. 
Traditionally, this part is equivalent to political style; it puts the focus on style mainly as 
language and means of persuasion (e.g., Hariman, 1995; Kazin, 1995). Rhetorical persuasion, 
however, is just one of the three functions of political style; for instance, division—forcing 
people to choose for either us or them—is just as much a purpose. This is demonstrated by 
ISIS’s online publications of beheading videos, which are evident examples of political 
communication, hence, political style (Chouliaraki & Kissas, 2018). However, the videos 
were only persuasive for those who already believed in the ISIS cause; for all other people, 
they were extremely repulsive, even a severe threat. The polarization effect of the videos 
was not primarily a presentational (rhetorical) matter, but a social one; seeking connection 
with ISIS’ own group of people, in order to recruit new fighters. Its rhetorical and ideational 
function is mainly subservient to its social purpose. 
Nevertheless, the presentational dimension is crucial in political style because it is in 
this dimension where changes in the other two dimensions begin. Through creatively using 
language, dominant framings can be revealed as (metaphorical) framings instead of truths. 
This can be the start of a revolt in the social dimension of the powerless against the 
powerful. And, ultimately, it can lead in the establishment of new dominant framings forming 
a “hegemony” (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985) in the ideational dimension.  
 
6 Five Focus Elements of Political Style 
 
The systematic analysis of political style gains insight from its division into three dimensions, 
but this division is still not specific enough to guarantee an equivalent analysis of various 
performances. To be able to analyze political style comparably, the attention in all analyses 
must be directed towards the same elements. To decide which elements cover political style 
best, the specific manifestations in the different dimensions is analyzed. As the ideational 
dimension is only accessible through its manifestations within the other two dimensions, it 
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suffices to analyze how political style manifests itself in discourse use (presentational 
dimension) and social action (social dimension). Both analyses result in broadly the same five 
elements, as explained below. 
 
6.1 Focus elements in the presentational dimension. 
 
As politicians construct their political identity in interaction with their surroundings, 
elements of political style can be formulated in terms of those surroundings. In order to 
discern the surroundings in the presentational dimension, the theatre concept is useful. It 
depicts politicians as actors or movie stars, who compete with each other for the attention 
and approval of the audience—the audience representing the voters and the media. The play 
that the actors perform is called democracy. The stage represents the socio-historical 
context: the country, available technology, and historical events. The roles of the actors 
differ: they can be a parliamentarian, member of the government, or part of a social 
movement. Traditional ideologies offer the script, but actors can also choose to improvise 
their performance or draw from multiple scripts of different ideologies. Without mandatory 
scripts or directions, all actors produce their own performance; this is their political style.  
As more elaborately described in Chapter 3, the analysis shows that the political 
stage contains five discursive elements on which politicians can express their political identity 
as unique, apart from their political standpoints (the political content): 
 
1 The people,  
2 Politicians,  
3 Democracy/government,  
4 Politics, and  
5 The political context as a whole. 
  
For instance, politicians can speak about the people or the elite (elements 1 and 2) as a 
homogeneous or a heterogeneous group, as good or bad, competent or incompetent. They 
can present the government or democracy (Element 3) as corrupt or fair, fake or 
respectable. Politicians can speak about politics (Element 4) as a fight, or as cooperation. 
They can also proclaim that the political context as a whole (Element 5) is in crisis or in 
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progress. In sum, these five elements cover political style in the presentational dimension 
and can function as focal points in political style analysis.  
  
6.2 Focus elements in the social dimension. 
 
For analyzing the social dimension of political style, the field theory of Fligstein and McAdam 
is helpful (2012). Bonikowski and Gidron (2016) pointed at the aptness of this theory for 
populism by showing that incumbent US presidential candidates used fewer populist 
elements in their speeches than did challenging candidates. A closer look at the theory 
reveals that it explains the social part of political style very well. 
The political field in which politicians operate can be viewed as a strategic action field, 
defined by Fligstein and McAdam as “socially constructed arenas in which actors struggle for 
power” (2012, p. 13). Their field theory is partly based on theories of Bourdieu (1985), but 
differs in its acknowledgment that fields are not necessarily stable; social agents can change 
the power relations within a field. The instability of the field makes the theory apt for 
political style, as the social dimension of political style can be characterized as an attempt to 
change the power relations in the political action field. 
Strategic action fields consist of three elements. First is the incumbent, referring to the group 
of actors that have disproportionate power within a field. Their power and superior access 
to recourses cause the field structure and rules to favor their interests. The second element 
is the challenger, referring to the group of actors that have an underprivileged position within 
the field. The challengers are less influential and must obey the dominant field order, usually 
against their direct interests. The third element is the governmental unit. This element 
controls obedience to the field rules and guides the performance and the reproduction of 
the field (2012, pp. 13–14). 
Besides these three elements, there are two other factors relevant to the power 
struggle within an action field. These elements make the field open to change. One (the 
fourth element) is that approximate fields must be in a state of chaos and crisis; only then, 
will the challenger be in the position to gain power. Otherwise, the incumbent party, having 
the advantage of field rules and access to recourses, will be able to hold its leading position 
(2012, p. 9). Lastly, social action itself is essential in order to change the power relations 
within a field (2012, p. 17).  
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Fligstein and McAdam emphasize how critical social skills are for gaining power in a strategic 
field. Framing the political field in a way that is beneficial for the challenger or incumbent 
party is a crucial strategy and skill, necessary for changing or beholding the power relations 
within the field (2012, p. 17). Hence, the social dimension of political style can be defined as 
a specific framing of the political field. This framing is structured around the above-
mentioned elements, which are useful as focal points for analyzing political style in the social 
dimension:  
 
1 Challenger:   The group not in power / the underdog as victim or not 
2 Incumbent:   The group in power / the elite as culprit or not 
3 Governmental unit:  Democracy/government as legitimate or not 
4 Strategic action:  In defense or in contention / politics as conservative or  
    progressive 
5 Proximate fields:  The political context / as in crisis or progress 
 
6.3 Political style in five elements. 
 
Comparing the elements of the social dimension of political style with the elements in the 
presentational dimension shows that they broadly align:  
 
1 The group not in power aligns with the people;  
2 The group in power only partly aligns with politicians, however, when formulated as the 
political elite, the two elements match (c.f., Lasswell, Lerner, & Rothwell, 1971);  
3 The governmental unit aligns with democracy-government;  
4 Strategic action aligns with politics, and;  
5 Proximate fields align with the political context. 
 
As the ideational dimension manifests itself in the above-analyzed dimensions, it follows that 
these five elements apply to all three dimensions of political style. Therefore, for assessing 
political style in general, these five elements are chosen as focal elements. The choice 
assures that the vital parts of political style are analyzed and that all analyses are comparable. 
It also allows for more detailed analyses and comparisons of political styles; for instance, in 
Chapters 3, 5, 6, and 8, political styles are compared at the detailed level of elements. 
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7 Style Labels 
 
Having defined political style as a discursive performance and having established its three 
dimensions and five focus elements, we are left with the choice of style labels for 
differentiating political styles. These style labels should, ideally, cover all dimensions and 
elements of political style, as well as refer to the political surroundings that they are 
analyzing. As De Haan argues (2000, p. 238), inventing new style labels—or borrowing them 
from other fields such as art, music, or fashion—rather complicates more than clarifies 
current political science issues. These styles are “circular”; they allow no further conclusions 
than that there are personal differences in style (2000, p. 238).  
This requirement dismisses the art/poetry inspired style labels of Ankersmit, the 
elegiac versus the satirical political style (2000, 2003). Hariman's labels (1995) do refer to a 
political context; he discerns a realist, courtly, republican, and bureaucratic political style. 
However, only the bureaucratic style is relevant to contemporary democracies; the other 
three refer to classical and renaissance Rome and to an African autocracy. The same 
problem counts for Cicero’s Attic and Asiatic style (Cicero, trans. 2012; Kennedy, 1999: 48–
49); these are meaningful in the political context of the first century BC, but not for today. 
Another option was using five political styles described by Koenis (2014, pp. 19–37), named 
after the solutions that most Dutch politicians see for the main problem of a specific period 
(2014, p. 19). Since WOII, Dutch politics encountered the emancipatory style, the wellbeing 
style, the business administrative style, a communitarian style, and a populist style. Different 
periods in history face different problems, and this affects the style of most politicians. The 
advantage of Koenis’ application of political style is that the link with the political context 
offers a better insight into Dutch politics. However, for seeing differences in political styles 
within one period, the styles do not suffice. For this, multiple simultaneous occurring styles 
need to be distinguished.  
 One well-known present-day political style label is the populist style. Choosing this 
label links this study to the most debated questions in political science of this moment; the 
recently observed global rise of populism (e.g., Moffitt, 2016; Norris & Inglehart, 2019), as 
well as the discussion on the nature of populism (e.g., Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013; 
Kaltwasser et al., 2017). If this dissertation can analyze political style in terms of populism, it 
will contribute to two highly debated issues in political science. A broad initial comparison of 
populism features in the literature suggested that populism was indeed an adequate label for 
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political style, as all five elements could be formulated in a populist style (see Chapter 3). 
The question was if all features of populism also fall within one of the five categories of 
political style. To answer this, Rooduijn’s (2014) inductively gathered features of populism 
were compared with the five elements of political style. A secondary analysis of Rooduijn’s 
data demonstrated that it is not only the core elements of populism, but in fact all 
inductively gathered features of populism that fall under the five elements of political style 
(see Appendix C). This bolstered the idea that populism was an adequate label for political 
style. 
Choosing the populist label, however, is not enough; a style requires at least one 
contrasting style. One option is to compare populism with “normal” politics, as done by, for 
instance, Jagers and Walgrave (2007). This opposition, however, is based on the assumption 
of a dichotomy between a normal, not-stylized (= mimetic) politics, and a stylized, populist 
one (= aesthetic). As explained in section 2, this is at odds with the conclusion that all of 
politics is stylized.  
In the populism literature, there are many concepts to which populism is opposed. 
Mudde (2004) compares populism with pluralism and elitism, while others place populism 
opposite technocracy (e.g., Laclau, 2005a; Moffitt & Tormey, 2014; Taguieff, 1998). Canovan 
(1999) contrasts populism to a pragmatic style, whereas Pappas (2016) opposes populism to 
liberalism. All these oppositions carry their own truth; the question is which of them works 
best as a contrasting style of populism as political style. A comparison with the five elements 
of political style demonstrated that elitism and pluralism, cover the five focus elements of 
political style best (see Chapter 3). The three styles were compared in more detail based on 
the literature on elitism (i.e., Bachrach, 1971, 1980; Best & Higley, 2010; Borchert, 2010; 
Dahl, 1971; Engelstad, 2010; Körösényi, 2010; Lasswell, Lerner, & Rothwell, 1971; Mackie, 
2009; Schumpeter, 2008), pluralism (i.e., Blokland, 2011; Dahl, 1961/2005, 1956/2006; 
Lijphart, 1968), and on the populism literature (i.e., Canovan, 1999, 2002; Laclau, 2005a, 
2014; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Moffitt, 2015, 2016; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013, 2017, 2018; 
Ostiguy, 2017; Taggart, 2002; Weyland, 2001). 
 Initially, the relationship between the three was conceptualized as linear: populism 
and elitism forming the poles of a scale with which political style could be measured, and 
pluralism holding a middle position. In this configuration, pluralism is both the opposite of 
elitism and populism, as well as a mix. For instance, populism views the elite as corrupt, as 
opposed to elitism, which sees the elite as good. The two form the poles of a linear scale, 
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the middle of which is pluralism, which views the elite as a group consisting of good and bad 
individuals. A similar pattern is visible in all five elements. Questions, however, arose as not 
all populism-elitism mixes could be characterized as pluralism.  
In order to investigate the relation between the three styles in more depth, and re-
examining whether the three labels—populism, elitism, and pluralism—were the right 
choices, Chapter 4 of this dissertation conducts a concept analysis of populism in contrast 
with many other concepts. With the help of A.J. Greimas’ semiotic square (1970/1987), a 
semiotic analysis demonstrated the three labels as a good match but also revealed a 
shortcoming; the linear scale had to be molded into a triangular one, as the styles were 
found to be each other's opposites and companions in shifting coalitions in the three 
dimensions. The complicated knot of meaning answers the question of why populism is often 
understood as an inherently incongruent concept (e.g., Stavrakakis, Kioupkiolis, Katsambekis, 
Nikisianis, & Siomos, 2016); it manifests itself in fundamentally different ways in each 
dimension of political style: 
 
• In the ideational dimension, populism is paired with elitism; together 
opposing pluralism in the opposition of viewing the people as one 
homogenized or unified people (populism and elitism) versus viewing the 
people as an assemblage of multiple groups and individuals (pluralism); 
• In the social dimension, populism merges with pluralism; as a pair opposing 
elitism in the opposition of no power to the elite (populism and pluralism) 
versus power to the elite (elitism); 
• In the presentational dimension, pluralism and elitism together oppose 
populism in the opposition of indirectly representing the people (pluralism 
and elitism) versus directly being the people (populism). 
 
Together, the three oppositions precisely demarcate what populism is and is not. Further 
semiotic analysis shows that the three styles precisely complement each other in mixing a 
personal, group, and systematic style evenly over the three dimensions. In its base, political 
style is a group style – purposed to connect with groups of people. A pure group style, 
however, is utopian; groups consist of individuals who need systems to reconcile group 
interests with individual interests. Inevitably, personal as well as systematic style elements 
are integrated with political (group) styles.  
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Figure 2.1 A political style as a group style in one dominant framing, incorporating individual 
and systematic elements. 
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Populism has a personal ideational dimension (the people as a (whole) person, oneself), 
whereas pluralism has group ideational dimension (the people as a group consisting of 
individuals (parts)), and elitism a systematic ideational dimension (the people (whole) as not-
governing). Within the other dimensions, the group, individual, and systematic styles shift like 
clockwork (see Figure 2.1). This logic shows the three styles as one constellation of 
concepts, explaining the styles at an abstract level. Although politicians often mix styles, it is 
always clear which style or anti-style a fragment has, in terms of one dimension and one 
element. In this way, the combination of the labels populism, elitism, and pluralism provides a 
Sartori-proof categorization of political styles. Sartori stated that labels in the social sciences 
must reflect unambiguous categories (Sartori, 1970, 1991). With populism, this has always 
been problematic, as the concept of populism is notoriously vague (Aslanidis, 2017; Pappas, 
2016; Van Kessel, 2014). Laclau states that this vagueness is inherent to the populist concept, 
as populism is a discursive act that differs per context (Laclau, 2005a, p. 85). Nevertheless, 
this dissertation shows that if populism is assessed in a triangular relationship with elitism 
and pluralism, within this restricted space, unambiguous answers are within reach. Populism 
still differs per context, but becomes comparable at a higher abstraction level, in its relative 
meaning towards elitism and pluralism. Chapter 4 explains this triangular interdependency 
more elaborately. 
 
8 Political Style and Metaphor 
 
Theoretically, metaphor plays a crucial role in political style as it is through creative 
metaphor usage that the language system opens up for frame changings, necessary for 
political change. In Chapters 7 and 8, I explored the purposes of present metaphors in 
political speeches and found confirmation for the theoretical connection between metaphor 
usage and differences in political style. Three types of metaphor have links with the three 
dimensions of political style, as well as with the three political style labels. As explained in 
Chapters 7 and 8 (see also Figure 1.5): 
 
• populism is related to pathos and emotion-based metaphor; 
• elitism is related to ethos and strategy-based metaphor; and 
• pluralism is related to logos and ratio-based metaphor.  
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Notwithstanding a theoretical connection between metaphor usage and political styles, the 
link does not show itself straightforwardly in political discourse, probably because the three 
dimensions of discourse are too much entangled to distinguish simple connections. In order 
to get more grip on the matter, many more metaphor analyses need to be conducted, such 
as the ones in Chapter 8. In Chapter 9, I describe the ways in which this theoretical link can 
be further explored via the connection of political metaphor analyses to the framework of 
political style, as presented in this dissertation. 
 
9 Conclusion 
 
This chapter defines political style not as an opposite of political ideas but as encompassing 
these. Political ideas are inseparable from their materialization in language and social action 
because they are all circularly related; they generate each other. Hence, ideas are one aspect 
of the broader defined style of a politician. 
 Political style can be regarded as a three-dimensional political performance 
generating political meaning: in the ideational dimension (cognition, ideas), social dimension 
(social relations and action), and presentational dimension (communication and rhetoric). 
The three dimensions all have their own logic. For this reason, it is essential to study each 
dimension separately to get a full understanding of the meaning expressed by a politician’s 
political style.  
Populism, elitism, and pluralism are a useful set of labels for empirical research into 
political style in the current political context of Western democracies. The precisely oppose 
and complement each other, for which reason they can be used to characterize all occurring 
political styles, populist or mainstream. They make political styles comparable at an 
abstraction level higher than the political contexts themselves.  
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The “secret” to be unveiled through analysis is not the content hidden  
by the form but, on the contrary, 
the “secret” of this form itself.  
Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, p. 3.  
 
Abstract 
Up to date, the concept of political style is underdeveloped, obstructing a profound 
understanding of political performances. This paper disentangles the components of political 
style by analyzing the concept systematically. It is argued that political style has to be 
regarded as occurring in three dimensions: the presentational, social, and ideational. As an 
example, a style analysis of six speeches of US politicians Donald Trump, Bernie Sanders and 
Hillary Clinton is performed. The analysis shows Trump having a full populist style, Sanders a 
populist-pluralist style and Clinton an elitist-pluralist style. Comparison of the three 
individual style profiles gives a clarification for otherwise unexplained differences and 
similarities between the three politicians. 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Currently, in most modern Western democracies, classifications of politicians are 
problematic. For instance, in the United States, political opponents Donald Trump and 
Bernie Sanders both criticize the same political elite and agree on subjects such as trade and 
infrastructure. Similarly, in France, extreme right Marine le Pen and extreme left Jean-Luc 
Mélenchon both want to change French policy radically, proposing to leave the European 
Union. Similarities such as these are often explained as populist in contrast with normal or 
pragmatic politics (Canovan, 1999). These politicians would share a populist style, but at the 
same time differ in “full” ideology, because populism is not a full ideology itself, but a political 
style or “thin-centered ideology” (Mudde, 2004, p. 544). 
However, this definition of populism poses a contrast between ideology and political 
style that does not match the observation that ideologies today are not as clear-cut as they 
have seemed in the past, given the above-sketched similarities between left- and right-wing 
politicians. Based on theories on ideology and style, I suggest that style should not be seen as 
something apart from ideology, but as a modern, fragmented shape within which ideological 
thought is expressed. It is based more on common sense than on ideological theory (Van 
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Dijk, 1998, 2015), and can be seen as a tag-cloud of issues scattered over the (new) media. 
This cloud is the ideational dimension3 of political style. It is held together by the social and 
presentational dimension of political style: the former is used to connect with a group of 
voters sharing the same style; the latter aims at persuading people who do not share that 
style (yet). The three dimensions together form the political style of a politician. This 
redefinition of political style, splitting it up in a ideational, social and presentational part, is 
grounded on style theories from diverse disciplines (political science, political philosophy, 
rhetoric, sociology and sociolinguistics) (e.g., Ankersmit, 1996; Coupland, 2007; Giddens, 
1991; Hariman, 1995; Moffitt, 2016; Pels, 2003a). 
This chapter further examines the nature of political style. Regarding it as a loose 
collection of ideological meaning, this chapter adapts critical discourse studies (CDS), since 
this approach mainly focuses on revealing hidden ideological meaning in discourse. With the 
help of the discourse-historical approach to CDS (Reisigl & Wodak, 2015; Wodak, 2015), 
this chapter offers a set of tools for style analysis of political performances. These tools are 
based on theories of political performanc (Wodak, 2009), on ideological theory (Thompson, 
1990; Van Dijk, 1998, 2015), and Goffman’s (1956) theory on the presentation of the self in 
everyday life.  
Five core traits of political style are identified where politicians in modern Western 
democracies can be compared. Labels of three main styles are adopted from the historical 
context (elitism, pluralism, and populism) and defined with the help of political research (i.e., 
Bachrach, 1971, 1980; Best & Higley, 2010; Blokland, 2011; Dahl, 1971, 1956/2006; Lasswell 
et al., 1971; Mudde, 2004; Rooduijn, 2014). Using this method for speech analyses of 
candidates in the 2016 US primaries (Trump, Sanders, and Clinton) results in the disclosure 
of unique combinations of elitism, pluralism, and populism. These combinations form 
individual political style profiles, contributing to a better understanding of the performances 
of these three politicians. 
 
 
 
 
3  In the original article, ideological, group and communication style were used instead of ideational, social, 
and presentational dimension. To better align with the other chapters, the labels are adapted to the ones used in 
the rest of this dissertation. The adjustment of labels is motivated in Chapter 1, section 3.3. 
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2 Ideology Changing Form 
 
Due to media developments, the political environment has dramatically changed over recent 
decades. This has had a great impact on political style. According to Street (2003), today’s 
politicians can be compared to film stars: “Skills of performance are skills in self-
presentation, in style. Style matters to politics, just as it does to other cultural forms” (p. 
95). In today’s “audience democracy,” a politician is a media-expert, a person who excels in 
communication through the modern media. In this type of democracy, “a candidate (…) 
must not only define himself, but also his adversa-ries. He not only presents himself, he 
presents a difference” (Manin, 1997, p. 222).  
Considering the strong connection between mass communication and the emergence 
of ideologies, this new mediated environment changes the very core of ideology. In the late-
18th century, mass media was a condition for the rise of traditional ideologies4 (Gouldner, 
1976, pp. 91–117; Thompson, 1990, pp. 82–85). As the media was a print form, the newly 
formed ideologies were bound to written theory; not only was verbal logic required to form 
coherent arguments, the editors of newspapers and publishing houses belonged to an 
intellectual class that favored thoroughly deliberated theories. This changed in the second 
half of the 20th century when the dominant media shifted from printed to televised and 
online media. The newer media allow a looser assemblage of ideological content where 
images are as important as words. This assemblage does not need a profound coherence 
because its content is spread in fragments over television and the Internet. This ideological 
style is mostly based on what Van Dijk (1998, pp. 103–107) describes as “common sense”; 
socially shared representations, based on immediate experiences and on simplified scholarly 
knowledge, as communicated through mass media. Consequently, people no longer need to 
be educated to a level of ideological competence in order to judge politicians; they can judge 
them based on political style and taste (Pels, 2003a, p. 50). 
In sum, within the last few decades, communicated ideological meaning has changed 
from verbal long stories/theories into visual/auditory tag-clouds/styles. This does not mean that 
traditional ideologies are necessarily dead, but rather that they have a new strong 
 
4  The concept of ideology in this chapter is used in two senses; the traditional as a system of ideas  and 
the critical conception of “the interface between social structure and social cognition” (Van Dijk, 1998). When 
traditional ideologies are meant, this is mentioned in the context. 
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competitor in ideological style. It is still difficult to make sense of these new forms of 
communicated ideological meanings because people are used to looking for a coherent long 
story or theory. In order to see a new sort of coherence, ideological styles must be 
examined alongside traditional ideologies. 
One similarity between traditional ideologies and ideological style is that both can be 
defined as “the interface between social structure and social cognition” (Van Dijk, 1998, p. 
8). It means that it serves as the basis for shared representations of a group. Furthermore, 
according to Van Dijk, analysis of ideological meaning has to consider three levels: first, these 
representations consist of a cognitive frame in which issues are regarded (cognitive level); 
second, ideology is always shared by groups (social level); third, ideology is always expressed 
in language or non-verbal communication (presentational level). Applied to political style, it 
results in its definition as the stylized manner in which ideological thought is expressed in language 
and group behavior. To understand how ideological style is politically used, the concept needs 
to be regarded in the broader context of political style. 
 
3 Three Dimensions Within Political Style 
 
Long before the emergence of political ideologies, political styles were acknowled-ged. In 
classical Rome, Cicero (trans. 2012) distinguished two styles; the sober Attic style, based on 
ancient Greek rhetoric, and the bombastic Asiatic style developed in Roman cities in Asia 
Minor. The Attic style appeared more sincere because of a lack of rhetoric, while the 
abundance of rhetorical elements of the Asiatic orators was thought to be more powerful. 
Cicero preferred the Asiatic style in front of the people at the Forum. For a more educated 
audience at the Senate, he typically favored the sober Attic style. (Cicero, trans. 2012; 
Kennedy, 1999: 48–49). 
Traditionally, political style was merely a matter of persuasion. Following Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric, politicians had to adjust their performance according to their audience to be 
effective. For instance, a young audience demanded a different style than an older one, and 
educated listeners another style than those less literate (Aristotle, trans. 1984, Rhet. 1390 a 
25). 
Today, however, sociologists and sociolinguists might frame the two Roman styles as 
the styling of social identities or as self-identities adjusted to different lifestyle sectors (Coupland, 
2007; Giddens, 1991). Within modern sociological theories, identity is not unitary, fixed, and 
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stable but plural and co-constructed in interaction with people, things, and spaces. This 
identity building is a creative process in which people express both their social identity and 
their search for social roles (Coupland, 2007, pp. 106–108). 
Contemporary political scientists, on the other hand, frame political style as 
“aesthetic representation”; within the context of modern representative democracy (in 
contrast with Cicero’s direct democracy) political styles are regarded as creative fillings of 
the “aesthetic gap” between the representative and the represented. Because politicians can 
never be identical with the people they represent, they have to bridge the difference 
creatively, like a painter paints a portrait (Ankersmit, 1996, pp. 49–56; Pels, 2003a, p. 49). 
Ankersmit and Pels differentiate between a mimetic and an aesthetic approach to democracy; 
a mimetic approach denies the gap and is therefore at odds with the representative nature of 
democracy. In an aesthetic approach, politicians seek connection with a group of people 
through a shared style and taste, without suggesting being identical (Ankersmit, 1996, pp. 
49–56; Pels, 2003a, p. 49). 
Although the notion of the aesthetic gap is valuable and is for a large part in 
accordance with the notion of social style, there is one dissention: in social theory there is 
no such thing as a not-stylish (mimetic) approach: all social behavior, including politics, is 
inevitably stylish (Giddens, 1991, p. 81). In this regard, the mimetic approach can be seen as 
an anti-style, denying the existence of political styles, and just another way to fill the 
aesthetic gap. 
In this interpretation, I define political style as “a stylized political performance 
purposed to fill the ‘aesthetic referential gap’ with a political identity.” This identity is partly 
constructed through the expression of ideological thought, and partly through expressions 
reflecting the style of certain social groups, in order to connect with these groups. 
Additionally, political style is about persuading people who are different and do not think 
alike (yet). Therefore, political style comprises of three dimensions: 
 
1 ideational (the fragmented expression of ideological thought);  
2 social (the co-construction of identities in interaction with others); 
3 presentational (language use aimed at persuasion)5.  
 
5  There is a parallel between these three dimensions and the three meta-functions of human interaction, 
discerned by Halliday: the ideational, interpersonal, and textual functions. Not only has Halliday been influential 
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In practice, the three dimensions are blurred. Nevertheless, for analytical purpose a 
distinction is advantageous; it allows seeing that politicians creatively combine ideational 
elements with social and presentational aspects. For instance, many politicians with populist 
ideas choose a matching social style, expressing to be part of the people, but this is not 
mandatory. Pim Fortuyn, for instance, a well-known Dutch politician, mixed mainly a populist 
ideational style with a clear elite social style: driving a Daimler, wearing expensive Italian 
suits, and coquetting with his former title of Professor. This elite social image did not make 
him an elitist altogether, but it gave him a unique stylized political profile, that was 
ideationally, socially, and rhetorically attractive. It is a creative way to “fill the aesthetic gap”, 
and a solution to the problem that all modern populist politicians face – having to be 
“ordinary and extra-ordinary at the same time” (cf. Moffitt, 2016, p. 55). 
This example entails that for the analysis of political style, style labels are needed that 
encompass the social, ideational, and rhetorical/presentational dimension. Existing political 
style labels either refer to rhetoric, using classical concepts such as logos, ethos and pathos 
in combination with modern rhetorical theory (as in Chapter 7 of this dissertation, and; 
Charteris-Black, 2009), or to social styles, such as the four styles of Hariman (1995). 
Although Hariman’s realist, courtly, republican, and bureaucratic styles do refer to political 
surroundings (such as classical Rome, African autocracy, and European contemporary 
bureaucracy), they do not refer to different styles within the political context of the analyzed 
performances. This makes labels circular, as De Haan argued (2000, p. 238); they allow no 
further conclusions than that there are personal (read social) differences in style. Such labels 
will not enhance insight into the political context; they can even obstruct it. Ankersmit 
proposed to use political style labels borrowed from painting or music styles, however, 
these labels also lack a link with the political context (Ankersmit, 2000, 2003; De Haan, 
2000). 
For insight into the political context, political style labels are needed. One known style 
label referring to the political context is the populist style, but it is unclear which other styles 
it relates to. Mudde (2004) compares populism with pluralism and elitism, while Moffitt (2016) 
opposes it to the technocratic style, a style combining expert knowledge with good manners 
and a belief in progress. Canovan, on the other hand, opposes populism to a pragmatic style 
 
for CDS (Halliday & Mathiessen, 2004; Wodak, 2001; Wodak & Meyer, 2015); the three dimensions and the 
three meta-functions both trace back to the same three tensions in discourse mentioned in Chapter 2. 
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favoring practical solutions over visionary beliefs (1999). To decide which labels apply, it is 
needed to develop the political and ideological style concept further. 
 
4 Political Style and the Theatre Concept 
 
Thus far, political style has not been analyzed systematically. The theater concept can be of 
help here because it is a common metaphor for politics and social behavior and has 
facilitated the way people think of both (cf. Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Earlier, De Haan (2000, 
pp. 246–248) pointed at the usefulness of the theatre to comprehend political style, as it 
expresses its aesthetic and interactive character. Recently Moffitt (2016, p. 49) used the 
theatre to explain the performative character of populism as political style. 
Traditionally the theatre concept has been used by rhetorical scholars for centuries, 
visible in concepts such as decorum with remarks on tone and gesture (Hariman, 1995, p. 
180; Kennedy, 1999, p. 110). Since the 19th century, political observers also used the theater 
metaphor to express the theatrical character of revolutionary political situations (Fitzgerald, 
2015). During the second half of the 20th century, political theorists adopted the metaphor 
to stress the mediated character of politics. Television evoked the image of politics as a 
broadcast show that voters at home could follow more directly than ever (Edelman, 1988; 
Green, 2010; Manin, 1997). An objection to the theater concept is that the metaphor would 
depict politics as an “elite play” in which the audience can only passively watch. However, 
this underestimates the active role of the audience/spectators; according to Green, a “gaze” 
includes a judgment. According to Edelman this judgment is crucial for the acceptance of an 
issue as a political problem or not (Edelman, 1988, p. 32; Fitzgerald, 2015; Green, 2010, pp. 
128–129). 
Besides for politics, the theatre metaphor is used for social life, most notably by 
Goffman (1956). In his theory on the presentation of the self in everyday life, all people 
perform a play in their interactions, and most of the plays are standardized so that observers 
can easily understand a situation (Goffman, 1956, p. 16). Wodak (2009) elaborated further 
on Goffman’s theory, focusing on political situations. Like Goffman, Wodak discerns a 
frontstage and a backstage: at the frontstage, the political performance takes place before an 
audience. This frontstage requires a setting, for instance parliament or a television broadcast, 
and a personal front. This personal front has two aspects: appearance and manner. Appearance 
refers to items that reflect the social status, and manner to the way actors conduct 
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themselves (Wodak, 2009, pp. 9–10). Although Wodak does not use the words “political 
style,” personal front clearly equals political style as it refers to politicians’ appearances (a 
dress-code, the entourage of a politician, his car etc.) as well as to their manner (the way 
they speak, what they say, whom they are friendly with and whom not, etc.). Where Wodak 
focuses on the backstage (Wodak, 2009, pp. 23, 36, 56), this chapter concentrates on the 
frontstage to define the traits political performances consists of, by comparing frontstage 
elements such as stage, play and audience with elements of a political performance. 
When applied to modern representative democracies, the picture is as follows: in the 
political theatre, actors (politicians) perform a play called democracy. The set is the location 
of a speech or debate: in parliament, on television, etc. The stage represents socio-historical 
context: the country, available technology, and historical events. The roles of the actors 
differ: being a parliamentarian or part of the government. Because the democratic play does 
not allow just one director (this would be an autocracy), all politicians are their own 
director, more or less co-directed by their party. The script is offered by traditional 
ideologies, but actors can also choose to improvise their performance or use multiple scripts 
of different ideologies. 
Without mandatory scripts or directions, all actors produce their own performance. 
This is their political style. The stage, being the socio-political context, alters in time, and 
accordingly the audience changes and uses different technology. Because the play resembles 
a television contest, the audience endorses or declines the actors during the play, calling 
them to leave or to adjust their appearance. Also, the theatre (politics as a whole) and the 
play (democracy) are under constant critique, or the gaze of the audience. Media has the 
role of super-audience; because they control the spotlights, they draw the attention to one 
actor or another, and because they have the loudest voice, they also impact public opinion. 
 
5 Defining Core Traits of Political Style 
 
The political theatre as sketched above offers insight into the elements constituting political 
style if these elements are linked to the frontstage characteristics defined by Goffmann 
(1956). Furthermore, four context levels must be reckoned with (Reisigl & Wodak, 2015, p. 
93). Table 3.1 shows these context levels in relation to Goffmanns’ front stage elements, 
along with those of the political theatre. 
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In Goffmanns’ terminology, political style, involving manner and appearance, consists of 
elements 1-4 from Table 3.1: speech; non-verbal communication; dress-code and other 
entourage elements, and; political role. The former two elements concern the text level 
while the latter two mostly belong to the social variables and institutional frames. This 
means that political style can be described through observation of Element 1-4. By 
comparing these descriptions with social styles from the historical context, the style in the 
social dimension can be revealed. To apprehend the rhetorical/presentational dimension of  
 
a Note: Context levels: 1 = text level; 2 = discourse /intertextual level; 3 = social variables and 
institutional frames; 4 = social-political history. 
 
 
Table 3.1 Analysis of the frontstage of politics related to Goffmanns (1956) and Reisigl and 
Wodaks (2015) definitions. 
 
 Theatre 
metaphor: 
Politics: Goffmann: 
frontstage = 
setting + 
personal front  
Wodak’s  
contexts 
levels a 
 Performance Political style = 
rhetorical/presentational + social + 
ideational  
Personal front = 
manner + 
appearance 
1, 2, 3 and 4 
1 Lines  The speeches that are uttered Manner  1 
2 The acting 
itself 
Non-verbal communication, 
movements, gestures etc. 
Manner 1  
3 Props and 
costumes 
Dress-code (formal or informal), 
entourage (i.e. security) etc. 
Appearance 1, 3 
4 Roles Member of parliament or 
government; opposition or coalition; 
Candidate in elections or not, etc. 
Appearance 3 
5 The theatre Politics Setting 2, 3 
6 The play  Democracy, consisting of multiple 
acts, such as: a parliamentary debate, 
elections, governing, canvassing etc. 
Setting   2, 3 
7 The actors Politicians Setting 2, 3 
8 The audience  The people / voters, the media 
(super-audience) 
Setting  2, 3 
9 The set  Institutional surroundings / location: 
parliament, government, party 
gathering, television broadcast etc. 
Setting  2, 3 
10 The stage The socio-historical context: the 
country, occurring crises and 
historical events, available 
technology 
Setting 2, 4 
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political style, language use (Element 1) can be analyzed with help of rhetorical theory. Lastly, 
to define the ideational dimension of political style, the four style elements have to be 
interpreted in relation to ideological differences. 
Traditionally, the socio-historical context (Element 10, the stage) was the focus of 
political researchers to define the differences between politicians on ideological issues. 
However, politicians can also differ in the style in which they frame the context: they can 
look at it as being in crisis or as under control. In the same manner, politicians can 
differentiate themselves on other elements of the political setting (Element 5-10), because all 
these components possess a discourse component besides their extra-linguistic/institutional 
nature. For instance, Element 5 Politics, obviously has an institutional side (an institutional rule 
is, for instance, the prohibition of physical fights), but within this institutional frame some 
politicians see politics as cooperation, while others see politics as conflict. This 
differentiation is possible on all mentioned elements (5-10 in Table 3.1). Even Element 9, 
Location, is for some a respected institution, and for others a fake parliament. 
So, besides the traditional ideological differences on political issues, politicians can 
deliberately make an ideological difference to other aspects of a political performance. A 
political style analysis should therefore look at elements 5-10 in Table 3.1, forming the core 
traits of political style: Politics, Democracy, People, Politicians and the Context. Because location 
is very context-specific and directly connected with other traits, it is integrated in the other 
traits. 
So far, this chapter has discussed three levels and five core traits of political style but 
is not useful as an analysis instrument yet. These traits and levels have to be combined with 
labels derived from the political context, encompassing the three dimensions. Before picking 
any label from an abundance of seemingly applicable isms, the maximal ideological differences 
on the five traits should be logically subtracted. This deductive approach guarantees that the 
right labels are selected to most accurately match ideological style. Logically the largest 
possible ideological differences are: 
People:   the people are good vs. bad;  
Politicians:  politicians are good vs. bad;  
Politics:  politics as conflict vs. cooperation;  
Democracy:  people’s self-governance vs. people electing others to govern; 
Context:  the historical context is in crisis vs. under control. 
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Earlier in this paper, populist, elitist, pluralist, technocratic and pragmatic styles were mentioned 
as existing political style labels. Relating these labels to the five style traits reveals whether 
these styles are apt to use for political style or not. 
Comparing known descriptions of populism with the five traits indisputably positions 
populism at one extreme end of all traits: populists see: (1) the people as good, (2) 
politicians as bad, (3) democracy as people’s self-government, (4) politics as conflict and (5) 
the historical context as in crisis (Akkerman, Mudde, & Zaslove, 2014; Hawkins, Riding, & 
Mudde, 2012; Moffitt, 2016; Rooduijn, 2014). So evidently populism settles as political style. 
Furthermore, comparing the five style traits with the technocratic style (Moffitt, 2016, 
p. 46), suggests that the latter only refers to the, context-dependent,  social dimension of 
political style – one of the three components of political style. The technocratic style 
associates itself directly with a social group of experts, while its features only partly, and 
more indirectly, refer to the ideational and presentational style traits. As a social style, it is 
better to oppose the technocratic style to a popular (social) style, rather than to a populist 
(political) style.  
The same applies for the pragmatic style of Canovan (1999): it associates itself 
primarily with a social group of hands-on entrepreneurs and solution seekers, while in the 
ideational dimension only resembling the political style traits of politics and context. As a 
social style, it is better to oppose this style to a visionary style, rather than to a populist 
(political) style, which is broader. 
Elitism and pluralism, both described by Mudde (2004, pp. 543–544) as oppositions to 
populism, directly refer to all five traits. Theoretical descriptions of elitism situate it at the 
other end of the ideological style scale, opposite to populism (Akkerman et al., 2014; 
Bachrach, 1971, 1980; Lasswell et al., 1971; Mackie, 2009; Mudde, 2004; Schumpeter, 2008). 
Descriptions of pluralism show that pluralism positions itself exactly on the middle of the 
scale on the five traits (Blokland, 2011; Dahl, 1956/2006). This means that populism, 
pluralism, and elitism settle as political styles, as demonstrated in Table 3.2. 
I suggest with populism, pluralism, and elitism, the basic scale of political styles being 
set; elitism and populism holding the end positions and pluralism occupying the middle. 
However, both populism and elitism are not exclusively practiced within generally accepted 
democratic boundaries (Moffitt, 2016, p. 140) – undemocratic forms of elitism and populism 
form the real ends of the scale as extreme elitism and extreme populism. Additionally, two 
mixed forms of populism-pluralism and elitism-pluralism can be inserted to keep the scale 
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balanced and get a better view of the differences between pluralist styles. Questions might 
rise because the scale levels a mixed elitist-populist score into an average pluralist score. 
This is accurately so, because a mixed elitist/populist score inevitably means that the 
politician is a pluralist, albeit performing in a stylized manner6. 
With a seven-points style scale (varying from extreme populism to extreme elitism), five 
style traits (the people, politicians, democracy, politics, and the context), and three dimensions 
(ideational, social, and presentational) the structure of the analysis tool is ready. It consists of 
five rubrics on three levels, describing five styles on each trait7. Based on this structure, a 
computer-based analysis instrument for the detection of political style elements in speeches 
is developed: the PEP-index, named after the initials of populism, elitism, and pluralism. In the 
following section, I give examples of an analysis using the PEP-index. 
 
 
Table 3.2 Populism, pluralism, and elitism compared on five core traits. 
 
 
6  In Chapter 4, the mixed populist-elitist style has been further scrutinized. This resulted in the creation 
of a separate category for mixed populism-elitism and an adaptation of the instrument. For the speech analyses 
in this chapter, this has only minor consequences, as the analyzed styles do not fall within the mixed populism-
elitism category. 
7  The complete rubrics are available at the Open Science Framework: 
https://osf.io/hdy8p/?view_only=de188c65ce144b39a37a158505ac59fb 
Ideological 
style / traits 
populism pluralism elitism 
1 The 
people 
The people are one and 
good/capable 
(exclusion of others) 
The people are multiple 
groups with different 
interests (inclusion) 
The people are one and 
bad/ignorant 
(exclusion of the people) 
2 Politicians Politicians are incapable 
and corrupt 
(exclusion of politicians) 
Politicians are, like all 
people, likely to do good 
but also likely to abuse 
power (inclusion) 
Politicians are proficient 
and good 
(exclusion of the people) 
3 
Democracy 
Democracy is self-
government of the 
people 
(power to the people) 
Democracy is majority 
rule, respecting minority 
rights 
(power to no one) 
Democracy is electing an 
elite government 
(power to the elite) 
4 Politics Conflict Negotiation (conflict as 
well as cooperation) 
Cooperation 
5 Political 
Context 
Negative: focus on what 
is lost (crisis) 
Factual: focus on facts 
(alert) 
Positive: focus on what has 
been reached (at ease) 
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6 Political Style of Trump, Sanders, and Clinton 
 
The PEP-index is used for speech analysis of US politicians Bernie Sanders, Donald Trump 
and Hillary Clinton encompassing two speeches each from the primaries in April 2016. The 
complete analysis is too long to include8; however, one trait (the people) is discussed in 
more detail while the other traits are only examined in relation to the general results. The 
analysis was focused on the whole video performance. Partly captioned video recordings of 
the speeches were retrieved from the Internet and transcribed (Speeches 3 to 8 in Appendix 
A). To define the style,  
speech fragments were compared with the five rubrics of style traits, of which Rubric 1 (The 
people) is displayed in Table 3.3. Meaningful fragments (sentences or short paragraphs) were 
labeled with codes, referring to elements of the rubrics. For  
instance, the code [1P/PO] refers to a populist score at the presentational level [P]  
of style trait 1 (The people, see Table 3.3). 
Although the PEP-index allows a quantitative approach, the performed analysis was 
restricted to qualitative inquiry. For each style element, fragments were selected, studied, 
and compared to reveal the overall style of each particular style element. Only speech 
fragments adding new information were included; for instance, as soon as it was clear that a 
politician spoke with the voice of the people [1P/PO], the focus was no longer on this 
feature, but on fragments that would suggest other styles on Element 1P. If two different 
styles were detected on one element, an estimation of the quantity was taken into 
consideration. To be confident that this approach was sufficient, a quantitative analysis has 
been performed of one complete speech. Because this analysis resulted in the same style 
score as the restricted qualitative search, the rest of the speeches have been analyzed based 
on the latter approach.  
 
8  The complete analyses are available at the Open Science Framework: 
https://osf.io/sq6cm/?view_only=3bf4bf232af44320b28d99fb491dc557 
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Table 3.3 Rubric of the political style-element The people. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The 
People 
[1] 
Ideational level [1I] Social level [1S] Presentational level 
[1P] 
Extreme 
Elitism 
[XEL] 
The elite are superior; 
the people are inferior.  
Discrimination and/or 
violence towards the 
people. The elite have 
special benefits. 
Verbal threats or incrimi-
nation of the people. 
Justification of criminal 
behavior of the elite.  
 
Elitism 
[EL] 
The people are a 
homogenous group > 
exclusion of the in-
group: The in-group is 
ignorant and tends to 
make poor choices. The 
out-group (the elite) 
knows what is right. 
Elitists have a distance from 
the people; they are not a 
part of the people. 
Identification with an (elite) 
out-group, who knows 
what is right. (Exclusive, not 
everybody belongs to the 
people.) 
 
The people are referred to as 
“them”. Elitists say what they 
think is good for the people. 
They speak to or over the 
people with arrogance; the 
people do not understand 
politics. 
 
Pluralism 
[PL] 
The people are a 
heterogeneous group > 
inclusion. The people 
consist of different 
groups that unite if 
interests coincide and 
compete if interests 
collide.  
 
Pluralists identify with a 
part of the people. They 
know their own group and 
communicate with other 
groups. (Inclusive: 
everybody belongs to the 
people). 
The people are referred to as 
“me,” “you” and “we” in the 
sense of working together, 
not being the same. Pluralists 
speak as part of one group to 
other groups. They speak 
with the people. 
Populism 
[PO] 
The people are a 
homogenous group > 
exclusion of the out-
group. The in-group are 
the real people; they are 
good and know what is 
right. 
Populists identify with the 
people; the populist is “one 
of us” and knows what is 
right “for us.” Distance 
from the out-group, who is 
unfair and/or do not know 
what is right. (Exclusive) 
 
The people are referred to as 
“we” in the sense of populists 
being the voice of the people, 
saying what the people think, 
in the language of the people. 
The out-group is “them.” 
Extreme 
Populism 
[XPO] 
The people are 
superior; out-group(s) 
are inferior people. 
Segregation from and 
discrimination of out-
groups. Deportation/ 
exclusion of out-groups 
from the country. 
 
Justification of discrimination 
and deportation. Accusing of 
the out-group of lying. 
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6.1 Donald Trump. 
 
On the ideational level of the people Trump shows a mixed style with pluralist, populist and 
extreme populist elements, resulting in an average populist style score. A populist element is, 
for instance, the expression that a president does not need to have special skills: “I mean, 
who is not qualified. Everybody is qualified. We are all qualified, right?” (8, 25:50). This quote 
is populist because it suggests that the people are capable of self-governance.  
An extreme populist style is visible in this quote: “By the way, we have the smartest 
and most loyal people, are in these rooms. The Trump-people are the smartest and they are 
by far the most loyal” (8, 38:05). This is extreme populist because it states that the people 
are superior, better people than the out-group. Furthermore, Trump sometimes tends 
towards pluralism: his notion of “the Trump-people” in the above quote displays 
consciousness of various groups of people. This is also visible in the following quote:  
 
But we have a tremendously divided country; white and black and everything, we 
have young and old. Everybody is at odds. There is tremendous division, because 
Obama is a tremendous divider. He divides, and he has done nothing for African-
American people. (8, 43:25) 
 
The quote is marked as mixed pluralist-populist, because it shows that eventually Trump 
thinks of the people as conceptually one (populist) because the corrupt elite is responsible 
for dividing the people. 
On social level Trump acts as a populist, in Pennsylvania relaying that he is one of us: “I 
went to school in Pennsylvania, I guess I am a product of Pennsylvania, I love Pennsylvania” 
(8, 7:40). In New York he states that he has New York values and is a typical New Yorker 
(7, 20:12). Trump admits that he used to be a part of the political elite, but now he is one 
with the people. He literally says he is “a worker, and you are workers too” (7, 11:59) and 
that he is not with “the bosses” anymore (7, 53:45). Clearly, “the bosses” do not belong to 
the people, but Trump does. In addition to these populist utterances, Trump’s extreme 
populism is apparent when he dispels an anti-Trump supporter from his rally (7, 7:57- 9:47). 
The total score for this element, however, is marked as populist because Trump defended 
himself with his first amendment rights, suggesting that he wants to stay within democratic 
lawful boundaries. Furthermore, he does not ban the press here; he stirs the people against 
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them, but that is a matter of rhetoric or presentation; on social level his overall style 
towards the people is populist. 
On a presentational level Trump scores extreme populist. He is a plain populist speaking 
in the voice of the people: “And it is ‘we,’ I am the messenger, and I am a good messenger - 
but I am just the messenger. It is about YOU” (7, 23:08). However, he is extreme populist 
when he stirs the people against out-groups (migrants, the media, other politicians) and 
accuses them of lies and terroristic activities: “The dishonest press, world's most dishonest 
people. They cover it wrong all the time” (7, 50:28), and:   
 
And then you have people coming from the migration; thousands and thousands of 
people are coming here, nobody even knows where they’re going, they put them all 
over the country. Nobody knows. Are they ISIS?  It could be the great Trojan horse. 
Nobody knows. We'll build a wall, don’t worry about it. We will build a wall, it is 
gonna get built. (7, 6:00)  
 
On average Trump scores populist on three levels of the style trait the people. 
 
6.2 Hillary Clinton. 
 
On the ideational level, Clinton expresses the pluralist vision that society consists of different 
groups, who work together because they have common interests: “I am focused on the 
issues that really matter to everybody. To some an issue or two might be more important 
than others, but if you look at them all, they are interlocking and intersectional” (6, 
22:58/34.73).  
On social level Clinton shows being in contact with a lot of people. Sometimes she is 
pluralist, saying that she and the people are “partners” in politics: “I will work my heart out 
for the people here in Northeastern Pennsylvania. I will be a good partner because we have 
work to do” (5, 14:05). Sometimes she displays that she is just a normal person, when she 
speaks of “we” going to the supermarket (populist), but also involved with her black and 
Latino friends (pluralist): 
 
There is no woman’s discount when we go to check out at the supermarket counter. 
I have been shopping a long time, and I have never been looked at by a cashier and 
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said, ok you are a white woman. You only have to pay $0.78. Or my friends, you are 
a black woman, you are a Latino woman, you do not have to pay the full freight. (5, 
27:28)  
 
When she expresses that she is one of us, this is not always convincing on social level 
because she appears far too busy to really socially be one with the people: 
 
I stopped in Scranton on my way here. I always feel so much at home. I stopped at 
Casa Bella restaurant. But I was running late so my planned dinner was kind of 
abbreviated, but I said hello to a lot of people there, and I met people who said things 
to me like, I knew your cousins. I knew your uncles. I had one man say; didn’t we sled 
down Court Street one winter? I said, could have been. Could have been. I was 
there. (6, 12:10)  
 
Because of her presentation as a busy politician, her style on social level is pluralist-elitist and 
not pluralist-populist, as it would have been if she had shown taking more time for people.  
On a presentational level, Clinton’s style is sometimes populist (as shown above), but 
most often pluralist, leading to a mixed populist-pluralist style. She sometimes refers to the 
people as “you” and herself as “I,” sometimes as “we” in the sense that she works together 
with the people: 
 
You sent me to the Senate. We worked together. We dealt with the horrors of 9/11 
together. We worked to bring opportunities to inner-city areas and upstate rural 
areas and it was the greatest honor of my life to represent you in the Senate and I 
want you to know that New York had my back and I always tried to have your back 
and I will again if I am so fortunate enough to be elected your president. (5, 22:00)  
 
On the three levels together, Clinton shows an average pluralist style.  
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6.3 Bernie Sanders. 
 
On the ideational level, Sanders has a mixed populist-pluralist style. He is populist because he 
states that the people, not the elite, know what is right. They have to think outside the 
boxes, because these boxes represent the status quo of the elite. This contains an 
opposition of an in- and an out-group, of the people as a unity against the elite (politicians, 
corporate America, Wall Street and media):  
 
Here is my point. The major crisis we face, are not that crises themselves, it is the 
belief told us every single day by the establishment, by the media, by Congress, you 
cannot make change. This is the status quo, the way it is, and the way it always will 
be. It does not matter what you believe -- and that is what this campaign is 
challenging. (4, 1:00:23)  
 
However, the people also consist of different groups, with different interests, 
potentially resulting in tensions, but with common interests they can work together 
(pluralist):  
 
What this campaign is about, is the understanding that when we stand together, black, and 
white, and Latino and Asian American, and Native American. When we do not allow the 
Donald Trumps of the world to divide us up, there is nothing we cannot accomplish. (3, 
1:17:00)  
Noteworthy is that Sanders (like Trump) points at his opponent as the cause of the 
division: it means that the people are conceptually unified after all. However, because 
Sanders sees the strength of the people in their diversity, it is still a pluralist notion of a 
united people rather than the people as one body:  
 
And if we do not allow the Donald Trumps of the worlds to divide us up, if we 
understand that our strength is in our diversity, and if we stand together, and if we 
demand a government that represents all of us, and not just the 1%, when we stand 
together, there is nothing that we cannot accomplish. (4, 1:05:04)  
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On social level, Sanders is also mixed populist-pluralist. He is populist presenting his family as 
a prototype of the American family, identical with “millions and millions of families all over 
this country” (3, 1:44:00). He often refers to people as “our brothers and sisters” (3, 1:49:39 
- 1:53:42), indicating that he sees the people as one big family (populist), albeit a very diverse 
family (pluralist). 
On a presentational level, Sanders’ style is mixed pluralist-populist. He often says that 
“we” or “this campaign” are listening to many groups of people (pluralist): 
 
We are listening to brothers and sisters in the African-American community (...) This 
campaign is listening to our brothers and sisters in the Latino community. (...) This 
campaign is listening to people whose voice is almost never heard, and that is the 
people in the Native-American community.  (...)This campaign is listening to young 
people. (3, 1:49:39 - 1:53:42)  
 
At the same time he often directly tells what the people know and feel, and in doing so he is 
a populist voice of the people: “You are tired and I am tired of seeing those videos on TV of 
unarmed people being shot by police officers.” (3, 2:04:30) 
He also lets the public say what he thinks (apparently the public already knows what 
he is going to say). This shows that he is one with the people: “What people say, they say 
‘Hey Bernie, you’re thinking too biiiig’ (accent). Your ideas are just, just ... [crowd yelling 
‘Huuuuge’] (Sanders laughting) yes, your ideas are too Huuuuuuge ... I don’t think so” (3, 
1:57;30). 
On average, Sanders has a mixed populist-pluralist style on the people. 
 
6.4 Conclusions of the Analysis. 
 
The overall results of the analysis are displayed in Figure 3.1, including the other four 
political style traits, not elaborated on here. The figure shows that Trump’s style can be 
characterized as populist, Sanders’ style as mixed populist-pluralist and Clinton’s as mixed 
elitist-pluralist. Looking at their styles in more detail contributes in many ways to a better 
understanding of the political situation, of which I mention two. 
First, Trump and Sanders share a populist profile, however, on four of five traits they 
differ in sub-categories. They only come close in their conception of politics: both see politics 
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as conflict. Yet, there is another similarity: they both blame their political opponent for 
dividing the people (Trump blames Obama and Sanders blames Trump). This can explain why 
they both aroused strong feelings amongst their followers; they both instilled the belief that 
their followers were the only ones seeing it right. This is more powerful than the pluralist 
standpoint that different groups always have different interests, or the elitist position that 
the people do not really understand politics anyway. 
Second, looking closer at the difference between Clinton and Sanders shows that, 
despite both being Democrats, their style difference is larger than that between Sanders and 
Trump. They differ most in their conception of politics: one seeing it as conflict, the other 
seeing it as working together. Only on one trait (the people) Clinton scores not as an elitist. 
However, the question is whether the audience believes Clinton’s bond with the people, 
because although she presents herself as one of us on presentational level, her performance 
on social level tells that she is far too busy for that. This inconsistency can be an explanation 
for the media describing her appearance often as unauthentic. 
 
Figure 3.1 Political style in total and on five traits separately, of three candidates in the US 
primaries, April 2016. 
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7 Conclusion and Discussion 
 
This chapter defines political style as “a stylized political performance purposed to fill the 
‘aesthetic referential gap’ with a political identity”. Political identities are complex because 
they are assembled through expressions in three dimensions: the social dimension (the co-
construction of identities in interaction with others), the ideational dimension (the 
fragmented expression of ideological thought) and the presentational dimension 
(presentation through language and other means). 
Through conceptual analysis with help of the theatre metaphor, five traits of politcial style 
are defined: the people, politicians, democracy, politics, and the context. Comparing differences 
on these traits with existing style labels, shows that populism, pluralism and elitism position 
themselves on all five traits and three dimensions, to form a balanced scale upon which 
political style can be measured.  
Although the performed analyses in this chapter explain important parts of the 
performances of Trump, Sanders and Clinton, to get a more complete picture political style 
analysis can be complemented with analysis of rhetorical and social styles. Rhetorical styles 
can be defined using classical rhetorical theory complemented with modern metaphor 
theory, as applied by Charteris-Black (2011, 2014) and in Chapter 7. This way the link 
between rhetorical and political styles can be studied further, in the same manner Hariman 
(1995) linked rhetorical features to his four political (social) styles, or as in Chapter 8 of this 
dissertation. 
Furthermore, to compare political style with context dependent social styles, labels 
can be abstracted from social contexts. For instance, Moffitt’s technocratic style, Canovan’s 
pragmatic style, and the earlier mentioned elite style, or notions such as a globalist vs. a localist 
style can be used to develop a more elaborate range of social styles. As said, the number of 
social styles can vary endlessly, but it would be interesting to see how context related social 
styles link to the more abstract political styles of politicians. 
Although the performed analysis of US presidential candidates only shows two mixed 
style forms (populism-pluralism and pluralism-elitism), it does not deny the existence of the 
third combination; elitism-populism. Returning to Pim Fortuyn; although he is generally seen as 
a populist, he sometimes used a mixed populist-elitist style: “In my campaign not only politics 
get a whipping, I also come down hard on the citizen. Worthless politicians but also 
worthless citizens” (as cited in Pels, 2003a, p. 52). Fortuyn is not the only one using a mixed 
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populist-elitist style; it reminds of a traditional Dutch social style: the Calvinistic reverend9 
dooming the people as well as politicians for not listening to God. It is for instance the style 
of Reverend Zandt in 1946, a parliamentarian for the Dutch Reformed Party (SGP): 
“Currently the word ‘progressive’ is very popular amongst the masses of the people. It is 
music in the ear of many voters. It is the syrup that is used to catch the voters like masses of 
flies” (Speech 21, p. 68).10 This quote is taken from a longitudinal investigation into 
ideological and rhetorical style changes in Dutch politics, for which the PEP-Index is originally 
developed. Although this research is still in progress, first analyses show that the PEP-index 
is useful in both the US and in the Netherlands, and therefore probably in other modern 
representative democracies as well. This suggests that the instrument is suitable for national 
and international comparison of styles over a longer range of time, as well as for more 
detailed analysis presented in this chapter; further research has yet to show if this is the 
case. 
While this approach assembles theories from different disciplines, the guidelines 
offered by Critical Discourse Studies made it possible to avoid eclectic failures such as 
mixing up seemingly similar concepts (i.e. Weiss & Wodak, 2003). A considerate 
interdisciplinary approach not only introduces new and insightful perspectives to the political 
realm, it also provides an awareness of the multivalence of concepts such as ideology and 
style.  
It might be argued that populism, elitism, and pluralism cannot be split up into 
sections which allow the styles to be mixed; it is the specific combination of features that 
makes them what they are. Nevertheless, as politics is an art, as suggested by political and 
rhetorical theorists (i.e. Ankersmit, 1996; Hariman, 1995; Pels, 2003a)) mixing styles is to be 
seen as a creative act. Political actors artistically combine theatre costumes of different 
styles; choosing a populist hat with an elitist gown and pluralist shoes. This sectional view on 
style provides more meaning than pure, unalterable labels of populism, elitism, and pluralism, 
 
9  Not to be mixed up with the (context dependent) style of American Reverends, like Martin Luther 
King’s, which is a completely different social political style. 
10  Original Dutch: “Dit woord ‘vooruitstrevend’ is thans bij de groote massa zeer in trek. Het streelt het 
oor van menigen kiezer. Het is de stroop, waarmede men de kiezers als vliegen bij menigten vangt.” Translation 
by author. 
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mostly because politicians seldom see themselves as elitist or populist, but they might admit 
that they have populist or elitist traits.  
In this chapter, this approach shows its value through the comprehensive view of the 
separate style traits and the possibility to compare politicians on such a detailed level. It 
helps to identify precisely which traits a particular style consists of. This is essential to know, 
because when it comes to performing on the political stage, it is often the smaller, cursory 
stylistic detail that makes the difference. 
 
4  
Probing into Populism’s Core 
An Analysis of the Deep Semio-linguistic 
Structure of Populism  
This chapter is a minor revision of: Schoor, C. (2020). Probing into populism’s core: An analysis of the 
deep semio-linguistic structure of populism. Critical Discourse Studies. DOI: 
10.1080/17405904.2020.1769698. Parts of this chapter have been presented at the conference: Logics, 
Critical Explanation, and the Future of Critical Political Theory: Applying Discourse Analysis in Multiple Contexts, 
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…listen to my simile, and you’ll 
appreciate all the more how  
greedy for images I am.  
Plato, The Republic, VI, 487e. 
 
Abstract 
In this chapter, I returned to Aristotle’s original definition of metaphor in order to set up a 
framework for the analysis of political metaphors with a focus on rhetorical style. Style is 
significant, because using a political metaphor is performing a political speech-act, and an 
important purpose of that speech-act, besides persuasion, is establishing a political identity 
and style. I first designated the exact position of Aristotle’s theory within conceptual 
metaphor theory, in order to avoid a lack of coherence between classical and conceptual 
metaphor theory. In the combination of the two theories, I was able to define three styles of 
purposeful political use of metaphor: a ratio-based, an emotion-based, and a strategy-based 
usage of (conceptual) metaphor. Examples of the three metaphor types show how they can 
be identified in political discourse. The framework can be helpful in further political analysis 
to assess what the role of rhetorical/presentational style is in political processes. 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The repetition of “I have a dream” in Martin Luther King’s famous speech; Margaret 
Thatcher’s turning of the negatively-intended nickname “Iron Lady” into something to be 
proud of; Barack Obama’s allusions to the American Dream: these examples all show that 
political persuasion is not a matter of conceptual metaphor or metaphorical thought alone. 
Most often, metaphors are used in combination with other rhetorical strategies such as 
repetition, inversion or hyperbole, which makes it necessary to combine conceptual 
metaphor analysis with classical rhetoric, as has been argued by Jonathan Charteris-Black 
(2005, p. 29, 2009, pp. 99–100).  
The need to look further than the conceptual level of metaphor in discourse was also 
expressed by Gerard Steen when he proposed to acknowledge three dimensions of 
metaphor: he argued that besides the conceptual and language dimension, the 
communicational dimension should be taken into account. A metaphor used for special 
communication purposes is different from a metaphor that is unintentionally used. According 
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to Steen, this would “reinstate the traditional distinction between metaphor as a tool for 
rhetoric versus metaphor as a tool for more general concerns of language and thoughts” 
(Steen, 2008, p. 238). 
So rhetoric is back in metaphor theory, but the application of classical rhetoric in 
combination with conceptual metaphor analysis is not evident, as during the last few decades 
many scholars have emphasized the contradiction between conceptual metaphor theory and 
the classical view on metaphor. Although this contradiction has been revealed as a 
misreading of Aristotle (see section 3), the supposed inaccuracy of classical metaphor theory 
is still in the air, and at the very least the two theories suffer from a lack of coherence. 
For example, in his analysis of political speeches, Charteris-Black uses all the classical 
definitions of rhetoric except that of metaphor. In a list of classical rhetorical tropes, the 
description of metaphor is tacitly replaced by a new one, which is clearly inspired by modern 
notions on metaphor (2014, p. 46). This may very well serve its analytical purpose, but it also 
raises questions such as: if Aristotle’s conception of metaphor is a fallacy, then why should 
his other rhetorical concepts be correct? Or, conversely, if Aristotle’s metaphor concept is 
not a fallacy, then why replace it? Most probably, Aristotle’s description of a metaphor just 
gives an answer to a different question than the questions modern metaphor theorists are 
concerned with. Changing the frame in which the concept of metaphor is placed also means 
changing the questions that are answered, so it might be meaningful to see what question it 
is that Aristotle’s description of a metaphor gives an answer to. 
In this chapter, I will return to Aristotle’s original definition of metaphor. To avoid 
inconsistency, I will first designate the exact position of this definition within conceptual 
metaphor theory and see where the two theories meet. At their meeting point, three kinds 
of rhetorical purpose of metaphor will be distinguished: a reason-based, an emotion-based, 
and a strategy-based persuasive purpose. Focussing further on the political use of metaphor, 
this framework is more useful than previous frameworks because it offers a determination of 
rhetorical style. Style is important, because using a political metaphor is performing a 
political speech-act, and — besides persuasion — an important purpose of that speech-act is 
establishing a political identity and style. For example, a politician can choose to use highly 
provocative metaphors or very sophisticated ones, with the aim of establishing different 
political identities and addressing different opponents and/or supporters. This chapter 
acknowledges three rhetorical political styles, based on what is (for the public) the main 
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obvious use of a political metaphor. This distinction is important for further political analysis, 
to assess what the role of rhetorical style is in political processes. 
 
2 Rhetoric and the Debate on Metaphor in Discourse 
 
For a long time, classical rhetoric was absent from the academic discussion on metaphor. 
Since the 1980s, many researchers have considered metaphor first and foremost as a 
conceptual process, traces of which could be found in language (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). 
Steen has recently argued that metaphor is also a matter of language and communication 
(2008) and accordingly proposed a threefold distinction of metaphor usage: metaphor in 
thought, metaphor in language, and metaphor in communication. To distinguish a metaphor 
in language and thought from a metaphor in communication, Steen proposed to look at the 
deliberate or non-deliberate use of a metaphor. When a metaphor was produced 
deliberately and/or conceived as a deliberate metaphor, there would be a special 
communication function. When it was used non-deliberately, it would be mere language and 
thought. 
In response to Steen, Raymond Gibbs stated that the distinction between metaphor 
in thought, language, and communication is indeed important, but that deliberate metaphors 
are not as deliberate as they seem and do therefore not essentially differ from other 
metaphorical language use (Gibbs, Jr., 2011). Another reaction came from Charteris-Black, 
who stated that the notion of “deliberateness” focuses too much on the intentions of the 
sender of the message, which is an uncertain area to enter; a researcher can never know for 
sure what the intentions of the sender are and even the sender himself may not be fully 
aware of his intentions at the moment of speaking (Charteris-Black, 2012). In the case of 
persuasive language, Charteris-Black proposed the term “purposeful” instead of “deliberate,” 
as this would characterize persuasive language as a “speech-act” (performing an action by 
speaking, Austin, 1962), and focus on the whole action of persuasion. For persuasive texts at 
least, this would be a better term, since persuasive language is always uttered with a purpose 
or a plan, with an effect on the audience in mind. Even when the purpose was not 
deliberately intended, it would still be purposeful language if the effect was persuasive 
(Charteris-Black, 2012, p. 17). 
Charteris-Black does not differentiate between political language and other 
persuasive language. Nevertheless, the purpose of a political speech-act differs from other 
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persuasive speech-acts; besides a persuasive purpose, there is also the purpose of 
establishing a political identity. With the choice of language, a politician takes a position 
within the political field, chooses his political friends and opponents, and establishes power 
(Martin, 2013, p. 10). So, politicians rarely if ever aim at persuasion alone; they have to make 
enemies as well as friends, as they want to represent a group of people, and these people 
need to be able to identify themselves with a politician. This makes politics, in essence, a 
creative activity, affected by style and taste (Ankersmit, 1996, p. 54). What is persuasive for 
one section of the public can be extremely repulsive for another. 
To define this rhetorical political style, Aristotle is an interesting source, since he was 
concerned with the difference between the emotional rhetorical style of the Sophists and 
the more rational rhetorical style he himself endorsed. His distinction between three means 
of persuasion — logos (the plain argument), ethos (the character of the speaker) and pathos 
(the emotional appeal on the audience) (Aristotle, trans. 1984, Rhet 1377b21)— offers a 
good starting point for an analysis of style, as different use of these means distinguished a 
Sophistic style from a deliberative style. However, the link between these three notions and 
conceptual metaphor is not very clear. So first, these classical notions need to be integrated 
into modern metaphor theory. 
 
3 Aristotle’s View of Metaphor: Not a Fallacy After All 
 
The role of Aristotle in modern metaphor theory has mainly been the part of the father of 
metaphor, which, due to new insights, is now considered out-of-date. At least this is the way 
in which George Lakoff and Mark Johnson referred to Aristotle in the afterword of their 
highly influential Metaphors We Live By, writing: “There are four major historical barriers to 
understanding the nature of metaphorical thought and its profundity, and these amount to 
four false views of metaphor. In the Western tradition, they all go back at least as far as 
Aristotle” (2003, p. 244). Likewise, other important conceptual metaphor theorists such as 
Andrew Ortony (1993, p. 3) and Zoltán Kövecses (2002, p. viii) have disassociated 
themselves from Aristotle, as did — much earlier — I.A. Richards and Max Black, the 
founders of the interaction theory on metaphor in which metaphor is treated as active 
language use (Black, 1954, p. 284; Richards, 1936, p. 89).  
This out-of-date stamp, however, has been more a matter of framing than anything 
else. During the last few decades, academics have convincingly shown that the supposed 
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fallacies of Aristotle are based on misreading, and that ancient and modern metaphor 
theories are not opposed, but rather in many ways complementary (Eco, 1983; Kirby, 1997; 
Mahon, 1999; Nussbaum & Putnam, 1992; Ricoeur, 2003). New interpretations of the 
Rhetoric and the Poetics support the insight that their traditional interpretation has been 
narrowed during the centuries. In fact, Aristotle did recognize the abundant use of metaphor 
in normal language, but the focus of the Rhetoric and the Poetics is restricted to the rhetorical 
and poetic production of metaphor. While these specific uses also involve cognitive 
processes such as learning and the creation of new meaning (Eco, 1983; Mahon, 1999; 
Ricoeur, 2003), there is more to learn about Aristotle’s ideas on metaphor in normal 
language and thought in other works. By comparing Aristotle’s ideas on language (in On 
Interpretation) with the passages Aristotle wrote on metaphor, John Kirby made it plausible 
to argue that Aristotle endorsed what now would be called a “semiotic view on metaphor,” 
which would clearly assign a cognitive function to the phenomenon (Kirby, 1997, p. 535). 
Furthermore, Martha Nussbaum and Hillary Putnam (1992) showed by examining On the Soul 
that Aristotle’s so-called “separation of body and mind” is based on a misreading as well. 
This separation forms the essence of a supposed fundamental difference between modern 
and classical metaphor theory, but Nussbaum and Putnam (1992) show that Aristotle was 
not so much concerned with the question of the body-mind relation, but rather with the 
question of identity: what makes a tree a tree and a human a human, even if they change 
forms. It is only in relation to this question that Aristotle puts form above matter, mind 
above body (for example, in stating that the soul is what distinguishes a living human being 
from a corpse), not in any other. Apart from this, Aristotle’s view on the soul is in fact very 
bodily: “The soul is not an ‘it’ housed in a body, but a functional structure in and of matter” 
(1992, l. 941). Additionally, Nussbaum (1996) shows that (bodily) emotions have an 
important cognitive function in Aristotle’s work: they become a way of “knowing” that 
something is important or true (Nussbaum, 1996, p. 309). So, the modern idea of bodily 
thought fits quite well within Aristotle’s ideas after all. 
Of course, there is a substantial distance between Aristotle and modern metaphor 
theory, but the above readings of Aristotle’s ideas on language, thought, and metaphor justify 
the conclusion that there is no major contradiction between classical and modern views of 
metaphor. The two are concerned with different aspects of the phenomenon, but that does 
not make them incompatible. To fully appreciate Aristotle’s view on metaphor, however, it 
is important to understand Aristotle’s work as an answer to questions that were urgent in 
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400 BC. Since there is no such thing as a timeless idea, as the philosopher Quentin Skinner 
(1969) has argued, the modern reader has to be careful, as the theory should be understood 
in the context of ancient Greece. 
 
4 Aristotle’s Metaphor as an Answer to Flattery and Deceit 
 
An important clue to Aristotle’s vision of metaphor can be discerned when he states in the 
Rhetoric that metaphors are abundantly used “by everybody in conversation” 
(Rhet1404b35)27: it shows that Aristotle differentiates between multiple dimensions of 
metaphor usage, and it is the purpose for which a metaphor is used that makes the 
difference. If the purpose is normal conversation, everybody is capable of producing 
metaphors. But when it comes to a rhetorical purpose, “metaphors must be drawn from 
things that are related to the original thing, and yet not obviously so related — just as in 
philosophy also, an acute mind will perceive resemblances even in things far apart” 
(Rhet1412a10-12). To see similarities in things that are different, a mind of the same caliber 
as a philosopher is required, with insight into logical relations and the capability of making 
syllogisms (a strict form of logical thinking). For sure, this is a different requirement than for 
the production of metaphors in conversation, of which everybody is capable. Metaphors 
used poetically or rhetorically demand a thoughtful mind, and although the two uses have 
much in common (c.f. Rhet1404b28), they differ substantially in purpose. Where the purpose 
in the Poetics is defined as “catharsis” (the purification and purgation of emotions), in the 
Rhetoric the purpose is “an action-guiding decision” (c.f. Oksenberg Rorty, 1996, p. 21). 
Aristotle did not consider every rhetorical use of metaphors to be positive. This was 
a reaction to a rhetorical practice in ancient Greece in which rhetoric was purely used as a 
weapon in debate, and was thought to have overwhelming power (e.g., Ricoeur, 2003, p. 10). 
Aristotle rejected this kind of rhetorical practice, and tried to distinguish real persuasion 
from the sophistic practice of flattery, threat, and deceit. Since rhetoric was used in 
assemblies and courts, there was, according to Aristotle, no scientific proof needed of the 
truth, as in science; because politics had to do with the future, one could never be certain of 
the truth. However, it was possible to discover the best possible solution through 
 
27  If not mentioned otherwise, references to Aristotle are to the revised Oxford translation (Aristotle, 
trans. 1984). 
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deliberation. Rhetoric should therefore lead to the most reasonable and probable decision. 
Because of this reasonable fundament, there is (unlike in later rhetorical theory) an 
important linkage of rhetoric with logic (Oksenberg Rorty, 1996, p. 1,8; Ricoeur, 2003, p. 
10). It is significant here that the first sentence of the Rhetoric states that it is the counterpart 
of Dialectic (Aristotle’s logical treatises) (Rhet1354a1). Also, the definition of metaphor in the 
Poetics (of which the latter part is omitted in most citations) should be understood in this 
light. It shows clearly the subordination of metaphor to Aristotle’s logical categories: 
“Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else; the 
transference either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to 
species, or on ground of analogy” (Poet1457b7-9). 
So, rhetoric should result in real persuasion based on philosophy and logic, and not 
on sophistic flattery and deceit. Aristotle saw different means to guarantee this. The first one 
is that logos—the plain argument—must be the leading principle. Certainly, also emotions 
(pathos) and the character of the speaker (ethos) are important, but only in order to help the 
audience to be persuaded of the reasonable and probable (e.g. Carey, 1996, p. 399). It is only 
because the audience is affected by other means than the logos that Aristotle needs the 
rhetorical means of ethos and pathos (Rhet1404a). Nevertheless, a rhetorician should always 
ensure that there is valid reasoning behind an emotional figure when he chooses to use it; 
otherwise it would not be genuine persuasion but deceit. 
Unfortunately, logos cannot always be trusted. Reasoning and arguments, as well as 
emotions, can be fallacious. Arguments should be based on real “enthymemes” (the 
rhetorical shorter variant of a syllogism, the procedure for logical thought), but sometimes 
they are not (Rhet1400b34). This happens, for instance, when something is presented as a 
cause when it is not, or when what counts for the parts is presented as counting for the 
whole as well, which is not necessarily true (Rhet1401a24-b30). This kind of deceit can only 
be revealed by genuine reasoning and logic. 
In short, in the frame of a reasonable rhetoric, as opposed to a sophistic and 
manipulative one, it makes sense that the use of metaphor was restricted to a rational use. 
This restriction did not mean that Aristotle thought that this was the only way a metaphor 
could be produced. On the contrary; sophistic rhetoric was full of wrong emotional 
metaphors, and that is why these restrictions were necessary. 
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5 Aristotle’s Metaphor in Relation to Imagination and Thought 
 
To understand the function of metaphor in Aristotle’s work better, it is helpful to look at his 
concept of phantasia (imagination). Although the production of good (i.e. rational) rhetorical 
metaphors was primarily and necessarily a rational process, the appreciation of the 
metaphor by the audience had much to do with phantasia, and this had to be anticipated 
during the production of the metaphor (Oksenberg Rorty, 1996, p. 23). 
Looking more closely at the concept of phantasia or imagination in On the soul (434a6-7), 
Aristotle distinguished two types of imagination: there is “sensitive imagination” which is 
present in all animals, and “calculative imagination”28 which only animals that are calculative 
possess, i.e. humans (c.f. Frede, 1992; Oksenberg Rorty, 1996, p. 19). Where sensitive 
imagination refers to unconscious imaginative thought as in dreams or when drunk, 
calculative imagination involves some sort of rational activity resulting in a strategy, such as 
the combination of images and a goal. For example, when you speak of “a golden dawn” it 
makes you want to get out of bed early. Although the sensitive type of imagination also 
contains a desire, it is more instinctive, like appetite or lust (Oksenberg Rorty, 1996, pp. 19–
23) and involves no calculative strategy. 
So, the production of metaphor had to anticipate the fact that the audience 
comprehends the metaphor in an imaginative, emotional way. A rhetorician could expect to 
evoke one of two types of imagination in the audience: either sensitive or calculative, both of 
which could be false or good. Not all emotions were considered to be right, and neither 
were all calculations. Only philosophy and genuine reasoning could assess whether the 
evoked emotion would lead to a good decision and action. It was nevertheless always 
uncertain whether the audience was actually going to experience the anticipated emotion; 
this would depend on the belief of the audience that the metaphor was telling the truth. 
According to Aristotle, images do not automatically come with emotions, as the emotions 
come from the belief that the image is (or could be) real (Nussbaum, 1996, p. 208); watching 
a movie with a murderer in it is not really frightening, only the belief that this murderer is 
 
28  Although the Oxford edition (1984) uses the translation ‘deliberative imagination’ I prefer Oksenberg 
Rortie’s translation as ‘calculative imagination’ (1996, p. 20). In Aristotle’s writings on deliberation, the word 
‘deliberative’ is often used with the meaning of ‘reasonable’ and ‘non-sophistic’. This has nothing to do with 
calculative imagination and using the term here would therefore be confusing. 
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actually somewhere in your house is. This would mean that only persuasive images (that are 
believed to be true) would come with emotions. In this light, it is clear that an orator should 
conceal his calculative strategy: if the public knew that there was a rhetorical strategy behind 
an apparent spontaneous speech, this would diminish the belief in the truth and the 
persuasive power of metaphor. In a similar way, the strategia (the military leadership in 
ancient Greece) used metaphors to sell their military plans to the people (Rhet1411a), but 
they never revealed their exact military strategy. This had to stay concealed in order to be 
effective. 
 
6 Where Aristotle Meets Conceptual Metaphor Analysis 
 
How does this all relate to conceptual metaphor analysis? In order to draw an accurate 
picture, I will start with Lakoff’s most recent description of conceptual metaphor (2008). He 
describes it as the simultaneous activation of two neural circuits in the brain. These neural 
circuits (also known as mental spaces) become connected with each other through 
simultaneous activation: “what fires together, wires together.” The result is a “blended 
mental space” where two or more concepts are directly linked through neural binding, and 
as a result a metaphorical, embodied meaning is created. For example, when a child gets a 
warning that fire is dangerous, in their mind the two concepts become linked, along with the 
feeling that they experience. The next time the child hears the word fire, they will 
automatically also think of danger and feel anxiety. This metaphor concept is represented in 
Figure 7.1, in the circle labeled CMT (Conceptual Metaphor Theory), situated in the upper 
rectangle that represents thought. 
Although Aristotle did not of course speak of neural circuits and embodied thought, 
his idea of phantasia (imagination) resembles very much the concept of a mental space. 
Aristotle calls it “a motion that does not happen without sense-perception but comes to be 
as the result of the activity of sense-perception” (428b11-15, trans. Frede, 1992, l. 4334). 
This means that phantasia is an action or a process, like a mental space in conceptual 
metaphor theory. It establishes the connection between the intellect and its sensible objects 
(c.f. Frede, 1992, l. 4424), and, most importantly, “without phantasia there can be no 
thought” (427b16, trans. Frede, 1992, l. 4321). In the figure, imagination is therefore placed 
next to the CMT-blended space in the domain of thought. Since Aristotle acknowledges two 
different types of imagination, it follows that there should be also two different types of 
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mental space and, consequently, two types of conceptual metaphor: a sensitive type and a 
calculative type. This is also portrayed in Figure 7.1. 
The division between sensitive and calculative imagination calls to mind the 
distinction between metaphors in the discussion on deliberate or purposeful use of 
metaphor referred to earlier (c.f. Charteris-Black, 2012; Gibbs, Jr., 2011; Steen, 2008). The 
sensitive type resembles non-purposeful or non-deliberate metaphor, as there is a direct 
referral to the senses without any deliberate or purposeful calculation, as in dreams or when 
drunk. Besides, sensitive imagination encompasses non-metaphorical concepts, as do mental 
spaces (Lakoff, 2008, p. 30). The calculative type of imagination resembles purposeful 
conceptual metaphors; it requires a calculated combination of imaginations and a rational 
activity, such as the combination of two images, which results in a purposeful goal or desire, 
a calculated strategy. Where sensitive imagination results in un-purposeful metaphors in 
language (left lower rectangle), calculative imagination results in purposeful communication 
(right lower rectangle).  
As shown in the figure, there are different types of purposeful metaphor, such as 
poetical and rhetorical metaphors. When it comes to rhetorical metaphors, Aristotle 
approved only one subtype: the metaphor that is subservient to rational judgment (the right 
lower circle), in contrast with sophistic metaphors in which emotion is unrestricted (the left 
lower circle). To assess this, the blended space (in thought) has to be expanded with an extra 
dimension: deliberation. Deliberation evaluates the imagination according to rational 
standards and judges whether there is a rational argument that supports its desire or plan. In 
Figure 7.1, deliberation and rational thought are also placed in the domain of thought. The 
arrow that starts here indicates the impact of rational thought on calculative imagination and 
metaphor. Since sensitive imagination also has impact on calculative imagination, there is 
another arrow going from sensitive imagination (with its un-purposeful metaphors) to 
calculative imagination (with its purposeful metaphors).  
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Figure 7.1 Where Aristotle meets Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT). 
 
Aristotle would strongly disapprove of the kind of metaphors in which sensitive imagination 
is foremost, as he did with other Sophistic language. In today’s political philosophy this 
normative aspect of Aristotle is disputed. Not only public reason must have its part in 
democracy, but also partiality, passion and even prejudice, for which rhetoric would offer 
room (Fontana, Nederman, & Remer, 2004; Garsten, 2006). Still, the question as to whether 
the metaphor has a rationale stays relevant in the context of political style. As mentioned 
before, politics is determined by the taste and style of politicians, in which voters can 
recognize themselves — or not (c.f. Ankersmit, 1996). A deliberative style, which was 
supported by Aristotle, would address a different public than a more sophistic style. In this 
context it would be preferable to replace the value-loaded terms that Aristotle used 
(deliberative vs. sophistic) with more neutral equivalents, such as reason-based vs. emotion-
based metaphor. 
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7 Application in Political Metaphor Analysis 
 
Now that I have outlined where classical and modern metaphor theories meet, I will use this 
meeting point for a combined application of the two theories in political metaphor analysis. 
In doing this, I have to consider the fact that it was not Aristotle’s purpose to describe all 
possible usages of metaphors: he only wrote extensively about metaphor in which the logos 
(the rational argumentation) was foremost because that was the metaphor type he wanted 
to teach to his students. More indirectly he wrote about metaphors in which the pathos (the 
emotional persuasion) is predominant, in the slipstream of his attack on Sophistic language. 
However, there is a third type of metaphor that Aristotle implied; the metaphor in which 
the ethos is privileged.  
Ethos is described as affirming trust in the sender, and along with text elements that 
depict the sender of a political message as a wise or good person, this purpose is directly 
linked with rhetorical communication itself; a rhetorical strategy has to be concealed to be 
effective. A sender would not seem reliable if it were obvious that he had a purposeful 
rhetorical strategy and the strategic purpose should therefore stay unmentioned and 
invisible — like the military strategies mentioned earlier. To cover-up the strategic purpose, 
people are led to believe that there is an emotional or rational purpose for the persuasion in 
question. However, this does not mean that there are no strategic metaphors besides the 
ones that show the trustworthiness of the speaker. Concealment is only needed with your 
own strategic communication purpose, while revelation of the strategic purpose of your 
opponent (or the suggestion of a strategic purpose) is the best way to torpedo that strategy. 
Summarized (as portrayed in Figure 7.2), it is possible to distinguish three types of 
purposeful political metaphors: reason-based, strategy-based and emotion-based. Although 
all metaphors will to some extent serve all three purposes, there is in most metaphors one 
purpose most visible to the public. The upper part of the figure shows the three domains of 
thought that Aristotle distinguished: sensitive imagination, calculative imagination, and 
rational judgment (upper ovals in the figure). Calculative imagination can lead to purposeful 
political metaphor (middle oval), but is influenced by both sensitive imagination (in which 
emotions are leading), and by argumentation (in which reason is leading). If emotions 
(pathos) are the main visible purpose in the political metaphor, it can be characterized as an 
emotion-based political metaphor; if deliberation (logos) is the most noticeable purpose, it is 
a reason-based political metaphor; and if revealing or concealing of strategy (ethos) is the 
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predominant purpose to the public, it is a strategy-based political metaphor (lower circles). 
With these three styles, the link between conceptual metaphor and Aristotle’s means of 
persuasion (logos, ethos, and pathos) becomes clear (see Figure 7.2). I will illustrate this with 
some examples.  
First, however, it is important to clarify that there are two levels concerned here, 
which might be confusing: the level of purposeful use of conceptual metaphors and the level 
of the classical rhetorical figures. In the latter, a metaphor exists along with figures such as 
allusions, similes, metonyms, and so on. Where classical rhetoric makes a clear distinction 
between these figures of speech, on the conceptual level a metaphor is much more broadly 
defined; something is a metaphor if it expresses a metaphorical relation between two 
cognitive domains, if there is a sort of “analogical thinking” (c.f. Dedre Gentner, Bowdle, 
Wolff, & Boronat, 2001, pp. 199–200, 243). Although CMT does make a distinction between 
metaphor and metonymy, this distinction is at the most a relative matter, as metonymy is 
often the base of a conceptual metaphor (Dirven, 2002). Generally spoken, a conceptual 
metaphor can take the form of a classical metaphor, but also the form of a metonymy, a 
simile, an allusion, or another figure of speech. All these classical figures can therefore also 
be characterized as purposeful metaphors (either emotion-, strategy- or reason-based), but 
only if they express an analogical thought.  
Figure 7.2 Three purposes for political metaphor. 
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7.1 Emotion-based metaphor. 
 
A good example of an emotion-based metaphor can be found in the allusion (a figure of 
speech in which there is an evocation of another context) to the Kristallnacht for the 
window-breaking by members of the Occupy movement. This allusion provoked a fierce 
debate in the US media at the beginning of 2014. It started with a letter by Tom Perkins 
published in The Wall Street Journal, in which he “would call attention to the parallels of Nazi 
Germany to its war on its ‘one percent,’ namely its Jews, to the progressive war on the 
American one percent, namely the ‘rich’” (Perkins, 2014). The conceptual metaphor behind 
this simile is PROGRESSIVES ARE NAZIS. This is an emotion-based purposeful metaphor and it is 
primarily meant as an expression of Tom Perkins’ feeling of being threatened, as Perkins 
explained later when he made an apology on Bloomberg television: 
 
I used the word because during the occupy of San Francisco by the Occupy Wall 
Street Crowd, they broke the windows in the Wells Fargo Bank, they marched up to 
our automobile strip on Van Ness Avenue and broke all the windows on all the 
luxury car dealerships, and I saw that, I remembered that, the police just stood by 
frozen, and I thought, well, this is how Kristallnacht began, so that word was in my 
mind. (Kopan, 2014) 
 
That Perkins made an apology for this comparison shows that he had to admit it did not 
hold against rational refutation, as pointed out in The Economist: “Nazis wanted to 
exterminate Jews and progressives want the richest Americans to pay slightly more taxes 
than they are paying now. That may be a good or a bad idea, but it is not genocide” (Night of 
broken metaphors, 2014). Although there are apparent similarities, such as broken windows 
and violence against a minority, these ostensible parallels do not justify other parts of the 
analogy. Therefore, the major part of the public assessed this conceptual metaphor not as 
reason-based (the argumentation behind it is not probable but rather highly controversial) 
but primarily emotion-based. Normally the debate about this kind of emotion-based use of 
metaphor stays focussed on the question of whether the analogy is appropriate or not. The 
focus on the three metaphor types makes it possible to see beyond this level and look at 
other purposes: besides the rational purpose of making a reasonable comparison, which did 
not turn out so well, the metaphor is a purposeful expression of an emotion, as Mr. Perkins 
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genuinely felt threatened. Furthermore, it is important to be aware that there are also 
strategic purposes involved. To get an insight into these strategic purposes, it is necessary to 
consider the context; in this case, it is meaningful that Mr. Perkins has a direct interest in the 
political debate on raising taxes for the rich, as he turns out to be a billionaire himself. 
 
7.2 Strategy-based metaphor. 
 
A good example of a strategy-based metaphor comes from the Dutch populist Geert 
Wilders, who has complained that EU-politicians “fill their pockets with high salaries and 
perks” (Wilders, 2012). The metaphor is a literal translation of a Dutch proverb, in which 
pocket filling means that someone is taking money in an illegitimate way (the proper 
translation would be lining their own pockets). The image is clear: a pocket is a private 
container, filled with money, in the same way that a bank account is often depicted as a 
container. In other words: Wilders suggests that other politicians are not involved in 
European politics for the greater good, but for their own gain, and that the EU only exists 
for the benefit of the politicians themselves. In this way, he does not need to combat the 
arguments of his opponents, he simply dismisses their strategy, and at the same time he is 
making his main political point that the EU integration project should be terminated. So in 
this example, the strategic metaphor enhances Wilders’ strategic political purpose. There 
are also emotional and rational aspects to this metaphor, as it rouses the emotions against 
the politicians in question and it is underpinned by salary figures.  
 
7.3 Reason-based metaphor. 
 
An example of a reason-based metaphor is present in a comparison made in The New York 
Times, in an article on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s policy of basing his economy on oil 
and gas income: “The Stone Age didn’t end because we ran out of stones. It ended because 
we invented bronze tools, which were more productive” (Friedman, 2014). The analogy on 
which this comparison was based showed that Putin was betting on the wrong horse in 
basing the Russian economy mainly on the export of oil and gas. Recent developments in 
renewable energy are remarkable, and it is to be expected that solar and wind energy will 
soon become not only better for the environment, but more efficient than hydrocarbon 
energy sources as well. The purpose of this comparison is – at least partly – rational 
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persuasion, as it tries to explain a complicated economic subject in a compelling way. 
Although the analogy is not valid in all respects (for example, the invention of bronze 
implements was not motivated by the threat of a future lack of stones), it is still justified 
because it is proportional and explains clearly the argument at stake. But, notwithstanding its 
rational character, there is also an emotional and strategic purpose, as Putin is framed as 
being stuck in the Stone Age. For a broader perspective on this, again the context must be 
considered, in this case Friedman’s background. If he had ties with Ukraine or was a 
stakeholder in competing oilfields, he would have a strategic interest in evoking negative 
emotions towards Putin. But since Friedman is a Pulitzer Prize-winning independent 
journalist, and seems not to have a direct interest in the matter, his trustworthiness is 
strong and the visible strategic purpose of this metaphor is relatively small. Russian readers, 
on the other hand, might say that he does have an interest here, because the newspaper in 
which he was published is American and therefore against Putin, which would make the 
persuasive basis as a whole less convincing for the Russian reader. 
 
7.4 Interaction between purposes and metaphors. 
 
These examples illustrate that the three purposes of metaphors are in direct interaction 
with each other. There are a few remarks to be made here. First, the purposes are not 
mutually exclusive. For example, a strong rational purpose does not imply that the emotional 
purpose is automatically weak. For instance, in this quote: “Putin’s legitimacy depends on 
keeping Russia and the world addicted to oil and gas” (Friedman, 2014). The underlying 
conceptual metaphor OIL USE IS ADDICTION contains a strong emotional value — an addiction 
is bad and can even be fatal — but here, most of the audience will assess it as a reason-based 
metaphor because it is broadly accepted as true that we cannot do without oil despite the 
fact that it is bad for the environment. Nevertheless, this does not make the word addiction 
less emotional. Additionally, the use of the word keeping depicts Putin as a drug dealer, 
which reveals that the metaphor also has a strong emotional purpose with regard to Putin; 
as the drug-dealing element is an addition to the metaphor of being addicted, it is not 
subservient to the rational purpose. So, the two different purposes may influence each 
other, but they are not interdependent. 
Secondly, an analyst should be aware of the history of a metaphor. For example, the 
OIL-AGE IS STONE-AGE metaphor had been coined long before Friedman employed it, by other 
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senders and for other purposes. Sheikh Zaki Yamani, the Saudi oil minister during the Arab 
oil boycott of the United States, had already used it in the seventies and it has been picked 
up by others since then. Knowing the background of this sender enhances the rational 
persuasive power of the metaphor; if there is one person who has no strategic interest at all 
in an end to the Oil age, it is the Saudi oil minister, so, the reasoning is, he must have had 
other (in this case rational) purposes in using this metaphor (c.f. “The end of the oil age,” 
2003). So, metaphor purposes are closely connected to the context and to earlier use of the 
metaphor. In the analysis of an isolated political speech, it is almost never possible to give 
consideration to these contextual influences. It is therefore important to analyze political 
utterances in a wider political context.  
As shown in the examples, it is possible to distinguish the purposes that are behind 
the use of a political metaphor by examining the text within its context, paying attention to 
conceptual metaphor, rhetorical figures, and the wider political context. Furthermore, it is 
possible to distinguish the rhetorical style of a politician by analyzing a number of their texts: 
if most of the metaphors they employ are subservient to rational argument and are used to 
make an argument more vivid, a politician deploys a rational rhetorical style; if most 
metaphors give full space to the expression of an emotion, even if there is a conflict with the 
rational argument, an emotional style is dominant; and, if metaphors are primarily used for 
the concealment of the political strategy of the speaker or the revelation of the strategy of 
the opponent, a politician is said to have a strategic rhetorical style. This distinction is 
important for further political analysis, to assess what the role of rhetorical style is in 
political processes. 
 
8 Contribution to Discussion 
 
Since this chapter was focused on metaphor usage for building a political identity and style, it 
does not cover all political metaphor purposes. Other purposes, such as winning elections, 
seeking political endorsement for a position, or calling people to action, are not considered; 
however, it would be possible to examine whether the rhetorical style of the same politician 
stays constant or alters when their political purposes change.  
In this chapter, conceptual metaphor analysis is extended with the aspect of 
deliberation or rational judgment. This extension validates the central place of deliberation in 
politics and would be justified for this reason alone. A counterargument would be that 
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according to CMT there is no such thing as pure rational deliberation, since conceptual 
metaphors play their part everywhere in language and thought. According to Lakoff, 
persuasion takes place at the unconscious, metaphorical level (Lakoff, 2004, p. 17). But this is 
not a black and white issue. Accepting the notion that all language and thought are loaded 
with values and emotions does not mean that the rational part of a metaphor cannot make 
any difference. It is still possible that, although an exclusively rational thought does not exist, 
one utterance is more rational than another and that this has a persuasive effect. Rational 
arguments work together with emotional language in the ingenious interplay that constitutes 
persuasion. 
Another new element in this chapter is the distinction between emotion-based, 
reason-based, and strategy-based purposeful metaphors. This triad is directly linked with 
Aristotle’s pathos, logos, and ethos, which offers the advantage of a coherent combination of 
modern and classical metaphor theory. Furthermore, the triad sheds new light on some 
assumptions in former metaphor research; for example, the assumption that the presence of 
more metaphors in a text would automatically mean that this text is also more subjective 
(e.g., Postma, 2011, p. 36). The distinction of the three types of rhetorical metaphor shows 
that this is not necessarily true, as a reason-based metaphor is in principle as objective as a 
rational argument (although the reason-based metaphor is likely more emotional than the 
argument, but that is a different matter). To really see if a text is more subjective, additional 
analysis would be needed; only more emotion-based metaphors would indicate that a text is 
more subjective, since there is no rational inter-subjective argument behind this type of 
metaphor. 
This chapter shows furthermore that the purpose of metaphors is too tied up with 
the context to be understood separately from it. This context encompasses both time 
(earlier use) and political arena (reaction at the political situation) and both should be taken 
into account in political metaphor analysis. Although it will not be easy to reveal strategic 
purposes of a sender, which, as has been shown, are by nature concealed, it is not 
impossible; it is not necessary to look into the senders’ head, as the purposes should be 
somewhere in the political discourse (c.f. Charteris-Black, 2012, p. 4). However, automated 
computer-led data analyses are not suitable for this kind of metaphor research, since they 
cannot reckon with the context. As a helping hand, search engines such as Google can be 
effective, for example in the detection of prior uses of a metaphor. Also large data corpora 
which allow access to the transcripts of political debates, are interesting research sources. 
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However, although computers can be helpful, in the end it always comes down to the 
analytical skill of the analyst.  
 
9 Conclusion 
 
The return to Aristotle’s questions has been illuminating in the discussion on purposeful 
metaphor. Aristotle offers a useful perspective on purposeful rhetorical style, as he was 
primarily concerned with the question of the difference between rational and emotional 
persuasion, between Sophistic and deliberative use of language. His theory, combined with 
conceptual metaphor theory, has led in this chapter to the distinction between emotion-
based, strategy-based, and reason-based purposeful metaphors. This division is vital for 
political metaphor analysis, as it gives an insight into the underlying purposes of a metaphor 
as well as the role metaphors play in politics. In addition, it offers a way to determine the 
rhetorical style of politicians by analyzing the metaphors they use, which is important for the 
further clarification of political processes. And finally, perhaps not the principal goal of this 
chapter but nevertheless noteworthy; this chapter restores to Aristotle the credit he 
deserves; that of the father of metaphor who is — like most fathers — maybe a bit old-
fashioned, but definitely not out-of-date. 
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For the politician should resemble the man  
who, as we have often seen in Africa, 
seated on a huge and unsightly elephant,  
can guide and rule the monster,  
and turn him whichever way he likes  
by a mere sign, without any violence.  
Cicero, De Re Publica, book II. 
  
Abstract 
This chapter presents a comparative metaphor analysis of three politicians’ speeches with a 
different political style, in order to clarify differences in the metaphors by relating them to 
the political style of the speeches. The speeches are selected from a set of US, UK, and 
Dutch political speeches, and have already been analyzed in terms of populism, elitism, 
pluralism, or a mix of these (see Chapters 5 and 6). The three selected speeches typically 
express one style in full; populist – Geert Wilders (NL); elitist – Boris Johnson (UK); and 
pluralist – Barack Obama (US). The analysis focuses on metaphors connected with key 
concepts of political style, such as the people,’ the (political) elite, government, and politics. 
Besides thematic differences – for instance, the war-metaphor is applied differently in the 
populist speech – the analysis shows a different accent in the main purpose of the 
metaphors. 
 
1 Introduction 
 
From Aristotle to conceptual metaphor theory, the consensus is that metaphor impacts 
substantially on political communication (e.g., Aristotle, trans. 1984; Charteris-Black, 2011; 
Musolff, 2017). As populism is on the rise as a global phenomenon (e.g., Norris & Inglehart, 
2019), and is often characterized as a political style (Canovan, 2002; Moffitt, 2016), the 
question arises how metaphors contribute to a populist political style. Do populist politicians 
employ metaphors differently from non-populist politicians? If so, does this have rhetorical 
advances, or are there other reasons for a populist usage of metaphor? For instance, 
populism is often associated with emotional politics, which might be reflected in the purpose 
with which metaphors are employed.  
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These questions can be explored by comparing the metaphors used in speeches of populist 
politicians with metaphors of politicians who are not considered populists. This chapter 
presents such an analysis on the limited scale of three speeches. An in-depth analysis of one 
populist, one elitist, and one pluralist speech demonstrates how these three political styles 
are expressed in different metaphors. Subsequently, by comparing the metaphors used in the 
three speeches for the same elements, boundaries of metaphor usage become visible. 
Besides, this chapter looks for patterns in the function of these metaphors in the speeches, 
to identify if there is also a specific purpose for those metaphors. 
The political speeches analyzed in this chapter have already been assessed on their 
political style in previous research, in which speeches of politicians originating from three 
countries were compared: the US, the UK, and the Netherlands (see chapters 5 and 6). The 
speech analysis-method used differentiates between populist, pluralist, and elitist political 
styles, as explained in the next section. The selected political speeches typically express one 
of these three styles in full. The populist discourse analyzed is from two speeches by the 
Dutch politician Geert Wilders. The elitist speech was delivered by the British politician 
Boris Johnson, whereas Barack Obama gave the pluralist speech.  All speeches date from 
2016 and 2017. 
Section 2 briefly describes the method used to define the political style of the 
speeches, together with the theoretical background concerning political style and populism. 
Section 3 explains the methods used for metaphor identification and analysis. The actual 
metaphor analyses are portrayed in sections 4, 5, and 6. In section 7, the three metaphor 
practices are compared, leading to the general conclusion and discussion. 
 
2 Political Style and Populism Theory 
 
Political style can be defined as a stylized political performance on the political front stage, 
purposed to fill the “aesthetic referential gap” with a political identity (see chapters 2 and 3). 
As argued by Ankersmit, politicians are never identical to the people that they represent, for 
which reason there is always an aesthetic referential gap between the voter and the 
representative (Ankersmit, 1996; Pels, 2003a). In order to connect with their own group of 
people, politicians stylize their performance into a unique political identity, so that people 
can recognize this politician as their representative. This political identity is not principally 
different from any other person’s, as identities are never fixed and stable but dependent on 
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the people and spaces with which they are surrounded (Butler, 1988; Goffman, 1956). 
However, because politicians’ professional survival depends on their popularity, their style is 
essential for their political life. A political style can be dissected into three dimensions: 
politicians express their ideas (ideational dimension), they have to connect with similar 
people (social dimension), and persuade people that do not think alike yet (presentational 
dimension) (see Chapter 3). 
To be able to assess the political style of politicians comparably, political style has 
been split up into five focus elements, based on the position that politicians take on the 
political front stage. On this stage, politicians compete with each other while being observed 
by an audience. The political stage consists of five discursive elements on which politicians 
can express their political identity as unique, apart from their political standpoints: 1 The 
people, 2 The political elite, 3 Democracy/government, 4 Politics, and 5 The political context (see 
Chapter 3). For instance, politicians can speak about the people or the elite (Elements 1 and 
2) as a homogeneous or a heterogeneous group, as good or bad, competent or incompetent 
to govern. They can present the government or democracy (Element 3) as corrupt or as 
good, fake or respectable. Politicians can speak about politics (Element 4) as a fight, or as 
cooperation. Also, they can proclaim that the political context as a whole (Element 5) is in 
crisis or in progress.  
The metaphor analysis in this chapter focuses on these five political style elements. 
This links metaphor use directly to political style and can shed light on the role that 
metaphor plays in stylized politics, such as populism. Populism does not stand on its own; it 
directly relates to pluralism and elitism (e.g., Mudde, 2017; J.-W. Müller, 2016). A semiotic 
analysis, described in Chapter 4, more precisely explores the relationship between populism, 
elitism, and pluralism. This analysis shows that populism, elitism, and pluralism share one 
grammar of meaning. In this grammar, the common features of two of the three concepts 
always linearly contradict the third, as follows:  
• Pluralism views the people as a heterogeneous group, whereas populism and elitism 
see the people as non-heterogeneous (homogeneous or equalized as one through 
populism). This is a cognitive matter (ideational dimension).  
• In elitism, politicians are part of the elite and want power for the elite, whereas 
populism and pluralism claim power for the people and politicians are part of the 
people. This is a matter of group relations (social dimension). 
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• In populism, political leaders posit a (quasi) unmediated relationship with the people; 
they present themselves as if they are the people, whereas elitist and pluralist 
politicians present a mediated relationship with the people they represent. This is a 
rhetorical matter (presentational dimension). 
 
The three-dimensional oppositions can be visualized as a triangular framework, with 
populism, elitism, and pluralism at the corners and their anti-styles at the opposite sides of 
the triangle (see Figure 8.1). Three corners and opposite sides visualize the oppositions in 
the three dimensions.  
For a political style analysis, the three-dimensional structure of populism entails that 
the same text has to be analyzed using three different lenses for the five elements, as the 
same element can express another style in different dimensions. For instance, a sentence 
such as “We, as a people, feel betrayed” is mixed populist/pluralist in the social dimension 
because it speaks of the people as “we.” At the same time, it is populist in the presentational 
dimension because it expresses an (as if) unmediated knowledge of the people. Ideationally it 
is mixed populist/elitist because it depicts the people as a homogeneous group. Overall, the 
average of the three is a full populist style. However, most politicians are found to have less 
consistent styles (see chapters 5 and 6); the three dimensions can be seen as building blocks 
with which political styles are assembled. In one element, the three dimensions never differ 
extremely from each other, as the ideational dimension is only knowable through discourse 
use and social action (the other two dimensions), so they overlap for a large part. However, 
over the five style elements, they do show variation.  
For instance, many (left-wing) populist politicians combine a pluralist view of the 
people (Element 1) with a populist view of the elite (Element 2). Only a few politicians show a 
full style; many politicians tend to mix two styles (so, populism/elitism, pluralism/elitism, or 
populism/pluralism). This is visible in Figure 8.1, which shows the overall score of multiple 
speech analyses. The circles demarcate which of these analyzed speeches are selected for 
examination on metaphor usage in this chapter; Obama is selected because he had a clear-
cut pluralist style, Johnson’s 2017 speech is selected because it showed a clear-cut elitist 
style, and Wilders is chosen from other full populists because he was Dutch, which kept the 
nationalities of the politicians balanced. Although Johnson is often characterized as a populist, 
the figure shows that his three speeches analyzed all combine elitism with populism (in 
Chapter 6, a more elaborate explanation of Johnson’s elitist-populist style mix). Only his 
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2016 Brexit speech is assessed as more populist than elitist; the two other speeches both fall 
within the full elitist range. This justifies classifying him as an elitist, albeit with populist traits. 
Johnson’s populism can mostly be explained by the Brexit referendum campaign or involves 
shared features of populism and elitism (namely anti-pluralist features). His 2017 speech is 
chosen for further analysis because it most clearly had a fully elitist style. 
 
 
More detailed descriptions of the political style analyses in Figure 8.1 are given in chapters 5 
and 6. The main focus was on the content of the speeches. The general presentation played 
a role in this, including metaphors, but without a special focus on these. The metaphor 
analysis presented in this chapter is performed in addition to the style analysis and solely 
focused on the metaphors used.  
Figure 8.1 Twenty speeches (listed in Appendix A) analyzed on political style. The three 
circled speeches are further analyzed on metaphor usage. 
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In the analysis on which Figure 8.1 is based, the political style of each politician was relatively 
defined within its own political context. After having defined multiple political styles 
originating in different contexts, it becomes feasible to study populism at an inter-contextual 
level, as the definition of political style is formulated at a higher abstraction level. 
Comparisons are only meaningful at this higher abstraction level. For instance, one of Boris 
Johnson’s metaphors for the people is “the lion,” which directly relates to the British symbol 
of the lion for the British nation. This metaphor has the same traditional connotation in the 
Netherlands because the lion is also a Dutch symbol for the nation, but in the US, this 
metaphor is less likely to occur in this context, because it does not figure as a national 
symbol – its equivalent would be an eagle. So, on this level, a comparison is not meaningful. 
Nevertheless, focusing on political style, the lion is meaningful because it refers to the people 
depicted as a circus animal that follows the will of the lion tamer. This makes it an elitist 
metaphor – as a domesticized animal, that is, a metaphor category at another abstraction-
level. 
 
3 Metaphor Theory 
 
In Conceptual Metaphor Theory, a metaphor is defined as a “cross-domain mapping,” or as 
the connection that is created between two domains of experience by using one domain to 
signify the other (Kövecses, 2017; Lakoff, 1993). The two domains are often referred to as 
the source and target domain; the source-domain is the provider of the metaphorical image 
that is used for the semiotic structure of the target-domain. Additionally, blending theory 
highlights that this transmission of meaning is not merely a transmission: in the confrontation 
of the source and the target domain, a “blended space” is created that generates a new 
meaning (Dancygier, 2017; Fauconnier & Turner, 2008). As already suggested by Ricoeur 
(1978, 2003), this new meaning is more than the sum of the meanings of the two domains 
and encompasses more than language: it involves the whole experience, encompassing 
thought, emotion, language, as well as physical experiences. 
In this conceptual sense, populism, as a political performance, is a metaphorical 
process in itself: populist politicians metaphorically signify the people; they make the people 
present in the political realm through metaphorical identification rather than through 
symbolic representation. The people and the populist leader blend into one conceptual space 
in which the populist becomes an embodied people, directly speaking for them. Through this 
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blend, populists claim to be the only ones that genuinely speak on behalf of the people, as 
they do not represent them, but are the people. In the construction of this blend, the whole 
personality of the politician plays a part, as expressed in appearance, attitude, language, 
register, and dialect. This being said, the following analysis focuses on the specific role of 
metaphor occurring in language for the construction of the populist blend.  
For the use of metaphor in language, the distinction between communicative, 
linguistic, and conceptual metaphor is relevant (Steen, 2008). The distinction puts the focus 
on the function of metaphors; conceptual metaphors have a cognitive function; they reflect a 
way of thinking, in which a more abstract matter has been conceptualized with the help of a 
more concrete domain. This does not necessarily involve language. If a conceptual metaphor 
is expressed in language, it is called a linguistic metaphor. Linguistic metaphors in Steen’s 
definition are not used deliberately; they can be seen as traces of metaphorical thinking in 
language. They are differentiated from communicative metaphors, which are linguistic 
metaphors that are deliberately used with a communicative purpose. Communicative 
metaphors are not merely cognitive traces in language; they have a communicative function 
besides the cognitive one. 
Politicians not only deliberately use communicative metaphors to communicate their 
political style; they also use them unintentionally to express their style. Both types of 
metaphors are purposeful for the political identity they perform (see Chapter 7). Hence, 
both linguistic and communicative metaphors are relevant for political style, as well as the 
underlying conceptual metaphors. In political communication, metaphors often form larger 
units, clustered around themes. Dependent on the size of the clusters, these themes are 
called “systematic metaphors” (Maslen, 2017) or “metaphor scenarios” (Musolff, 2016, 
2017). 
This analysis looks for all types of metaphors, with a special focus on clusters of 
metaphors that are used to express a political style. The method to identify the metaphors is 
close reading. The method originates from literary studies; established in the nineteen-thirties 
by I. A. Richard, a literary scholar who is also known for his metaphor theory, it is a 
renowned approach of analyzing literary texts. It involves paying close attention to how texts 
with a literary purpose are produced by using linguistic strategies (Herrnstein Smith, 2016; 
Richards, 1936). Close reading has been applied to political metaphor by Charteris-Black 
(2012, 2014) and mostly aims at communicative metaphors used with a persuasive purpose. 
However, politics does not only involve persuasion; as mentioned in section 2, political style 
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has three functions; besides persuasion, it involves the social connection with people and the 
expression of thought. So, not only communicative metaphors but also linguistic and 
conceptual metaphors are relevant. To ensure that less salient linguistic and conceptual 
metaphors were not missed, the MIP metaphor identification procedure was applied, as 
described by the Pragglejazz group (2007).  
In all three speeches, all metaphors were identified first. As there was no quantitative 
goal, these were not counted; the focus was on identifying different kinds of metaphors. 
After the identification, metaphors that referred to the five target-domains mentioned in 
section 2 were analyzed. If those metaphors formed clusters with other metaphors, these 
metaphors were also included in the analysis. 
A special focus was on metaphor scenarios; these can be regarded as mini-narratives 
that include a solution to a problem. They not only express thought; they mostly convey 
strategic or emotional implications. For instance, the lion metaphor mentioned is not only an 
expression of seeing the people as incapable of governing themselves, but it also implies a 
solution, as freeing the lion would be dangerous. Thus, the metaphor implies that it is good 
that the people do not govern themselves, and that the elite is needed to guide the people. 
This implication contrasts with the metaphor that depicts the people as slaves; in this 
scenario, setting the people free is implied as a goal, as slavery is generally seen as 
extraordinarily immoral and unlawful. There are mainly three functions of metaphors and 
metaphor-scenarios in a narrative: as described in Chapter 7, they can have a strategic, 
rational, or an emotional function, or a combination of the three. The analysis will assess the 
purpose of the metaphors used in the speeches and see if and how the speeches differ.  
 
4 Obama: The People as America 
 
Barack Obama delivered the speech analyzed here in 2016 during the Democratic 
Convention, in which Hillary Clinton’s candidacy for the presidential elections officially was 
announced (Speech 1). The main purpose of the speech was an endorsement for Clinton, 
which meant that Obama also denounced her Republican opponent, Donald Trump. In 
Chapter 5, the political style of the speech is assessed as pluralist. Summarized, this means 
that Obama speaks of himself as being part of the people (this is mixed populism/pluralism in 
the social realm); additionally, he does not see the people or the elite as one, homogenized 
group, but as individuals and smaller groups, like Latinos, blacks, and whites, that compete 
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with each other but also unite as Americans (this is pluralist in the ideational dimension). 
Moreover, he does not directly speak for the people; on the contrary, he emphasizes that he 
communicates with the people, representing and helping them (this is mixed pluralism/elitism 
in the presentational realm). The scores on the three dimensions average out to a full 
pluralist profile. The metaphor analysis presented below is performed separately from the 
style analysis in Chapter 5. It focuses on the metaphors used for the five key elements of 
political style, as mentioned in section 2. 
 
4.1 The people. 
 
Obama often refers to the audience and himself (you, we) as “the people,” as in this 
fragment:  
 
I think it’s fair to say this is not your typical election. It’s not just a choice between 
parties or policies -- the usual debates between left and right. This is a more 
fundamental choice; about who we are as a people, and whether we stay true to this 
great American experiment in self-government. (1, 00:08:50) 
 
It expresses that he views himself and the participants of the Democratic Convention as 
(part of) the people, which can be seen as metaphorical or as literal. The audience is part of 
the American people, and the speech was broadcast all over the country, so Obama literally 
addressed the people of the United States. However, this expression is metaphorical as well 
in relation to another metaphor in the speech; Obama often refers to the audience as the 
country, as in: “Hello, America!” In this way, he also identifies the people with the country. This 
schematic metaphor is supported by the conceptual metaphor of AMERICA/THE COUNTRY AS A 
PERSON/GROUP OF PERSONS, but also as the result of the cooperation between people, as in the 
following fragments: “America is already great. America is already strong. And I promise you, 
our strength, our greatness, does not depend on Donald Trump” (1, 00:23:44). And in: 
“America has never been about what one person says he’ll do for us. It’s about what can be 
achieved by us, together” (1, 00:27:10). In this chain of metaphors, Obama uses the 
metaphor of the country as a signifier for the people: everybody in America, black, white, 
Latino, man, woman, can identify with America. It is an inclusive metaphor for the people 
and perfectly fits Obama’s pluralist view of the people. 
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4.2 The elite. 
 
Obama does not directly refer to the target domain of the elite because he does not 
recognize it as a separate category; in pluralism, everybody is part of the people. However, 
Obama does speak of politicians that normally can be regarded as part of the political elite: 
Clinton and Trump. As shown in the following example, he sees POLITICIANS AS CHAMPIONS, or, in 
the case of Trump, as a fake champion: “I came to realize that her unbelievable work ethic 
wasn’t for praise; it wasn’t for attention -- that she was in this for everyone who needs a 
champion” (Over Clinton) (1, 00:14:50), and: “Does anyone really believe that a guy who’s 
spent his 70 years on this earth showing no regard for working people is suddenly going to 
be your champion?”(Over Trump) (1, 00:20:23). Politicians are the champions of groups of 
people; they have won the contest to represent the people. The champion metaphor fits 
with Obama’s view that politicians are part of the people, instead of the elite; it is a very 
meritocratic view of the elite. People become a champion by hard work, and not, like 
Trump, by being born rich. 
 
4.3 Politics and democracy/government. 
 
The champion metaphor is part of the metaphor scenario that Obama uses for POLITICS AS A 
CHALLENGE or a contest to create a better world, as in these fragments: “It’s precisely this 
contest of ideas that pushes our country forward” (1, 00:09:22), “We are challenged to do 
better; to be better” (1, 00:11:08), and “After the worst recession in 80 years, we fought 
our way back.” (1, 00:05:22). It is not a fight of the people against the elite, as in populism; it 
is a fight in which everybody cooperates – in a competitive way – for a better world.  
Obama depicts DEMOCRACY AS AN INSTRUMENT to use for GOVERNING. The latter is the WORK 
that has to be done for the country: “Democracy works, America, but we got to want it -- 
not just during an election year, but all the days in between” (1, 00:31:12), and: “America has 
never been about what one person says he’ll do for us. It’s about what can be achieved by 
us, together, through the hard and slow, and sometimes frustrating, but ultimately enduring 
work of self-government.” (1, 00:27:10) 
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4.4 The political context as a whole. 
 
When Obama speaks of the political context, he keeps the distance of a neutral observer. 
He speaks of it as a book or as a report, a statistical graph that is going up or down. The 
CONTEST scenario is also visible, in sentences such as “we fought our way back” after the 
financial crisis: “We’ve seen deficits come down, 401(k)s recover, an auto industry set new 
records, unemployment reaches eight-year lows, and our businesses create 15 million new 
jobs” (1, 00:05:22), and: “We opened up a new chapter with the people of Cuba...” (1, 
00:06:32) 
 
Purposes of 
Obama’s 
metaphors 
People 
metaphors 
Elite 
metaphors 
Politics 
metaphors 
Government 
/democracy 
metaphors 
Political context 
metaphors 
Ideational 
(cognitive) 
I 
Framing 
America as 
strong 
(opposed to 
Trump’s 
frame of 
America as 
not great) 
Reframing 
people vs. 
elite into 
people and 
their 
champions 
(no internal 
divide) 
Framing politics 
as working on a 
better world. 
Elections as a 
contest; 
politicians as 
competing who 
does this best. 
Framing 
governing as 
hard work for 
the people, and 
democracy as an 
instrument for 
that work.  
Framing the 
context as a 
book or as a 
graph that is 
going up. 
Obama as a 
reader/observer  
Reframing Trump’s populist frame (people vs. elite) into a pluralist frame (getting 
political results together) 
Emotional 
(social) 
I+S 
Expressing 
optimism, 
strength. 
Empowermen
t, “we can do 
it” 
Evoking 
positive 
feelings for 
Clinton/aversi
on of Trump 
Engaging the 
people in a 
positive 
movement: “we 
can do it” 
Evoking 
admiration: 
politicians are 
hard-working 
and  helpers  
Evoking positive 
feelings and 
trust: it is going 
well. 
Engaging the people in a positive movement: “We can do this” together with 
politicians 
Strategic 
(presentatio
nal) 
I+S+P 
Unify the 
people – 
reframing the 
political 
debate 
Reframing the 
political 
debate, 
winning votes 
for Clinton 
Putting focus on 
political results 
and experience, 
which is 
advantageous for 
Clinton 
Putting the 
focus on the 
amount of work 
and effort that 
governing takes 
Focus on 
changing things 
for the better 
(from a positive 
feeling, not 
negative) 
Putting the focus on the hard work that politicians do. Showing Clinton as fit for the 
job – as she is known as experienced and a hard worker. 
I: Ideational dimension-- S: social dimension -- P:  Presentational dimension 
 
Table 8.1 Purposes of Obama’s metaphor usage. 
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4.5 Purposes 
 
Obama’s primary purpose of his metaphors is the (re)framing of the debate (see Table 8.1). 
He often opposes his frame to the way that Trump views the world. Ideationally, he tries to 
reframe Trump’s populist frame in his own pluralist frame. On the emotional level, he aims 
at empowering the people by expressing his belief in them. Strategically, he aims at letting 
the people choose for political experience and results (so, for Clinton), instead of choosing 
for the antagonism of the people against the elite. All three purposes entail reframing of the 
debate, which has to be seen as the main purpose of Obama’s metaphors used in this 
speech. 
 
5 Johnson: The People as Animals or Slaves 
 
The speech by Boris Johnson was held at the British Conservative Party Conference, 
October 2017 (Speech 10). Johnson spoke in his role as Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, and the primary purpose of this speech was the presentation of his foreign policy, 
and more generally, his Brexit-agenda, a year after the Brexit referendum had resulted in a 
vote to leave the EU. As the government was in negotiation with the EU on a Brexit-deal, 
this speech can also be seen as a popularity contest between Johnson, leader of the hard-
Brexit line, and Theresa May, representing a soft-Brexit policy.  
As already mentioned in section 2, the political style of this speech is assessed as 
mainly elitist in Chapter 6. Ideationally, Johnson sees the people as one (mixed 
populist/elitist). Socially, Johnson is part of the elite (elitist) but also fighting with the people 
against another elite (mixed elitist-populist). Presentationally, he identifies with the elite, but 
also with the people and the elite together against the EU (mixed elitist/populist). Hence, 
Johnson’s elitism has some populist traits, but the average score remains within the full elitist 
reach. The metaphor analysis presented below is an addition to the style analysis.  
 
5.1 The people 
 
Unlike Obama, Johnson does not refer to himself as the people: the people are always 
“they.” When Johnson uses “we,” he mostly refers to Britain or the country; to the elite and 
the people together. The metaphors that Johnson uses for the people are either 
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domesticized animals or slaves; this depends on the elite members he relates the people to. 
His opponents – the socialist party and the EU bureaucrats in Brussels – are slaveholders or 
traders, with the people as slaves: “The shadow leader and shadow chancellor are seriously 
proposing to put place the British people back in bondage.” (10, 00:09:50) 
In contrast, Johnson and his fellow elite members relate to the people as a lion tamer 
to a lion, or as cattle and owner of the cattle. Johnson and his fellow elite members treat the 
people well, whereas the slaveholders abuse the people: “We are not the lion. [symbol of 
England] We do not claim, like some others, to be the lion. That role is played by the people 
of this country. But it is up to us now – in the traditional non-threatening, and genial, self-
deprecating way of the British – to let that lion roar.” (10, 00:28:01) 
Comparing the people with an animal usually is an insult, but it does not have to feel this way 
because it is a traditional metaphor for the people. For instance, in Christianity, it is common 
to refer to the people as flock and to Christ as the Shepherd. The difference is that in the 
latter all people are flock, and in Johnson’s metaphor only the people are animals and the 
elite not. 
 
5.2 The elite 
 
Johnson’s metaphors for the elite are twofold: the good elite (he and his fellow Tories) are 
depicted as elite members with a positive image; a pharaoh, a guide (of the people), the 
winner of the game, a lion tamer, or a doctor who find cures. These are all images of natural 
leaders or helpers of the people: “Like the pharaohs of upper and lower Egypt, they are 
double hatted ministers” (10, 00:01:46), and: “I believe we will eventually find a cure for the 
psychological contaminate on of radical Islamist extremism. Just as we have eradicated 
smallpox and polio.” (10, 00:21:36) 
The bad elite (Corbyn, Labor politicians, and the media) are associated with elite 
members who abuse the people, or even worse, shown as zombies who are a threat to the 
people: “It (socialism) is back from the grave – its zombie fingers straining for the levers of 
power, and that is why we cannot rest” (10, 00:10:50), and: “The shadow leader and shadow 
chancellor are seriously proposing to put place the British people back in bondage” (10, 
00:09:50). 
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5.3 Politics and democracy/government 
 
Johnson depicts politics as a game, and himself as a winner: “And the only way to win the 
future is not to retreat from the world, not to abandon globalization but to play our part, as 
we always have, in making the world safer and freer.” (10, 00:12:36) Democracy is not 
something that the people already have; it is a goal that has to be reached, the destination of 
the travel that Brexit is: “the path to democracy and freedom.” Besides, Johnson speaks 
about politics as a competition between countries that Britain leads and wins. Mostly, this 
happens when he speaks of foreign policy – so this is more related to this content than to 
his political style, but it also fits into his view on politics as a contest. 
Purposes 
Johnson’s 
metaphors 
People 
metaphors 
Elite 
metaphors 
Politics 
metaphors 
Government 
/democracy 
metaphors 
Political 
context 
metaphors 
Ideational 
(cognitive) I 
Framing the 
people as not 
capable of 
governing, 
and not free 
Framing the 
Conservatives 
as competent 
leaders and 
others (Labor, 
EU) as abusers 
Framing 
politics as a 
game and 
himself as a 
winner and a 
strategic 
player  
Democracy 
as a travel 
destination, a 
goal + as 
freedom 
Framing the 
context as an 
international 
competition + 
as a film or 
graph (going 
up) that one 
sees 
Framing politics as a game that Johnson wins and the people follow. 
Emotional 
(social) I+S 
Bonding with 
elite 
members, 
being better 
than the 
people 
Evoking 
positive 
feelings for 
conservatives 
and mocking 
labor 
Expressing 
confidence; 
daring the 
audience to 
be bold 
Evoking the 
desire for 
freedom and 
the feeling of 
being 
imprisoned 
Positive 
feelings: Britain 
leads the 
world, is 
successful, can 
stand on its 
own 
Expressing confidence and a daring attitude. Evoking desire for Brexit. 
Strategic 
(Presentational) 
I+S+P 
Showing 
eloquence – 
political 
power play 
Gaining 
support by 
showing 
eloquence and 
knowledge  
Showing 
competence 
to win the 
game, gaining 
support 
Gaining 
support for a 
hard Brexit 
Gaining 
support for 
the 
government 
and for a hard 
Brexit. 
Gaining support through eloquence and competence, and through framing 
politics as a game that fits his bold attitude. Presenting himself as successful. 
I: Ideational dimension-- S: social dimension -- P:  Presentational dimension 
 
Table 8.2 Purposes of Johnson’s metaphor usage. 
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5.4 The political context 
 
Like Obama, Johnson speaks about the context as a graph that goes up (due to the 
government), or as a film that you watch. Like Obama’s book metaphor, this suggests 
distance and the neutrality of an observer: “…has seen inequality not rise but fall (...) to the 
lowest levels for three decades” (10, 00:11:42). He also refers to the political context as a 
journey that has been made, and from which one comes back. Besides, problems can be 
handled with a “Swiss army knife,” which refers to the military, but also to adventurous 
journeys in which such knives are a necessity. Problems are things you can cut with a knife, 
or nuts to be cracked. Mostly, however, the political context is a competitive game, played 
by countries and politicians: “We lead the world in bio-science and fin-tech…” (10, 00:25:54) 
 
5.5 Purposes 
 
With his metaphor usage, Johnson creates a purposeful narrative structured around the goal 
to gain support for himself as a leader (see table 8.2). First, politics is framed as a 
competitive game, a game that requires guts and a bold attitude to win. Subsequently, 
Johnson portrays himself as having the right character and leader capacities to win this game; 
he has guts and knows how to play. He stimulates the people to be daring and confident and 
go for a hard Brexit. Supporting him means a winning game for all spectators. A daring 
attitude, for which he is famous, will be rewarded, and a less daring attitude, like for instance 
that of Theresa May’s soft Brexit policy, will not. He mostly gains support through eloquence 
and showing proficiency as a leader. 
 
6 Wilders: The People as Heroes, Liberating the Country 
 
The Dutch politician Geert Wilders held the two speeches analyzed during the six months 
before the Dutch elections in March 2017; one on a European platform in January 2017 
(Speech 21), and the other in September 2016 (Speech 20), on a yearly debate in Dutch 
parliament, the General Assessments, which is broadcasted and always gets a lot of media 
attention. Because the platforms differ, the speeches can be seen as complementary; they 
contain many identical sentences and parts of sentences, but the first speech is aimed at a 
broader public, whereas the second speech is directed towards a public that is already on 
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the same wavelength as Wilders. The overarching goal is winning support for his party and 
for sister parties in Europe. 
In my previous political style analysis, the speeches were assessed as fully populist in 
all three dimensions; Wilders speaks of the people as a good homogeneous group and the 
elite as a bad homogeneous group (ideationally populist); Wilders is part of the people 
(socially populist or pluralist), and he speaks directly for the people (presentationally 
populist). This results in an average score of a full populist political style.  The following 
metaphor analysis is complementary to the style analysis, which is more elaborately reported 
on in Chapter 5. 
 
6.1 The people 
 
Like Obama, Wilders speaks of the people as “we,” and he often equates the people with 
the country. The difference is that in Wilders’ speech the people are not only metaphorically 
the country, they are also the rightful owners of the country: “We are the Netherlands, and 
this is our country” (22, 00:02:45). Wilders’ country is the private property of the native 
Dutch inhabitants. Immigrants are associated with terrorists and thieves who threaten to 
take away the country from its rightful owners: 
 
“We will reclaim it [our country]. From today onwards. We will no longer allow that 
our women and daughters are harassed by you; that our neighborhoods are 
terrorized; our stores robbed; that the elderly no longer dare to go for a walk at 
night; (…) That the Netherlands gets destroyed. We no longer accept that.” (22, 
00:02:50) 
 
Wilders depicts the people as asleep, not aware of the danger of losing their country. They 
have to wake up: “We are losing our country. Forever, if we don’t wake up very soon” (22, 
00:00:08), and: “If we do nothing, if we do nothing, then we cease to exist.” (21, 00:10:30). 
Fortunately, according to Wilders, many people are waking up; these people, the 
supporters of Wilders and other European right extremist parties, are “awake,” and the 
saviors of the country and the people: “They are blind to the truth, but we are not!” (21, 
00:06:17), or: “The people in Western countries are waking up” (21, 00:21:25), and: “You 
are the heroes and saviors of Europe. I thank you for that.” (21, 00:18:36) 
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6.2 The elite 
 
Wilder’s elite is blind, drunk, a coward, and looking the other way: unable and unwilling to 
see the danger that the people are losing their country. They are “gamblers” (they gamble 
with the people’s rights), or too anxious to act: “This is only possible if we do away with - as 
we do now - political cowardness and looking away from problems” (22, 00:42:06). The elite 
has abandoned the people, which is why the people have to wake up. They cannot trust the 
elite to defend them: “Because the people should not be left behind. We, we here 
altogether, we are the hope of the people. And we will never disappoint them. Never” (21, 
00:13:00).  
6.3 Politics 
 
Wilders often speaks about politics in war metaphors. He fights a “capitulation culture” (22, 
00:11:38); Political parties are “arch enemies” (22, 00:11:45); We are going to “conquer the 
country back” (21, 00:20:00); We “fight back” (22, 00:03:26). The goal of this war is to free 
the people and rescue the country. Politicians such as Wilders are the instrument in this 
liberation. As in: “My friends! This year will be the year of the people. (...) The year of the 
liberation” (21, 00:20:10). And: “The people in Western countries wake up. (...) They want 
their freedom back. They want their sovereign nations back. And we, the European Patriots, 
we will be their instrument. Long lives Freedom.” (21, 00:22:07) Or: “History calls upon us 
to save Europe. To save our own humanistic, Jewish-Christian culture and civilization, our 
freedoms, our nations, the future of our children.” (21, 00:16:30) 
 
6.4 Democracy/government and political context 
 
Just as politics is “the liberation of the people,” so the democracy is the means through 
which the people can liberate themselves, by voting for Wilders: “This year is the year of the 
people (…) The year of a democratic and peaceful political revolution in Europe” (21, 
00:20:10), and: “In two months,’ in March, we will give the Dutch people the opportunity to 
liberate the Netherlands!” (21, 00: 02:47). For Wilders, not only politics is war, the whole 
context is (against Islam). It is: “a dark tunnel” (21, 00:14:30) or a “black summer of the 
Jihad” (21, 00:20:43). But there is light at the end of the tunnel: Wilders sees a “patriotic 
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spring” (21, 00:02:10). He dreams of a future in which “Islam is just a nightmare that has 
passed” (22, 00:43:34).  
 
6.5 Purposes 
 
The main purpose of Wilders’ metaphor usage is polarization, the construction of a 
boundary between the people and foreigners that want to steal the country from its rightful 
owners (see Table 8.3). His WAR metaphor does not allow friendly cooperation between 
politicians from different parties. These are “arch enemies” who have given the country away 
to foreigners, leaving the rightful owners of the country empty-handed. 
 
Purposes 
Wilders’ 
metaphors 
People 
metaphors 
Elite 
metaphors 
Politics 
metaphors 
Government 
/democracy 
metaphors 
Political 
context 
metaphors 
Ideational 
(cognitive) 
I 
Framing native 
Dutch as the 
rightful owners 
of the country 
Framing other 
political parties 
as bad and 
unwilling  
Framing 
politics as 
war, and the 
country as 
occupied  
Democracy as 
freedom and 
change 
Framing 
political 
events as 
war 
The people as in war with enemies, fighting for freedom and abandoned by the 
elite  
Emotional 
(social) 
I+S 
Evoking fear of 
loss/support 
for his policy 
Evoking strong 
negative 
emotions 
against the elite 
Evoking 
strong 
emotions of 
being in a 
war, under 
attack 
Positive, 
expressing joy 
and success 
Arousing 
fear and 
anger 
Evoking negative emotions: fear, anger, loss, war. And positive feelings of 
success. 
Strategic 
(Presenta-
tional) 
I+S+P 
Polarization: 
Constructing a 
boundary 
between the 
people/others 
Polarization: 
constructing a 
boundary 
between the 
people /elite 
Placing 
oneself in the 
underdog 
position  
Encourage 
people to join 
the success 
Gaining 
support 
through 
negative 
emotions 
Polarization, taking the underdog position and presenting himself as successful. 
Note: I: Ideational dimension-- S: social dimension -- P:  Presentational dimension 
 
Table 8.3 Purposes of Wilders’ metaphor usage. 
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7 Conclusion and Discussion 
 
This chapter shows contrasts and commonalities between the metaphors used in a populist, 
elitist, and pluralist speech. In all the speeches, the metaphors are used as a persuasive 
framing strategy. Johnson’s depiction of politics as a daring game makes him look like a good 
choice, as he is known for his bold character. Obama’s depiction of politics as a challenge 
that requires hard work implies Clinton is a good fit, as she is known for her hard work and 
perseverance. Wilders depiction of politics as a war fits his polarization strategy. It shows 
that all three speakers succeed in creating a metaphorical environment that fits their 
rhetorical goals best.  
Besides this rhetorical use, the metaphors contribute to the political style of the 
politicians; either a populist, or elitist, or pluralist style. Exploring populist speeches in direct 
contrast with contradictory styled speeches is fruitful; it not only shows what populist 
metaphors look like but, more importantly, what they do not look like. Understanding what 
populism is-not is crucial because politics is a creative process, and new expressions of 
populism are endless. However, all new metaphors are restricted by the boundaries of what 
populism is-not. In order to delineate those boundaries more precisely, the differences and 
similarities in metaphor usage in the analyzed speeches will now be considered more closely. 
First, all three speeches depict politics as a fight. This aligns with observations in 
other metaphor research that politics is commonly depicted with the conceptual metaphor 
of FIGHTING or WAR (Flusberg, Matlock, & Thibodeau, 2018; Lakoff, 2014; Musolff, 2016).  
However, this analysis highlights the point that not all metaphorical wars are the same. Only 
in the populist speech is politics portrayed as a fully-fledged, literal war, relating to the 
populist antagonism between the people and the elite. This fits with the observation that 
populist politicians often use war metaphors for politics in general (Flusberg et al., 2018, p. 
6). In the elitist speech, politics is also depicted as war, but this happens in combination with 
the metaphor of politics as a COMPETITIVE GAME; this is a “fight” as well, even “a battle of 
ideas,” and it refers to the conventional, ubiquitous metaphorical application of the war 
metaphor for argument and game (Dancygier, 2017), and not to a literal war. The difference 
with a literal war is that outside politics, the participants in the fight can still be friends; after 
all, it is only a game.  
The pluralist speech analyzed also depicts politics as a game, but not a competitive 
sports game with a clear winner and loser; politics is A CHALLENGE or A CONTEST in which all 
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participants work together. It is often a “fight” and sometimes even a “battle,” but there is 
not one winner or loser; everybody gains in the end and remains friends even during the 
game. This differentiation between WAR metaphors suggests that, for instance, Bush’s “war 
on terror,” and Nixon’s “war on drugs” are not primarily populist. These “wars” refer to a 
challenge on which all people work together. This is a pluralist use of the war metaphor. On 
the other hand, the emotional weight of the WAR metaphor adds to a populist social style; 
however, this is, at most, partly populist because the ideational part is pluralist (detailed 
features of political styles in appendix D). Analysis of the speeches by Bush and Nixon can 
enlighten us as to which style they predominantly use.  
Second, the speech analysis suggests that metaphorically speaking of the people as 
“captured animals” and of politicians as their “caretakers” or “tamers” is typically elitist, so 
non-populist. In both populism and pluralism, this metaphor is unthinkable because it shows 
the speaker to be not part of the people. Speaking of the people as “we” is not specifically 
tied to one style (it can be populist or pluralist), and speaking of the people as “the nation” is 
even possible in all styles, as it can refer to the people, or to the people and the elite 
together. Only not speaking of the people as “we,” but consistently as “they,” or even as 
“animals” can be characterized as typically elitist as it expresses the elitist feature of the 
people as an audience that does not govern.’ This confirms that Johnson is better 
characterized as an elitist than as a populist, as he consistently refers to the people as “they”. 
Third, in the populist speech, the people are depicted as the rightful owners of a 
country. It expresses the people as being one homogenized group, and can, for this reason, 
be seen as an expression of populism. However, it is questionable whether it is typically 
populist because elitism also sees the people as one homogenized group. The metaphor is 
possibly more tied to nativism or nationalism because these concepts unite the people with 
the elite; however, this needs further investigation.  
Fourth, the analysis shows that, as suggested by Van Leeuwen (2019), simply counting 
the number of references to the people does not suffice for measuring populism in political 
text or talk. Van Leeuwen already showed that grammatical differences matter for the 
people centrism in a text; additionally, this analysis shows that metaphorical differences can 
result in a completely different style. Hence, it is the way in which these references are 
made, that make the difference between populism and other political styles. 
Fifth, the analysis suggests a link between the three styles and the three means of 
persuasion described by Aristotle: ethos, pathos, and logos (Aristotle, trans. 1984). The main 
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purpose of the elitist speech (Johnson) is to gain support by showing eloquence and a good 
character – ethos in Aristotle’s rhetoric. The main purpose of the pluralist speech (Obama) 
is reframing Trump’s populist frame into a pluralist one – which has to do with how you 
think, or the logos. Wilders’ populist main purpose was polarization, which is a matter of 
pathos. In theory, the link is logical. In elitism, the people have to trust the elite based on 
their good character (ethos) because they are themselves not able to govern. In pluralism, 
the people judge policies on the content (logos), because everybody should be involved in 
politics to prevent power abuse. In populism, politicians are considered good if they are one 
of us, which is based on a feeling (pathos). Notwithstanding this theoretical link, a 
straightforward connection between populism and pathos seems to be too simple as all 
three means of persuasion (ethos, logos, and pathos) are used in all speeches to support the 
main purpose. In order to understand in more detail how this works, further research is 
needed. 
To conclude, the in-depth analysis of a populist, elitist, and pluralist speech has been 
insightful. Particularly the differences in the use of the WAR metaphor and the means of 
persuasion (pathos, ethos, logos) would be worth exploring further. As Musolff (2016) 
suggests, a corpus analysis could confirm whether the observed patterns are more broadly 
detectable. The amount of populist discourse that is being produced at this moment gives us 
ample material to work with.  
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Conclusion  
 
Political Style, a Matter of Framing  
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Reframing is changing the way the public sees the world.  
It is changing what counts as common sense.  
George Lakoff, Don’t Think of an Elephant, p.xv 
 
Abstract 
 
This concluding chapter discusses the overall conclusions of this dissertation against the 
background of the academic literature on the topic. Being interdisciplinary, this dissertation 
contributes to various academic discussions. Conceptually, it contributes to the political style 
concept, the populism concept, and the concept of political metaphor. Methodologically, it 
adds a new speech analysis method to the existing tools for political discourse analysis. In 
terms of political analysis, this dissertation adds to our understanding of current political 
developments. The five topics are subsequently discussed in the following five sections. 
 
1 Contributions to the Political Style Concept 
 
In the literature, the political style concept was severely underdeveloped, and an important 
part of this dissertation consist of building up a theory of political style for the use of political 
analysis. This section discusses three main developments of this theory in relation to the 
existing literature on political style.  
 
1.1 Three-dimensional style. 
 
Traditionally, political style has been seen mainly as rhetoric, which emphasizes the 
persuasive function of political style (Cicero, trans. 2012; Hariman, 1995).This broadly 
equates to the presentational dimension of political style in this dissertation. At the end of 
the 20th century, Ankersmit and Pels highlighted the various relational aspects of political 
style (Ankersmit, 1996; Pels, 2003a). Their approach broadly translates to the social 
dimension in this dissertation; when it recognizes aspects from other dimensions, these 
aspects comply with the social function of political style. More recently, Koenis (2014) has 
defined political style as a manner of solving political problems. This approach highlights 
ideational elements of style (framing) as well as social elements (policies). Besides, Moffitt 
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and Tormey have defined political style as a performance (Moffitt, 2016; Moffitt & Tormey, 
2014). This definition acknowledges features in three dimensions but specifically highlights 
the social and ideational parts that are visible from the presentational dimension.  
Hence, all existing approaches partly cover the topic of political style. The style 
concept in this dissertation claims that, in order to gain a profound understanding of political 
performances, the analyst must consider the three dimensions separately; as the expression 
of ideas, a social act, and a performance on the political stage. This is because each 
dimension highlights and hides different aspects of political style. Only by consciously and 
deliberately changing the angle of analysis, can aspects be revealed that would otherwise 
have stayed out of sight.  
An example of an expression having divergent meanings in three dimensions is the 
elite image of the Dutch populist politician Thierry Baudet. Generally, good manners are 
seen as contradictory to populism (Moffit, 2016; Ostiguy, 2017). One way to explain this 
apparent contradictory performance is to consider political style separate from ideas. This 
interpretation does not deem Baudet’s style populist, only his ideas (Rooduijn, 2019). This 
interpretation is grounded in the broadly acknowledged ideational approach of populism (i.e., 
Mudde, 2017). As an alternative, this dissertation suggests a three-dimensional interpretation 
of Baudet’s political manifestation of good manners, as follows:  
 
• His good manners are elitist in the ideational dimension, expressing the idea that the elite 
are the helpers of the country, working for the greater good. In the ideational dimension, 
Baudet combines his elitist manners with populist or mixed populist-elitist (anti-pluralist) 
style elements; for instance, depicting the people as a good homogeneous group 
(populist) and expressing that his own values are not opinions, but the real truth 
(populist-elitist). This results in an average mixed populist-elitist ideational style profile. 
• In the social dimension, his good manners can be interpreted as mixed populist-elitist. 
Not only is Baudet himself a part of the elite (elitist), but he claims that the same can be 
said for the Dutch people as a whole; the Dutch being descendants of high culture, 
known for their world-famous painters, writers, and scientists. The not-elite are the not-
western, not-white cultures. Hence, with his culturally educated image, Baudet expresses 
to be part of this (elite) people. This is assessed as populist, which results in an average 
mixed populist-elitist social style profile. 
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• In the presentational dimension, his good manners can be understood as fully populist. 
Due to populist influences, most mainstream politicians in the Netherlands emphasize 
their status as a normal person, rather than as part of the elite. Baudet’s elite image is, 
therefore, entirely anti-political class, with the express purpose of contrasting 
mainstream politicians. 
 
A more detailed analysis in Chapter 6 shows Baudet’s style as more populist than elitist, yet 
still evidently a mix of the two. This is highly compatible with his right-wing, nationalist, and 
nativist agenda. The mixed profile describes his ideas better than a purely populist one. 
Hence, comprehending the entire performance of the politician adds to our insight into 
current political presentations. Of course, there can be reasons for limiting a research focus 
to just one dimension, but one should be aware that this is a restriction.  
 
1.2 Left-right-center politics and political style. 
 
By analyzing multiple speeches in three political contexts ⁠—the US, the UK, and the 
Netherlands⁠—a pattern emerged that is worthy of investigating further: in all three contexts, 
left-centered populists are situated at the populist-pluralist (anti-elitist) side. This suggests 
that they mainly express populism in the social dimension: being part of the people and 
claiming power for the people. Additionally, right-centered populists are situated at the 
elitist-populist (anti-pluralist) side. This means that they mainly express populism as a set of 
ideas; for instance, that the people are a more or less homogeneous moral group. Populists 
that combine left and right features are close to the populist corner, combining the two 
sides. This means that they express populism in all three dimensions: ideational, social, and 
presentational. Lastly, analyzed mainstream politicians are positioned at the pluralist-elitist 
side of the triangular framework.  
Complementing this analysis with political style analyses in more (Western and non-
Western) countries would reveal whether this spread across the triangular framework can 
be more widely observed. If this is indeed the case, it provides an explanation for the so-
called horse-shoe model. This model is proposed as an alternative for a straight line depicting 
the political spectrum between left- and right wing politics (Koenis, 2014; Pels, 2003b; 
Taylor, 2006). In a straight line model, the extreme-left and right are positioned the furthest 
away from each other, expressing that they are fundamentally different. Alternatively, the 
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horseshoe model expresses that extreme-left and extreme-right wing politics, besides their 
differences, also often resemble one another. 
Explanations for the horseshoe are diverse. Pels characterizes the two ends as more 
stylized politics than the content-centered middle (Pels, 2003b). Koenis points at the 
difference between culture relativism—seeing distinctive cultures as principally different—at 
the ends of the horseshoe and culture universalism—accentuating universal values—in the 
middle (Koenis, 2014, p. 125). Taylor sees the middle of the horseshoe as connected with 
elitism because politicians occupying the center often hold power; the two ends can be seen 
as left and right-wing populism (Taylor, 2006, p. 118). Although these explanations explain 
why the extreme right and left are simultaneously different and similar, they do not explain 
how this apparent paradox works. This is why others question the validity of the horseshoe 
conceptualization; they argue that the extreme left and right are too far apart to be even 
slightly associated with each other (Choat, 2017) 
Projecting the triangle onto the horseshoe explains the logic behind the apparent 
paradox of proximity and distance of the far right and left. First, the projection in Figure 9.1 
suggests that combined elitism-pluralism forms the center of the horseshoe, instead of pure 
elitism as suggested by Taylor. Mixed elitism-pluralism depicts the current centrist political 
style better than elitism alone; the academic literature agrees that pluralism⁠, in combination 
with unintentional elitism ⁠, has been the dominant political organization form in most 
Western countries throughout the latter half of the 20th century (Blokland, 2011; Dahl & 
Stinebrickner, 2002; Lijphart, 1968). Also, Koenis’ and Pels’ differentiations between the 
center and the ends of the horseshoe (universalism versus relativism and stylized versus 
content-centered politics, respectively) correspond with features of mixed elitism-pluralism 
versus populism, as visible in the description of the speech analysis method in appendix D. 
Second, the triangular framework answers to Choat’s objection to the horseshoe 
model. Where the horseshoe suggests a meeting point of the extreme left and right at the 
end of the horseshoe, the triangular framework depicts this meeting point as not only a 
merging point but also a radical shift in view. The corners of the triangular framework show 
radical turning points in the main framing of the political context. This comprehensively 
explains the simultaneous differences and similarities of the extreme right and left; although 
right- and left-wing populism both share the same style elements in three dimensions, their 
main frame is fundamentally different. The left mainly sees the world through the social lens 
and demands a fair share. The right, on the other hand, views society mainly through the 
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ideational lens, claiming that their vision of society—a vision based on the dominant (hence 
traditional) framings in language—is the real truth. Although the populist left and right share 
the same framings of the three dimensions (the people as one, no power to the elite, and 
identification with the people), the two secondary dimensions are framed differently towards 
the main dimension, which results in a fundamentally dissimilar political style. For instance, it 
leads to the difference between a one homogeneous people, and a one, unified people (more 
on this in section 2.3 and 2.4). 
The question might arise as to why the meeting points at the other two corners of 
the triangle are not as salient as the one between extreme right and left. The other two 
corners also mark fundamental changes of frame, and it is expected that this would be visible 
in a salient change of style. This is not the case because, here, the presentational dimension 
is involved, a dimension concerned with cooperation instead of opposition. The empathic 
character of the presentational frame makes its difference from other framings less visible. 
 
 
Figure 9.1 The triangular framework projected onto the horseshoe model. 
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1.3 Mixing personal, group and systematic styles. 
 
This dissertation contributes to the concept of political style by analyzing it as a combination 
of a group style, personal style, and systematic style (see Chapters 2 and 4). At its core, a 
political style is a group style, as it is used to connect with a group of people (Ankersmit, 
1996). However, a pure group style is utopian, as groups always consist of individuals, and 
therefore necessitate systems that can reconcile group and individual interests. Hence, mixes 
of group, personal, and systematic styles naturally emerge as realistic versions of a political 
(group) style. As depicted in Figure 9.2, populism, elitism, and pluralism ⁠—as well as their 
anti-styles ⁠—are the logically possible constellations that evenly spread a group, system, and 
personal component over the three dimensions of political style. They precisely complement 
each other and are, for this reason, a useful set of connected concepts with which to 
consider politics.  
  
Figure 9.2 Populism, elitism, and pluralism as three realistic group styles, each mixing personal, 
group, and systematic style features. 
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The six styles together form a closed system of political styles; they cover, within a closed 
space, all logically possible styles. However, as all analytical lenses are restricted, so is the 
lens chosen for this dissertation. For instance, by focusing on groups styles, this dissertation 
does not consider styles that are predominantly personal or systematic. In the same way that 
a group style incorporates personal and systematic elements, a personal or systematic style 
can carry elements from other styles. This appears to be the case with ideologies such as 
liberalism and fascism (both incorporating group and systematic elements within a mainly 
personal style) and communism (incorporating group and personal elements within a mainly 
systematic style). This means that in another closed space, other styles figure as the logical 
opposites of populism. Further analysis is required on the identification of the various 
concepts that figure in these. 
The focus of this dissertation also does not consider unbalanced combinations within 
one style, such as two systematic parts and one group. Such combinations are, for instance, 
visible in a populist autocracy or an oligarchy. These phenomena fall beyond the scope of this 
dissertation, but they are certainly worth investigating further. For instance, such study could 
potentially answer the question of where populism changes from a democratic into a non-
democratic phenomenon, such as in a populist autocracy. 
 
2 Contributions to the populism concept 
 
In this dissertation, I critically engage with the arguments of various other scholars on the 
nature of populism. I want to emphasize that the analyses conducted in this dissertation 
would have been impossible without their work. The framework that I built is raised on the 
shoulders of their insightful analyses. 
 
2.1 The nature of populism. 
 
The question of as to whether populism is a political style, a strategy, or a set of 
ideas/ideology has been elaborately debated in the populism literature, however, up till now, 
without an evident conclusion (e.g., Aslanidis, 2016b; Freeden, 2017; Gidron & Bonikowski, 
2013; Moffitt & Tormey, 2014; Mudde, 2017; Ostiguy, 2017; Pappas, 2016; Weyland, 2017). 
In light of the political style theory developed in this dissertation, this is not surprising. There 
is no main category, as the proposed categories of ideas, style, and strategy evidently 
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correspond to the three dimensions in which populism occurs. These dimensions are 
circularly related; therefore, populism is inevitably all three at the same time. However, as 
the dimensions also contradict each other, populism never expresses itself in all dimensions 
at the same time; this would be an internally incoherent political style. Recently, the various 
existing approaches have been (re)categorized into three mainstream ones: (1) the ideational 
approach, (2) the political-strategic approach, and (3) the socio-cultural approach 
(Kaltwasser et al., 2017). This categorization does not pose the question of which approach 
fits populism best; all approaches contribute to our insight into populism in their own 
manner, which is a more fruitful perspective.  
Researchers adhering to the ideational approach often argue that populist 
expressions in the social and presentational realm are merely an expression of populist ideas 
(Hawkins et al., 2012, pp. 3–4; Mudde, 2017; Rooduijn, 2013, p. 163). However, not all 
aspects of populism are visible from a one-dimensional perspective, be it ideational, social, or 
presentational. More concretely: framing populism as a set of ideas, hides the commonalities 
between populism and pluralism; framing it as a strategy, hides the commonalities of populism 
and elitism; framing it as a rhetorical matter, hides the commonalities that it shares with both. 
Opposing populism to other concepts, such as technocracy or pragmatism, does not solve 
this problem either; other opposing concepts also regard the subject from the point of view 
of one leading dimension, and each dimension partly excludes the other dimensions’ 
meanings.  
Some approaches to populism use a mix of two dimensions. For instance, Laclau 
(2005a, 2005b) and Ostiguy (2017) view populism from both the social and presentational 
perspective. This is still not enough: only through making the three different framings visible 
by using shifting perspectives can populism be defined more completely. This is what I 
propose in this dissertation. 
 
2.2 The missing link between various populism approaches. 
 
The core structure underlying the constellation of populism, elitism, and pluralism is 
depicted in Figure 9.3. The structure can be summarized by one rule: the shared features of 
two of the three concepts will always contradict the third. This rule works as a grammar for 
the three concepts. No matter which features figure in the comparison between the three 
concepts⁠—be they broadly accepted or contested⁠—this logical rule is applicable, as this logic 
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is the reason that these features can be considered potentially populist in the first place. By 
analyzing many features in the populism, elitism, and pluralism literature, this logic has been 
revealed. 
This logic is elaborately discussed elsewhere in this dissertation. Examined here is the extent 
to which this framework is new. As explained in Chapter 4, practically all parts of populism’s 
core-structure had already been mapped. Mudde had described the ideational dimension of 
this structure in his classical article the Populist Zeitgeist (Mudde, 2004). Aside from this, 
Hawkins mentioned several of the overlapping features of populism and pluralism (Hawkins 
et al., 2012). Furthermore, Weyland’s “populist twist” refers to the presentational feature of 
populism (Weyland, 2017). The social and presentational dimensions of populism were partly 
mapped by Ostiguy (2017) and by Laclau (2005a), etcetera. What lacked was the insight into 
how all this knowledge of populism links together. This is what this dissertation contributes 
to the literature: the underlying structure that connects the different approaches. On a more 
Figure 9.3 The semio-linguistic structure underlying populism. 
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abstract level, as explained in Chapters 2 and 4, the labels populism, elitism, and pluralism can 
be replaced by other concepts⁠—what is key is the oppositions they represent between: 
 
• The opposition signifier-signified / the powerful versus the underdog: a social opposition  
• The opposition species-genus / inclusive versus exclusive politics: an ideational  opposition  
• The opposition metonymy-metaphor / representing people versus being the people: a  
   presentational opposition  
 
The opposition between signifier-signified is social, as it concerns the relation between 
language and the thing to which language refers. This always involves power, as it is the 
powerful subject who decides which name (signifier) is given to a powerless signified object; 
though the signifier never accurately represents the object, the signified has no power to 
change that. The second opposition, between species and genus, is ideational (and not social) 
because it does not involve the link between language and the real world, but instead the 
relation between signifiers. It is purely located in language system and is, for this reason, an 
ideational matter. Because the ideational dimension is circularly related to the other 
dimensions (in the end, the language system is also part of discourse and open for change 
based on language use), it incorporates a power and presentational element, but only 
indirectly so. Lastly, the opposition between metaphor and metonymy (identifying with the 
subject, instead of approaching it) is rhetorical and belongs, for this reason, to the 
presentational dimension. 
As visible in Figure 9.3, the three oppositions can also be characterized using the 
spatial oppositions in-out, up-down, and next to-on top of. These spatial labels are inspired by 
De Cleen’s and Stavrakakis’ (De Cleen, 2017; Stavrakakis & De Cleen, 2017) use of the 
spatial oppositions up-down and in-out. The scholars define the up-down opposition as a 
characteristic of populism, whereas they see the in-out opposition as a characteristic of 
nationalism and nativism. They therefore claim that these two oppositions serve to 
differentiate populism from nationalism/nativism; in populism, discourse in predominantly 
structured around the up-down axis, whereas in nationalist discourse the in-out axis is 
pivotal. It is indeed true that in the social dimension populism differs from nationalism and 
nativism; in this dimension, populism is structured around the up-down opposition of the 
powerful against the underdog, whereas nativism and nationalism are not. This does not 
mean, however, that populism is not also structured around the in-out opposition. The two 
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oppositions do not exclude each other, as they occur in different dimensions: the up-down 
in the social dimension, and the in-out in the ideational dimension. In the ideational 
dimension, populism finds itself on the same side as nationalism and nativism; they are all 
exclusive to some extent, as also as posited by Mudde and Kaltwasser (2012). Populists must 
exclude at least some people from their group; otherwise there would be no antagonism, no 
us versus them. In this sense, populism is similar to nationalism and nativism; they are all 
exclusive, albeit of different groups and in different gradations. Hence, in the opposition of 
exclusive versus inclusive, they are not opposed to each other but find themselves on the 
same side; both opposed to pluralism. Pluralism includes all groups and individuals: the elite, 
immigrants, anybody.  
For the question where nationalism differs from populism it is, indeed, not very 
helpful “to label both the exclusion of national outgroups (…) and the populist exclusion of 
‘the elite’ a matter of ‘exclusion’” (De Cleen, 2017, p. 11 of 23). Alternatively, maybe it is 
helpful to focus the attention separately to the three dimensions in which populism and 
nationalism occur. The wider focus may provide new insights; for instance, the fact that 
populism and nationalism easily get entangled (Palonen, 2018) can be explained by their 
similarity in the ideational dimension. 
Finally, the presentational opposition between next to and on top of is constitutive to 
populism, or, in linguistic terms, the difference between a metonymic versus metaphorical 
relationship with the people. Populists identify themselves with the people; they 
metaphorically make the people present in the political domain via their political 
performance. This opposes populism to both elitism and pluralism; in the latter two styles, 
politicians have a metonymic relationship with the people. They represent the people in the 
political domain, instead of making them immediately present.  
 
2.3 A non-heterogeneous people as part of populism. 
 
This dissertation also contributes to the academic discussion concerning whether or not a 
homogeneous people and exclusive politics is an inherent part of populism (De Cleen, 2017; 
Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012; Stavrakakis & De Cleen, 2017; Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014). 
An analysis⁠ of the populism-elitism opposition using the semiotic square of Greimas 
(1970/1987), exposes in 4 steps the underlying opposition of a heterogeneous (S) versus a 
non-heterogeneous people (~S) (see Figure 9.4). Logically, the opposition is not, as often 
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assumed, between heterogeneous and a homogeneous people. Such an opposition contains a 
fallacy; the same fallacy found in equaling not-white with black, or not-alive with dead: the 
former terms are broader than the latter. Black, dead, and homogeneous are not just the 
opposites of white, alive, and heterogeneous; they all constrain the opposition to one 
meaning. The logically correct opposition of heterogeneous is non-heterogeneous: this 
includes not only the concept of homogeneous, but also those of equalized as one or unified.  
 
 
Figure 9.4 A Greimassian analysis of the opposition between a heterogeneous versus a non-
heterogeneous people.  
 
The deep structure of language restricts manifestations of populism and elitism to a non-
heterogeneous people. It does not predict that a homogeneous people is part of populism; as 
long as the people are one in any sense (be it unified, homogeneous, or homogenized 
through populist or elitist rhetoric), it can ideationally count as populist (or elitist). On the 
other hand, it is too strong to state that the idea of a homogeneous people is alien to 
populism, as argued by scholars following Laclau. They reason that if the people are already 
homogeneous, they do not need to be unified by populism, for which reason an upfront 
homogeneous people must originate in the ideologies with which populism is combined, such 
as nationalism or nativism. Indeed, populism as an act partly defies populism as an idea, 
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however, this does not mean that they are not both possible manifestations of the concept 
populism. At least, the structure underlying the concept allows both. 
As outlined by Laclau (2005a), the logical route from individualism to populism takes multiple 
steps, steps that ultimately lead to a unified people that were not originally homogeneous. In 
Laclau’s route to populism, the individual logic first changes into a group logic (ideational 
dimension); next, the elite is recognized as the common cause of heterogeneous unsatisfied 
demands (social dimension), based on which the signifier of the people is discursively 
constructed as a complaint against the people in power (presentational dimension). The 
latter two steps imply a non-heterogeneous people. This can be homogeneous from the 
perspective of the observer, but for the populist self, the people are unified, not 
homogeneous.  
This route, however, is not the only path from individualism to populism. 
Alternatively, there is a short-cut in the underlying semio-linguistic structure that takes 
advantage of the fact that populism combines a group logic with a personal logic in the 
ideational dimension (see Figure 4.3). Ideationally, populism sees the people as a person 
(oneself). For this reason, it feels logically correct that one would keep one’s personal logic 
in the transition from individualism to populism. If this process starts with the presentational 
dimension instead of the ideational (which remains personal), the social dimension 
automatically becomes populist as well, as this feature is implied by the other two (more 
elaborately, see Chapter 4). This short-cut takes someone in one step from individualism to 
populism. This process includes a homogeneous rather than unified people, because the 
people were never seen as multiple in the first place. This populist route is not based on the 
act of unification, as according to Laclau’s definition of populism, but on the act of 
identification with the people and the retention of one’s personal logic as an individual. 
In sum, a homogeneous people is not integral to populism, but it is a possible 
expression process takes even less effort than the logical, unifying variant of populism. It 
explains why populism is often, but not always, combined with right-wing ideas. 
 
2.4 An inter-contextual definition. 
 
By using this relative definition of populism ⁠—understood in relation to elitism and 
pluralism ⁠—all political styles are assessed within their own contexts. This responds to 
Laclau’s characterization of populism as inherently context-dependent; as an act of unifying 
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the unsatisfied demands that exist in a specific context (Laclau, 2005a). Nevertheless, 
Greimas (19070/1987) states that the deep semio-linguistic structure of language restricts 
the logic behind the contextual manifestations. It follows, then, that styles become 
comparable on an inter-contextual level after they have been established within their 
context. With this, the analysis tool heeds Van Kessel’s (2014) warning not to mix features 
of populism that refer to different abstraction levels, as exemplified in Sartori’s (1991) cat-
dog concept. To stay within the cat-dog analogy: first cats are compared with cats, and dogs 
with dogs to see what kind of pet these individual cats and dogs are (for instance social or 
solitaire, aggressive or friendly). After this, it becomes possible to compare friendly cats with 
friendly dogs, and aggressive cats with aggressive dogs—which in turn enhances the insight 
into the general differences between cats and dogs. 
 
2.5 Three political acts. 
 
The core idea that lays the foundation of this dissertation is the recognition of the three 
discursive dimensions⁠—ideological, social, and presentational⁠—at work within political style, 
as explained in Chapters 2 and 4. Though characterizing ideological thought as part of 
discourse is broadly accepted,, ideas/ideologies themselves are not regularly granted a 
separate dimension within discourse. Mostly, they are seen as being materialized in discourse 
and therefore lacking any immanent existence, as this would add content or truth to ideas 
and thus place them outside discourse. For this reason, Althusser restricts ideology to its 
materialization in discourse use (Althusser, 1971/2008). This dissertation, however, claims 
otherwise. My research finds that although ideas exist only within discourse, they materialize 
according to their own logic—a logic that originates in the discourse structure, as termed by 
De Saussure (1916/2015). This, then, does not add pre-given content or truth to an idea.  
This ideational logic exists immanently from the other two logics, as the three logics 
contradict each other to some extent. In this contradiction, an excess of meaning is present 
(more elaborately, see Chapter 2). Acknowledging the structural character of the ideational 
dimension within discourse can help to clarify certain discussions on populism, such as the 
emotional dispute between Laclau and Žižek (Laclau, 2006; Žižek, 2006b, 2006a). The two 
scholars discussed populism, based on theories of (amongst others) Marx, Hegel, and Lacan. 
The discussion evidently goes beyond the linguistic scope of this dissertation. Nevertheless, 
relating the controversy to linguistics helps to understand what is at stake. Linguistically 
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speaking, Laclau and Žižek refer to the question of whether or not the discourse used to 
create a populist equivalential chain (in the social and presentational dimension) is already 
pre-structured in the discourse system (ideational dimension) or not. According to Žižek, 
capitalism is such a super structure and a populist struggle (in discourse use) will never 
structurally change capitalism as a system, as the ideational dimension restricts the discourse 
used to what is acceptable within the capitalist system. Laclau contests this; he asserts that 
Žižek misunderstands Lacan and that he adds the context-dependent content of capitalism 
to the purely formal Lacanian Real (Laclau, 2005a, p. 234).  
 Laclau states that the construction of the people is a purely performative act, 
however, the linguistic analysis in this dissertation asserts that Žižek has a point: a people is 
not constructed out of nothing, but out of existing dominant framings within discourse 
(Žižek, 2006a). The content of these dominant framings maybe context dependent, but the 
logic which they are based on is structural (see Chapters 2 and 4); it is the logic that accepts 
words as universal truths rather than as framings. Unconsciously, people often use the 
frames that they want to fight, and if this happens this fight is doomed to fail. For instance, a 
person can argue that the country needs its tax, and that “tax relief” is not a good idea. This 
argument, however, contains an internal contradiction because the word relief already frames 
tax as something negative. Using the word tax relief in a pro-tax argument makes it less 
persuasive (Lakoff, 2004). Only through revealing that dominant framings within the 
ideational dimension of discourse are in fact framings rather than truths, can the system be 
made (somewhat) open for change (see Chapter 2). 
This entails that, besides the rhetorical construction of an external enemy—which is 
the discursive (presentational) act of populism—another discursive act is needed in politics: 
the deconstruction of an internal enemy. This enemy consists of our own thoughts and 
language, built up from dominant framings and contradicting our own political goals. This is 
not a populist act, but a pluralist one, as it is grounded in the recognition that a subject is not 
one or whole but split and constructed through discourse. The language structure underlying 
populism, elitism, and pluralism shows that pluralism is grounded in the split nature of the 
subject and society, whereas both populism and elitism express an imaginary wholeness of 
the subject and society (see Figure 9.3). So, in order to change a society, politics necessarily 
comprises a pluralist act, besides the Laclauian populist act.  
If there is a pluralist and a populist act needed in politics, it is only logical that an elitist act is 
also required. The required elitist act is that people are not in politics for their own gain, but 
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instead to help others. Although elitism is often critiqued for being the opposite, the 
intention of elitism is altruistic; people who have a better position in society are obliged to 
help the less fortunate by working “for the greater good.” This good intention is an 
underestimated aspect of elitism. The altruistic act of elitism—people helping other 
people—is a third unmissable political act, because it is the only way to achieve peace 
between individuals and groups of people after the populists and pluralist fights have been 
fought. Hence, all three political styles are needed in a democracy; populism as much as 
elitism and pluralism. 
 
3 Contribution to the Political Metaphor Concept 
 
Metaphor is central to the populist phenomenon, even more profoundly than I had expected 
when starting this project. It was the salient use of metaphor by the populist politician Geert 
Wilders—employing terms such as “a tsunami of refugees” and “a headrag tax”—that had 
sparked my interest in the topic in the first place (Schoor, 2011). This question had mainly 
concerned the manifestation level of language. However, in the process of developing a 
political style theory, it showed that metaphor plays an important part in populism on all 
three of Greimas’ (1970/1987) levels of language: the manifestation level, the surface semio-
linguistic structure, and the deep semio-linguistic structure of language. 
On the manifestation level of language, the speech analysis performed in Chapter 8 
elucidates the role of metaphor in populism and other political styles. The three dimensions 
play a part here in terms of the purpose of the language used. These purposes have 
repercussions for the types of metaphors used by populists. For instance, the analysis in 
Chapter 8 shows that the POLITICS IS A FIGHT metaphor is used differently in populism than in 
elitism and pluralism. In the elitist speech, politics is competitive game in which the winner 
takes all. In the pluralist speech, politics is a contest, a challenge in which all people work 
together and win. In the populist speech, politics is a fully-fledged war. These metaphors 
precisely express the core values of elitism, pluralism, and populism. They can, for this 
reason, be regarded as typical for these styles. 
 On the surface structure level of language, or the populist narrative, populist politicians 
are themselves a main metaphor for the people. Populists very explicitly do not present 
themselves as politicians: they act metaphorically as the people themselves, speaking directly 
on their behalf. With their performance, populists make their version of the people 
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metaphorically present in the political realm. This demonstrates the necessity of the entire 
political performance⁠—and not just the ideas it expresses ⁠—to a fuller comprehension of 
populism. 
Regarding the deep structure of language, the core structure underlying populism 
traces back to the three main linguistic oppositions explained in chapters 2 and 4. Here, 
metaphor as linguistic principal is central to populism: it uses direct (metaphorical) 
identification with the people, instead of the adjacent (metonymic) relationship between 
people used by non-populists.  
 The relation between language, populism, and metaphor offers a new angle from 
which to analyze the role of metaphor in political framing. Lakoff emphasized the importance 
of metaphor for framing (Lakoff, 1995, 2004, 2014). According to Lakoff, Republicans think 
of the country as a family with an authoritative father, whereas Democrats conceptualize it 
as a family with nurturing parents (Lakoff, 2004, p. 6). The analyses in this dissertation 
suggest that Lakoff’s identification of two main metaphorical family frames in US politics 
requires elaboration. Speech analysis in Chapter 3 shows that a democrat such as Bernie 
Sanders often speaks of the people as “brothers and sisters”. Hence, at least a third family-
related metaphorical frame is being used in US politics; that of the children as equals with 
absent parents. There are many observable variants of this scenario, visible in common 
phrases such as the brotherhood of men, and the brothers and sisters of the revolution. Another 
variant is the orphans-frame: in the Netherlands, politician Pim Fortuyn called the people 
orphans, ones who had done away with their parents in the sixties and were now in need of 
a father and mother (Fortuyn, 2002). More family related political frames are identified by 
Augé. She showed that English, Spanish, and French media not only used the nurturing mother 
as a political frame; also the strict mother and victimized mother regularly occurred (Augé, 
2019). Musolff also identified two family metaphors in European media: alongside the usual 
children-parent metaphor scenario, he also defined a marriage-divorce metaphor (Musolff, 
2016, p. 31). The variety of family metaphors is not surprising; using metaphors is a creative 
process, and there is always the possibility of reframing the family in yet another way. This 
entails that, at the manifestation level, it is difficult—if not impossible—to link metaphor 
usage to political style. However, linking metaphors to this dissertation’s framework allows 
us to discern patterns in metaphor use at another level of abstraction. 
For instance, it is apt to place the Republican authoritarian father at the right side of 
the horseshoe/left-right triangle (Figure 9.1), and the Democratic nurturing parents in the 
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center, below the triangle of Figure 9.1. The rebellious children can be placed at the left side, 
as well as the victimized mother, and so forth. Though there is an endless possibility of new 
metaphors for expressing political framings, some metaphor scenarios are typical for a 
certain frame, which makes them unsuitable for use in other frames. This is, for instance, the 
case with the war metaphor scenario, as demonstrated in Chapter 8. All political frames 
allow the depiction of politics as a fight. However, depicting it as a war is not possible in a 
pluralist or elitist frame, as its typical populist view of politics directly contradicts these 
styles.  
Lastly, as described in Chapters 2 and 8, this dissertation points at a theoretical 
connection between three metaphor purposes and the three dimensions of political style. 
Style and metaphor theories suggest relationships between populism, pathos, and emotion-
based metaphor, between elitism, ethos, and strategy-based metaphor, and between 
pluralism, logos, and ratio-based metaphor, as explained in Chapter 8. However, the link 
does not reveal itself candidly in political discourse— which always contains all three types 
of metaphor—as the three dimensions are inseparable. However, the main purposes of the 
three speeches analyzed in Chapter 8 do in fact reflect this pattern. The amount of speeches 
analyzed is too limited to allow us to draw conclusions based on this pattern; more analyses 
are needed in order to explore this further. 
 
4 Contribution to Political Analysis Methods 
 
The analysis tool developed here is an improvement upon existing tools, as it is based on a 
Satori-proof answer to the question of whether or not something is populist (elitist, 
pluralist), but at the same time avoids creating contested cases. Sartori demanded social 
research categories that would generate clear yes or no answers (Sartori, 1970, 1991). The 
logic of the tool never pits populism entirely against pluralism or elitism; precisely in its 
overlap with one style is populism the opposite of another. This results in a stepwise yes-no 
procedure that can be used to define a political style: is a speech fragment populist or not? If 
not: is this fragment elitist or not? If not: it is pluralist. If fragments cannot be identified as 
having one style⁠—even with clear categories, political discourse is not always 
unambiguous⁠—they can at least be identified as having one anti-style, which consists of the 
shared features of two other styles. 
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The ability to generate yes/no categories that align with the common-sense understanding of 
populism is of great value for social research into populism. One might argue the merit of 
existent yes/no categories, such as those based on two broadly accepted minimal definitions 
of populism by Mudde (2017) and the Essex School (e.g., Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014), 
respectively. Indeed, separate from each other, they do work; however, when considered 
together they leave many contested cases, such as Jeremy Corbyn, who is considered 
populist according to one minimal definition, but not the other (see Chapter 4, section 1). 
The populism definition in this dissertation helps to assess these contested cases, as it 
precisely shows how a style is assembled. For instance, Corbyn displays a mixed populist-
pluralist style, fully populist in the social dimension but only partly in the ideational and 
presentational dimensions. Using clear yes/no categories does not entail that someone is 
either populist or not: instead, the layered form of the model allows forms of populism that 
are mixed with elitism or pluralism. 
Other scholars have constrained the populist category in their construction of yes-no 
categories. For instance, Pappas (2016) defines populism as “democratic illiberalism,” as 
opposed to liberalism. This yes-no category is indeed relevant in today’s European 
democratic contexts. Nevertheless, Papas creates a large group of newly contested cases by 
denying the populist label to all Northern liberal populist parties, such as the Dutch Freedom 
Party and the Danish People’s Party. This goes against the common-sense meaning of 
populism, in which these parties are regarded as populist (Moffitt, 2017). In the framework 
presented in this dissertation, democratic illiberalism’ is more broadly identified as anti-
pluralism, which is mixed populism-elitism, while the northern liberal populists such as Geert 
Wilders are regarded as fully populist (see Chapter 5). This assessment is better in line with 
other definitions of populism. 
Apart from the elimination of contested cases, the PEP index holds the advantage 
over other analysis methods that it is capable of assessing all political styles ⁠—populist as well 
as mainstream. It does not ask the question what is populist, it asks what is, in this specific 
political context, relatively populist, elitist, or pluralist? Together, the three styles cover all 
possibilities in a logical field of what style a political performance can have.  
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5 Contribution to the Literature on Current Politics 
 
This dissertation also contributes to the understanding of recent political developments, 
most prominently the current global rise of populism (Moffitt, 2016; Norris & Inglehart, 
2019). The speeches analyzed in the context of this dissertation may only provide small 
contributions; nevertheless, little pieces can be of great help in gaining insight into this 
complex political situation. In this section, I summarize a few insights gathered from the 67 
speech analyses conducted. 
In the United States, the analysis of speeches of Trump, Sanders, Clinton, and Obama 
have illuminated both differences and similarities between the politicians. Whereas Sanders 
has a mixed populist-pluralist style, Trump has a full populist style. Clinton has a mixed 
pluralist-elitist style, and Obama’s style falls between Clinton and Sanders; he is fully pluralist. 
A closer look at Clinton and Sanders shows that, despite both being Democrats, their 
difference in style is larger than that of Sanders and Trump. The two Democrats mostly 
differ in their conception of politics: one seeing it as conflict, the other seeing it as 
collaboration.  
In addition to this, I analyzed Trump’s style in speeches spread over a three-year 
timespan, which made it possible to evaluate how his style developed from populist to mixed 
populist-elitist. By analyzing his style in comparison to similar mixed populist-elitist styles ⁠—
Boris Johnson in the UK and Thierry Baudet in the Netherlands ⁠—I was able to illuminate 
how elitist elements are integrated into a populist discourse. This style combination had 
hardly been explored until now. 
While Trump’s style was predominantly populist before he was elected president of 
the US in 2016, his speeches delivered in 2017 and 2018 show a slow movement toward 
elitism. As president, Trump continues to create an internal (populist) frontier within 
American society. However, the opposition is no longer between the people and the elite 
and immigrants; the new divide is between the real people (together with the real elite) and 
the bad elite and immigrants. This shift allows him to embrace his elite role as president 
while remaining part of the real people. 
In the UK, Boris Johnson’s political style between 2015 and 2017 shows two changes: 
one from mixed elitism-pluralism to full anti-pluralism, and one from elitism to populism and 
back. The populist move can be interpreted in light of the polarizing effect of the 
referendum, whereas the movement toward anti-pluralism can partly be understood as 
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strategically-rhetorically motivated: within the ongoing Brexit debate, it is much more 
persuasive to state that the (non-pluralist) people voted as one for Brexit than that just over 
half of the people voted for Brexit. Besides, the analysis shows that Johnson’s presentational 
style before Brexit was more pluralist than his ideas and that the elitist-populist style is more 
internally coherent; the separate styles of the dimensions come closer together in 2017 than 
in 2015 and 2016. 
 In the Netherlands, Thierry Baudet has consistently held a mixed populist-elitist style, 
combining a plain populist message with an elite, intellectual image. The style combines well 
with his nationalist and nativist message. Moreover, it has the strategic benefit of positioning 
him advantageously in the political field: different from both mainstream politicians and the 
dominant populist player in the Netherlands, Geert Wilders. 
Lastly, a comparison of a fully populist speech with both fully elitist and pluralist 
speeches has contributed to the insight into the various metaphors used in different political 
styles. The analysis shows that simply counting the number of references to the people is 
insufficient for measuring populism in political text or talk. Van Leeuwen (2019) showed 
already that grammatical differences matter for the people centrism in a text; additionally, this 
dissertation shows that metaphorical differences can result in a completely different style. 
Hence, it is the way in which references to the people are made, that distinguishes populism 
from other political styles. 
The conducted speech analyses can be complemented with numerous new analyses, 
ones that can be compared with the previously analyzed speeches. This provides ample 
opportunities for international political comparisons. A few are already underway, such as an 
analysis of Johnson’s political style before, during, and after the Brexit referendum in 
comparison with Jeremy Corbyn’s and Nigel Farage’s style (Schoor, 2019). Only Farage’s 
style has remained somewhat over the course of the Brexit campaign; both Corbyn’s and 
Johnson’s show major style shifts. Also, the differences between populist and non-populist 
styles in current Dutch politics are under analysis, by complementing the style analyses of 
right- and left wing populists in this dissertation with analyses of mainstream politicians in the 
Netherlands.  
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6 The Politics of Style 
 
The relevance of political style has shown itself through the analyses in this dissertation. The 
layered expressions of style enable politicians to express much more than a simple 
statement or opinion in the limited timeslot of a media presentation. They express not only 
what they stand for, but also who they are, and who they fight for. The concepts developed 
in this dissertation provide a handle for analyzing the entire performance of politicians in a 
comprehensive way.  
The performed analyses show that most politicians express a coherent style (or anti-
style); a style in which all parts contribute to their political message. More analyses are 
needed in order to gain a deeper insight into the meaning of political style. For instance; the 
relation between populism-elitism-pluralism and right-left-center politics; the relation 
between political role and style; the relation between political circumstances, such as 
referendums and elections, and style. All these questions can be further investigated with the 
tools developed in this dissertation. With the developed concepts and analysis tool, this 
dissertation has leveled the playing field of political style analysis. Now, it is time to explore 
the field even more thoroughly. 
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Appendix A: Speech List 
 
Analyzed Speeches in PEP-index 2.0 
The USA: 
1. Obama, B. “The Democratic Convention Speech,” Philadelphia, July 27, 2016. 
https://www.c-span.org/video/?412847-101/president-obama-remarks-democratic-
national-convention 
2. Obama, B. “Press conference,” Canada, June 29, 2016. 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/photos-and-video/video/2016/06/29/president-
obama-participates-trilateral-press-conference (partially analyzed) 
3. Sanders, B. “The Washington Square Rally,” New York, April 13, 2016. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s9NjVjG2lqI 
4.  Sanders, B. “The Penn State Rally,” Pennsylvania, April 19, 2016. https://www.c-
span.org/video/?408383-1/bernie-sanders-campaign-rally-university-park-pennsylvania 
5. Clinton, H. “Manhattan Rally,” New York, April 18, 2016. https://www.c-
span.org/video/?408350-1/hillary-clinton-getoutthevote-rally  
6. Clinton, H. “Scranton Rally,” Scranton PA, April 22, 2016. https://www.c-
span.org/video/?408560-1/hillary-clinton-campaign-event-scranton-pennsylvania 
7. Trump, D. “The Buffalo Rally,” Buffalo, April 18, 2016. https://www.c-
span.org/video/?408351-1/donald-trump-campaign-rally-buffalo-new-york 
8. Trump, D. “The Wilkes-Barre Rally,” Wilkes-Barre, April 25, 2016. https://www.c-
span.org/video/?408686-1/donald-trump-campaign-rally-wilkesbarre-pennsylvania 
9. Trump, D. “The Pensacola Rally,” Pensacola, FL, December 8, 2017, video, 
https://www.c-span.org/video/?438191-1/president-trump-holds-rally-pensacola-florida;  
10. Trump, D. “The Minnesota Rally,” Rochester, MN, June 20, 2018, video, https://www.c-
span.org/video/?452500-1/president-trump-campaigns-republicans-rochester-minnesota. 
 
The UK: 
11. Farage, N. “The 2015 UKIP Conference Speech” September 25, 2015. https://www.c-
span.org/video/?328350-1/uk-independence-party-conference-nigel-farage-speech 
12. Farage, N. “The 2016 Peterborough Brexit Campaign Speech,” March 17, 2016. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RDdDS2NZO14 
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13. Farage, N. “The 2017 Conservative Political Activism Conference,” February 24, 2017. 
https://www.c-span.org/video/?424395-4/nigel-farage-2017-conservative-political-action-
conference 
14. Johnson, B. “The 2015 Conservative Party Conference Speech,” Manchester, October 6, 
2015, video, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j2jJQumLfg8 
15. Johnson, B. “The 2016 Brexit Campaign Speech,” May 9, 2016. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4ViQNeZRK3w 
16. Johnson, B. “The 2017 Conservative Party Conference Speech,” October 3, 2017. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YMKURiCcUNI 
17. Corbyn, J. “The 2015 Labor Conference Speech,” September 29, 2015. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qHGEnYChJYM 
18. Corbyn, J. “The 2016 Brexit Remain campaign,” April 14, 2016. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t6a2sEc-BWE 
19. Corbyn, J. “The 2017 Labor Conference Speech,” September 27, 2017. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bKpCwTEJ77A 
 
The Netherlands: 
20. Wilders, G. “Parliamentary Speech,” The Hague, September 21, 2016. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m-dq2xy80cs 
21. Wilders, G. “ENF Congress Speech,” Koblenz, January 21, 2017. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QhEAB9dyUpU 
22. Roemer, E. “The Party Congressional Speech,” January 14, 2017. 
https://www.sp.nl/nieuws/2017/01/emile-roemer-we-maken-sp-groot-en-rutte-klein 
23. Roemer, E. “Final Election Television Debate,” March 14 2017. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jTQLq_9N1rU 
24. Baudet, T. “The Founding Speech,” Amsterdam, January 14, 2017. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=1&v=JvlRApuId-o 
25. Baudet, T. “The Rotterdam Rally,” Rotterdam, March 9, 2017. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EuPSQOltuxI 
26. Baudet, T. “The Maiden Speech,” The Hague, March 28, 2017. 
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20162017-60-9.html 
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27. Baudet, T. “The Venlo Rally,” Venlo, June 11, 2018, video, 
https://www.facebook.com/forumvoordemocratie/videos/fvd-in-
venlo/1584507648341607/ 
28.  Baudet, T. “The Senate Victory Speech,” March 20, 2019, video, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_ABtS0Hd12s 
29. Rutte, M. “Debat over de regeringsverklaring 2012 deel 1”, The Hague, November 13, 
2012, https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20122013-22-3.html 
30. Rutte, M. “Debat over de regeringsverklaring 2012 deel 2”, The Hague, November 14, 
2012, https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20122013-22-6.html 
31. Zandt, P. “Debat over de regeringsverklaring 1946, deel 1 ”, The Hague, July 9, 1946 
https://repository.overheid.nl/frbr/sgd/1946I/0000074966/1/pdf/SGD_1946I_0000015.pdf  
 
Analyzed speeches in PEP-index 0 
The Netherlands: 
32. Wagenaar, G. (CPN), “Debat over de regeringsverklaring 1946, deel 1”, The Hague, July 
9, 1946. P. 56 onwards. 
https://repository.overheid.nl/frbr/sgd/1946I/0000074966/1/pdf/SGD_1946I_0000015.pdf  
33. Wagenaar, G. (CPN), “Debat over de regeringsverklaring 1946, deel 2”, The Hague, July 
10, 1946. p. 82 onwards. 
https://repository.overheid.nl/frbr/sgd/1946I/0000074967/1/pdf/SGD_1946I_0000016.pdf 
34. Wagenaar, G. (CPN), “Interpellatiedebat onrust uitzending dienstplichtigen naar 
Indonesie”, The Hague, September, 25, 1946. p.38 onwards. 
35. Van der Goes van Naters, M. (PvdA) “Debat over de regeringsverklaring 1946. Deel 1”, 
The Hague, July 9, 1946. P 58 onwards.   
https://repository.overheid.nl/frbr/sgd/1946I/0000074966/1/pdf/SGD_1946I_0000015.pdf  
36. Van der Goes van Naters, M. (PvdA) “Debat over de regeringsverklaring 1946, deel 2”, 
The Hague, July 10, 1946, p. 84 onwards. 
https://repository.overheid.nl/frbr/sgd/1946I/0000074967/1/pdf/SGD_1946I_0000016.pdf 
37. Schouten, J.(ARP). ) “Debat over de regeringsverklaring 1946, deel 1”, The Hague, July 9, 
1946. P. 48 onwards.  
https://repository.overheid.nl/frbr/sgd/1946I/0000074966/1/pdf/SGD_1946I_0000015.pdf  
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38. Schouten, J.(ARP). ) “Debat over de regeringsverklaring 1946, deel 2”, The Hague, July 
10, 1946. P. 77 onwards.  
https://repository.overheid.nl/frbr/sgd/1946I/0000074967/1/pdf/SGD_1946I_0000016.pdf 
39. Beel, L. (KVP). “Regeeringsverklaring 1946,”, The Hague, July 05, 1946 p. 45 onwards. 
https://repository.overheid.nl/frbr/sgd/1946I/0000074965/1/pdf/SGD_1946I_0000014.pdf 
40. Beel, L. (KVP).  “Debat over de regeringsverklaring 1946, deel 2”, The Hague, July 9, 
1946. P. 74 onwards  
https://repository.overheid.nl/frbr/sgd/1946I/0000074966/1/pdf/SGD_1946I_0000016.pdf 
41. Koekoek, H. (BP). “Debat over de regeringsverklaring 1971, deel 1”, The Hague, August 
4, 1971. P. 213 onwards. 
https://repository.overheid.nl/frbr/sgd/1971/0000222150/1/pdf/SGD_1971_0000125.pdf;  
42. Koekoek, H. (BP). “Debat over de regeringsverklaring 1971, deel 2”, The Hague, August 
5, 1971, p 253 onwards 
https://repository.overheid.nl/frbr/sgd/1971/0000222151/1/pdf/SGD_1971_0000126.pdf 
43. Den Uyl, J. (PvdA). “Debat over de regeringsverklaring 1971, deel 1”, The Hague, August 
4, 1971, p 154 onwards 
https://repository.overheid.nl/frbr/sgd/1971/0000222150/1/pdf/SGD_1971_0000125.pdf;  
44. Den Uyl, J. (PvdA). “Debat over de regeringsverklaring 1971, deel 2”, The Hague, August 
5, 1971, p 236 onwards 
https://repository.overheid.nl/frbr/sgd/1971/0000222151/1/pdf/SGD_1971_0000126.pdf 
45. Van Mierlo, H. (D66). “Debat over de regeringsverklaring 1971, deel 1”, The Hague, 
August 4, 1971, p. 160 onwards 
https://repository.overheid.nl/frbr/sgd/1971/0000222150/1/pdf/SGD_1971_0000125.pdf  
46. Van Mierlo, H. (D66). “Debat over de regeringsverklaring 1971, deel 2”, The Hague, 
August 5, 1971, p. 239 onwards 
https://repository.overheid.nl/frbr/sgd/1971/0000222151/1/pdf/SGD_1971_0000126.pdf 
47. Wiegel H. (VVD). “Debat over de regeringsverklaring 1971, deel 1”, The Hague, August 
4, 1971, p.172 onwards 
https://repository.overheid.nl/frbr/sgd/1971/0000222150/1/pdf/SGD_1971_0000125.pdf 
48. Wiegel H. (VVD). “Debat over de regeringsverklaring 1971, deel 2”, The Hague, August 
5, 1971, p.243 onwards 
https://repository.overheid.nl/frbr/sgd/1971/0000222151/1/pdf/SGD_1971_0000126.pdf 
49. Biesheuvel,  B. (ARP). “Regeringsverklaring 1971”, The Hague, August 3, 1971, p.138 
onwards https://repository.overheid.nl/frbr/sgd/1971/0000222149/1/pdf/SGD_1971_0000124.pdf 
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50. Biesheuvel,  B. (ARP). “Debat over de regeringsverklaring 1971, deel 2”, The Hague, 
August 5, 1971, p. 218 onwards 
https://repository.overheid.nl/frbr/sgd/1971/0000222151/1/pdf/SGD_1971_0000126.pdf  
51. Bolkestein, F. (VVD) “Debat over de regeringsverklaring 1994, deel 1”, The Hague, 
August 31, 1994, p. 5836 onwards 
https://repository.overheid.nl/frbr/sgd/19931994/0000003679/1/pdf/SGD_19931994_0001090.pdf; 
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Appendix B: Subscores 
Sub-scores of the analyzed speeches in PEP-index 2 
 
Elements:        
1 – The people;       
2 – The elite;        
3 – Democracy/government;     
4 – Politics; and  
5 – The political context.  
 
Dimensions: 
I – Ideational; 
S – Social; and 
P – Presentational. 
 
Scores: 
po = populism poel = mixed populism-elitism 
el = elitism  elpl = mixed elitism-pluralism 
pl = pluralism  popl = mixed populism-pluralism 
 
X-Y scores: the total and sub scores are converted into positions on a X-Y isosceles 
triangular field. The triangle has Populism, Elitism, and Pluralism at its corners, with: 
 
Populism:  Y = +86,6  and X = +100 
Elitism: Y = +86,6  and X = -100 
Pluralism: Y = -86,6  and X =  0 
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The USA: 
 
Obama, 2016, speech 1  
Dimensions Elements Styles (%) X-Y position 
Total score pluralist 13% 7% 80% +7 -52 
Sub-scores 1 2 3 4 5 po  el pl X Y 
I Ideational pl elpl pl popl pl 10% 10% 80% 0 -51,9 
S Social popl pl popl pl pl 20%  80% 0 -51,9 
P Presentational popl pl pl pl elpl 10% 10% 80% 20 -51,9 
Table B1 
 
 
Sanders, 2016, speeches 3 en 4 
Dimensions Elements Styles (%) X-Y position 
Total score populist/pluralist 57%  43% +57 +12 
Sub-scores 1 2 3 4 5 po  el pl X Y 
1I Ideational popl po popl popl popl 60%  40% +60 +17 
1S Social popl popl pl po po 60%  40% +60 +17 
1P Presentational popl popl pl po popl 50%  50% +50 0 
Table B2 
 
 
Clinton 2016, speeches 5 en 6 
Dimensions Elements Styles (%) X-Y position 
Total score elitist/pluralist  43% 43% 13% -43,3 +3,85 
Sub-scores 1 2 3 4 5 po el pl con X Y 
1I Ideational pl el elpl elpl elpl  50% 50%  -50 0 
1S Social con el pl elpl elpl  40% 40% 10% -40 +5,8 
1P Presentational con elpl elpl elpl elpl  40% 40% 10% -40 +5,8 
Table B3 
  
216 APPENDIX B 
 
 
 
 
 
Trump, 2016, speeches 7 en 8 
Dimensions Elements Styles (%) X-Y position 
Total score populist 90% 3% 7% +87 +75 
Sub-scores 1 2 3 4 5 po  el pl X Y 
I Ideational popl po po po po 90%  10% +90 +69 
S Social po poel popl po po 80% 10% 10% +70 +69 
P Presentational po po po po po 100%   +100 +87 
Table B4 
 
 
Trump 2017, speech 9 
Dimensions Elements Styles (%) X-Y position 
Total score populist 87% 13%  +73 +87 
Sub-scores 1 2 3 4 5 po el pl X Y 
1I Ideational po po po po poel 90% 10%  +80 +87 
1S Social po poel po po poel 80% 20%  +60 +87 
1P Presentational po po po po poel 90% 10%  +80 +87 
Table B5 
 
 
Trump 2018, speech 10 
Dimensions Elements Styles (%) X-Y position 
Total score Populist/elitist 67% 33%  +33 +87 
Sub-scores 1 2 3 4 5 po el pl X Y 
1I Ideational po poel po poel poel 70% 30%  +40 +87 
1S Social po poel poel poel poel 60% 40%  +20 +87 
1P Presentational poel poel po po poel 70% 30%  +40 +87 
Table B6 
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The UK: 
 
Farage 2015, speech 11 
Dimensions Elements Styles (%) X-Y position 
Total score populist 80%  20% +80 +52 
Sub-scores 1 2 3 4 5 po el pl X Y 
1I Ideational popl po po popl po 80%  20% +80 +52 
1S Social popl po popl po po 80%  20% +80 +52 
1P Presentational po po po po pl 80%  20% +80 +52 
Table B7 
 
 
Farage 2016, speech 12 
Dimensions Elements Styles (%) X-Y position 
Total score populist 87%  13% +87 +64 
Sub-scores 1 2 3 4 5 po el pl X Y 
1I Ideational popl po po po po 90%  10% +90 +69 
1S Social po po po po po 100%   +100 +87 
1P Presentational popl popl po po popl 70%  30% +70 +35 
Table B8 
 
 
Farage 2017, speech 13 
Dimensions Elements Styles (%) X-Y position 
Total score populist 100%   +100 +87 
Sub-scores 1 2 3 4 5 po el pl X Y 
1I Ideational po po po po po 100%   +100 +87 
1S Social po po po po po 100%   +100 +87 
1P Presentational po po po po po 100%   +100 +87 
Table B9 
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Johnson 2015, speech 14 
Dimensions Elements Styles (%) X-Y position 
Total score Elitist 23% 57% 20% -33 +52 
Sub-scores 1 2 3 4 5 po el pl X Y 
1I Ideational elpl poel poel poel el 30% 60% 10% -30 +69 
1S Social elpl elpl el poel el 10% 70% 20% -60 +52 
1P Presentational poel elpl pl poel poel 30% 40% 30% -10 +35 
Table B10 
 
 
Johnson 2016, speech 15 
Dimensions Elements Styles (%) 
X-Y 
position 
Total score Populist-elitist 63% 30% 7% +33 +75 
Sub-scores 1 2 3 4 5 po el pl X Y 
1I Ideational poel poel poel po po 80% 15% 5% +40 +87 
1S Social poel poel poel po poel 60% 40%  +20 +87 
1P Presentational poel poel popl po popl 60% 20% 20% +40 +52 
Table B11 
 
 
Johnson 2017, speech 16 
Dimensions Elements Styles (%) X-Y position 
Total score Elitist-populist 30% 70%  -40 +87 
Sub-scores 1 2 3 4 5 po el pl X Y 
1I Ideational el poel poel poel el 30% 70%  -40 +87 
1S Social el el poel poel el 20% 80%  -60 +87 
1P Presentational poel el poel poel poel 40% 60%  -20 +87 
Table B12  
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Corbyn 2015, speech 17 
Dimensions Elements Styles (%) X-Y position 
Total score Pluralist-populist 37%  63% +37 -23 
Sub-scores 1 2 3 4 5 po el pl X Y 
1I Ideational plpo po plpo plpo po 70%  30% +70 +35 
1S Social pl pl pl pl po 80%  20% +20 -52 
1P Presentational pl pl pl plpo plpo 80%  20% +20 -52 
Table B13 
 
 
Corbyn 2016, speech 18 
Dimensions Elements Styles (%) X-Y position 
Total score Pluralist-populist 30% 3% 67% +27 -29 
Sub-scores 1 2 3 4 5 po el pl X Y 
1I Ideational pl po po elpl popl 50% 10% 40% +40 +17 
1S Social pl popl pl pl popl 20%  80% +20 -52 
1P Presentational pl popl pl popl pl 20%  80% +20 -52 
Table B14 
 
 
Corbyn 2017, speech 19 
Dimensions Elements Styles (%) X-Y position 
Total score Populist/pluralist 60%  40% +60 +17 
Sub-scores 1 2 3 4 5 po el pl X Y 
1I Ideational pl po popl popl po 60%  40% +60 +17 
1S Social po po popl popl po 80%  20% +80 +52 
1P Presentational pl po pl popl popl 40%  60% +40 -17 
Table B15 
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The Netherlands: 
 
 
Wilders 2016-2017, speech 20 and 21 
Dimensions Elements Styles (%) X-Y position 
Total score Populist 97%  3% +97 +81 
Sub-scores 1 2 3 4 5 po el pl X Y 
1I Ideational po po po po po 100%   +100 +87 
1S Social po po po po po 100%   +100 +87 
1P Presentational po po po po popl 90%  10% +90 +69 
Table B16 
 
 
Roemer 2017, speech 22 and 23 
Dimensions Elements Styles (%) X-Y position 
Total score Populist/pluralist 70%  30% +70 +35 
Sub-scores 1 2 3 4 5 po el pl X Y 
1I Ideational pl popl po plpo po 60%  40% +60 +17 
1S Social pl po po po po 80%  20% +80 +52 
1P Presentational popl po pl po po 70%  30% +70 +35 
Table B17 
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Baudet 2017, speech 24, 25 and 26 
Dimensions Elements Styles (%) X-Y position 
Total score Populist/elitist 70% 30%  +40 +87 
Sub-scores 1 2 3 4 5 po el pl X Y 
1I Ideational po poel po poel po 80% 20%  +60 +87 
1S Social poel poel po poel po 70% 30%  +40 +87 
1P Presentational poel poel poel poel po 60% 40%  +20 +87 
Table B18 
 
 
Baudet 2018, speech 27 
Dimensions Elements Styles (%) X-Y position 
Total score populist/pluralist 73% 27%  +47 +87 
Sub-scores 1 2 3 4 5 po el pl X Y 
1I Ideational po po po po po 100%   +100 +87 
1S Social poel poel poel poel po 60% 40%  +20 +87 
1P Presentational poel poel poel poel po 60% 40%  +20 +87 
Table B19 
 
 
Baudet 2019, speech 28 
Dimensions Elements Styles (%) X-Y position 
Total score populist/pluralist 70% 30%  +40 +87 
Sub-scores 1 2 3 4 5 po el pl X Y 
1I Ideational po poel po poel po 80% 20%  +60 +87 
1S Social poel poel poel poel po 60% 40%  +20 +87 
1P Presentational poel poel poel po po 70% 30%  +40 +87 
Table B20 
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Rutte 2012, speech 29 and 30 
Dimensions Elements Styles (%) X-Y position 
Total score Elitist/pluralist 3% 47% 50% -43 0 
Sub-scores 1 2 3 4 5 po el pl X Y 
1I Ideational elpl el el el pl  70% 30% -70 +35 
1S Social pl el elpl elpl elpl  50% 50% -50 0 
1P Presentational popl pl pl el pl 10% 20% 70% -10 -35 
Table B21 
 
 
Zandt 1946, speech 31 
Dimensions Elements Styles (%) X-Y position 
Total score Elitist-populist 37% 43% 20% -7 +52 
Sub-scores 1 2 3 4 5 po el pl X Y 
1I Ideational el po pl poel poel 40% 40% 20% 0 +52 
1S Social el poel poel poel poel 40% 60%  -30 +69 
1P Presentational elpl po poel poel popl 50% 30% 20% +10 +35 
Table B22 
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Appendix C: Inductive versus Structural features of populism 
 
The 5 elements and 3 dimensions of 
the core structure of political style  
Populist features in the 
PEP-index (appendix D) 
Rooduijn’s (2014) inductive 
features of populism (bold: 
belonging to populism’s 
core) 
1 The people Ideational  The people as one good 
and capable body. 
3 Homogeneity of the 
people 
5 Exclusionism 
Social Populists are part of one 
homogeneous/unified 
people. 
1 People-centrism 
5 Exclusionism 
Presentational Voice of the people in 
language of the people: 
identification. 
5 Exclusionism 
7 Simplistic language 
8 Direct Communication 
Style 
12 Loosely mediated 
relationship 
2 The political elite Ideational  The elite as bad / not right. 2  Anti-Elitism 
 
Social Populists do not belong to 
the elite: no power to the 
elite.   
2  Anti-Elitism 
10 Image of the outsider 
12 Loosely mediated 
relationship 
Presentational Emotional, accusatory 
language towards the elite: 
blaming. 
2  Anti-Elitism 
10 Image of the outsider 
3 Democracy / 
government 
Ideational  Democracy is self-
governance of the people. 
4   Direct Democracy 
 
Social Exclusive power to the real 
people or one of us. 
4   Direct Democracy 
11 Centralization of leader 
Presentational Messages / solutions based 
on the people's "common 
sense." 
7 Simplistic language 
8 Direct Communication 
Style 
4 Politics Ideational  Politics is a fight and is 
about changing the status 
quo. 
9 Polarization 
Social Conflict: belief that 
compromises are betrayals 
of the people. 
9 Polarization 
Presentational Polarization style; stirring 
the people. 
9 Polarization 
5 Context Ideational  Focus on crisis / what has 
been lost. 
6 Proclamation of a 
crisis 
Social The people / the populist 
as "the hero." 
2 Anti-Elitism 
10 Image of the outsider 
Presentational Negative, pessimistic 
language, enlarging crises. 
6 Proclamation of a 
crisis 
Table C1 
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Appendix D: Six Political Styles Relatively Defined 
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De politieke betekenis van stijl 
Politiek optreden tussen populisme, elitisme en pluralisme. 
 
De afgelopen vijftig jaar is de rol van stijl steeds belangrijker geworden in de politiek. Door 
ontwikkelingen in de media—zoals de opkomst van de smartphone en sociale platforms als 
Facebook en Twitter, wint de vorm van politieke uitingen aan invloed ten opzichte van de 
inhoud. Niet alleen wat politici zeggen doet ertoe, maar in steeds grotere mate ook hoe ze 
dat doen. Waar die vorm precies uit bestaat, is echter onduidelijk, want het concept politieke 
stijl is structureel onderontwikkeld. Waar de ene wetenschapper spreekt over retoriek, doelt 
de ander op het bredere begrip discourse. Weer andere wetenschappers wijzen op het sociale 
aspect van politieke stijl. Dit zorgt voor veel ruis in wetenschappelijke discussies over 
politiek, zoals de discussie over populisme; degenen die dit fenomeen zien als een politieke 
stijl blijken het vaak over verschillende dingen te hebben.  
Onderzoek naar de rol van stijl in de politiek—zoals in deze dissertatie—begint 
daarom onvermijdelijk met het beantwoorden van de vraag: wat is politieke stijl? Een analyse 
van het concept wordt gepresenteerd in het theoretische hoofdstuk 2 van dit proefschrift. 
Samengevat is politieke stijl het “gestileerde optreden van politici op het politieke toneel met 
als doel het verschil tussen kiezer en gekozene te overbruggen met een politieke identiteit”. 
Er zijn drie dimensies betrokken bij politieke stijl, als gevolg van het feit dat politieke stijl en 
de politieke identiteit die het uitdrukt in en door discourse ontstaan.   
Discourse verwijst naar de taal en cultuur van een groep in de ruimste zin van het 
woord: alles wat in een groep betekenis heeft, dus ook acties, mode, of de inrichting van 
ruimtes hoort bij discourse. Discourse omvat altijd drie dimensies: de dimensie van de 
ideeën (cognitie); de sociale dimensie (groepsrelaties), en de dimensie van de presentatie 
(taal, beeld, retoriek). Deze drie dimensies zijn terug te voeren op de drie fundamentele 
spanningen die er per definitie in discourse bestaan.  
 
• Een eerste spanning in discourse bestaat in de relatie tussen het teken (in de taal) en het 
betekende (het ding). Deze relatie is in principe arbitrair en wordt bepaald door een 
sociale relatie waarin macht een rol speelt: het machtige subject geeft een naam aan het 
machteloze object. Een voorbeeld: ouders geven hun kind een naam. Een kind heeft daar 
geen macht over, terwijl deze naam nooit perfect past. Het kind kan pas een andere 
naam kiezen wanneer het zelf een mondig subject is geworden. Het verschil tussen 
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machtig subject en machteloos object is de basisspanning in de sociale dimensie van 
discourse. 
• Een tweede ingebouwde spanning in discourse is terug te voeren op de syntagmatische 
relatie tussen tekens. Dit is de spanning tussen het universele (genus) en het specifieke 
(species). Een voorbeeld: ook al voldoet geen enkele hond (species) precies aan het 
prototype van een hond (genus), toch is het onomstreden dat bijvoorbeeld een Chiwawa 
een hond is en geen konijn. Dat komt omdat de genus van een woord een extra 
betekenis heeft op een hoger abstractieniveau. Op basis daarvan wordt besloten wat een 
hond is en wat niet. Een genus heeft echter ook altijd een tekort, omdat het geen enkele 
hond in detail beschrijft. Deze spanning, veroorzaakt door een extra en een tekort aan 
betekenis, legt de basis voor een autonome dimensie van de ideeën in discourse, en heeft 
betrekking op categorisaties van woorden. 
• Een derde ingebouwde spanning in discourse is terug te voeren tot de paradigmatische 
relatie tussen tekens; de mogelijkheid om meerdere betekenissen toe te kennen aan 
hetzelfde woord. Een voorbeeld: bleek is een tint, maar kan ook verwijzen naar een 
emotie en naar een schoonmaakmiddel. De relatie tussen de verschillende mogelijke 
betekenissen van een teken kan een metaforische zijn, waardoor de relatie tot stand komt 
op basis van identificatie van het ene teken met een ander. Het kan ook een 
metonymische relatie zijn. In dit geval wordt de betekenis benaderd door omschrijving van 
een onderdeel, zoals bij het schoonmaakmiddel bleek, dat genoemd is naar het effect dat 
het heeft op kleur. Dit speelt zich af in de dimensie van de presentatie. 
 
Uit de semiotische analyse beschreven in hoofdstuk 4 blijkt dat deze drie fundamentele 
spanningen in discourse direct verband houden met politieke stijl: het zijn de drie spanningen 
die ook de relatie bepalen tussen drie gerelateerde politieke stijlen; populisme, elitisme, en 
pluralisme. Voor hierop verder in te gaan, volgt eerst een korte omschrijving van deze drie 
stijllabels. 
Elitisme is een opvatting over democratie waarin het volk ongeschikt wordt geacht 
om het land te besturen. Daarom vindt men het beter dat de elite regeert. Leden van de 
elite zijn helpers van het volk en zorgen ervoor dat het land gedijt. Eliteleden competeren 
met elkaar om de gunst van het volk dat het recht heeft de beste leider te kiezen en slechte 
leiders af te zetten. Deze opvatting van democratie is tegenwoordig niet meer in zwang en 
heeft na de Tweede Wereldoorlog plaatsgemaakt voor een pluralistische opvatting over 
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democratie. Pluralisme definieert het volk als een heterogene samenstelling van groepen en 
individuen. In het pluralisme heeft niemand het privilege van de macht; iedereen heeft in 
principe toegang tot de macht, maar alleen tijdelijk. De afspraak is dat de groep of politicus 
met de meeste steun tijdelijk mag regeren, onder voorwaarde dat de rechten van 
minderheden worden gerespecteerd. Ondanks het feit dat de meeste huidige westerse 
democratieën heden ten dage pluralistisch zijn, is elitisme niet helemaal verdwenen. Ook in 
een overwegend pluralistische context hebben elites vaak gemakkelijker toegang tot de 
macht dan mensen uit het gewone volk. Dit laatste is een veel gehoorde klacht in het 
populisme. Populisten eisen namens het volk de macht op, omdat alleen zij écht de stem van 
het volk vertegenwoordigen. De overige politici dansen volgens de populist naar de pijpen 
van de corrupte elite die alleen uit is op het eigen gewin. 
Zoals gezegd, analyse van de onderliggende taalstructuur van populisme, elitisme en 
pluralisme laat zien dat deze structuur terug te voeren is op de drie fundamentele 
spanningen in discourse. Bij deze drie spanningen staan er altijd twee politieke stijlen 
tegenover de derde, in wisselende samenstelling, en wel als volgt: 
  
• De ideeën-dimensie: pluralisme staat aan de kant van de species (het volk is een 
heterogene samenstelling van individuen en groepen) tegenover populisme/elitisme, 
aan de kant van de genus (het volk is een); 
• De sociale dimensie: elitisme staat aan de kant van het machtige subject (macht aan 
de elite) tegenover pluralisme/populisme aan de kant van het machteloze object dat 
de macht eist om over zichzelf te beslissen (macht aan het volk); 
• De presentatie-dimensie: populisme staat aan de kant van metaforische identificatie 
(identificatie met het volk) tegenover elitisme/pluralisme aan de kant van de 
metonymische benadering (representatie van het volk).  
 
Omdat de drie dimensies van discourse circulair met elkaar verbonden zijn—ze veroorzaken 
elkaar en ze zijn elkaars gevolg—betekent dit dat ook populisme, elitisme en pluralisme 
circulair met elkaar zijn verbonden. Hierdoor vormen ze gedrieën een gesloten systeem: ze 
omvatten een logisch veld op grond waarvan alle voorkomende politieke stijlen kunnen 
worden gedefinieerd. Dit houdt in dat stijlen van politici eenduidig kunnen worden bepaald: 
een uitspraak is altijd pluralistisch of niet; vervolgens, als het niet pluralistisch is, dan valt het 
onder elitisme of niet; en wanneer dat ook niet het geval is, dan is het noodzakelijkerwijs 
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populistisch. Soms is een uitspraak niet eenduidig, maar een stijl kan altijd ten minste worden 
gedefinieerd als een anti-stijl; datgene wat een stijl niet is. Dit komt overeen met de 
gezamenlijke kenmerken van de twee andere stijlen. Voor een stijlanalyse moeten dus zes 
stijllabels onderscheiden worden—drie stijlen en drie anti-stijlen—die gezamenlijk alle 
mogelijke politieke stijlen omschrijven. 
 Door nog verder in te zoemen op de drie dimensies van de drie stijlen, blijkt er nog 
een patroon te bestaan. Een politieke stijl is in principe een groepsstijl, omdat het 
functioneert om contact te leggen met een groep mensen. Echter, een pure groepsstijl 
bestaat niet, omdat groepen altijd bestaan uit individuen. Om groeps- en individuele belangen 
met elkaar te verzoenen, zijn er systemen nodig, bijvoorbeeld het systeem van een 
democratie, waarin meerderheids- en minderheidsbelangen worden afgewogen. Conceptuele 
analyse laat zien dat populisme, elitisme en pluralisme ieder op hun eigen manier een 
persoonlijke, groeps- en systematische stijl combineren, en weer in wisselende samenstelling 
precies elkaars tegengestelde en bondgenoot zijn in elke dimensie. Het zijn drie varianten 
van een groepsstijl waarin persoonlijke, groeps- en systematische elementen gelijkmatig over 
de drie dimensies zijn verspreid. 
De drie stijlen lenen zich dus goed om gezamenlijk te gebruiken voor de analyse van 
politiek discourse, bijvoorbeeld speeches, maar ook manifesten, partijprogramma’s, debatten 
of andere optredens. Om ervoor te zorgen dat de analyses op een vergelijkbare manier 
uitgevoerd worden, met aandacht voor dezelfde onderdelen, zijn er vijf focuselementen van 
politieke stijl gedefinieerd, gebaseerd op een analyse van de afzonderlijke dimensies. Deze 
focuselementen zijn: 1) Het volk; 2) De politieke elite; 3) Democratie/regering; 4) Politiek; en 5) 
Politieke context. Van deze vijf elementen zijn beschrijvingen gemaakt voor de drie stijlen en 
hun anti-stijlen, die alle aan elkaar gerelateerd zijn. De beschrijvingen van deze vijf elementen 
in drie dimensies en zes stijlen (met in totaal 90 stijlelementen) zijn dus relatief: niets 
behoort objectief tot het populisme, elitisme of pluralisme — de elementen worden 
gedefinieerd ten opzichte van elkaar. De beschrijvingen vormen de kern van een methode 
voor de analyse van politiek discourse, de PEP-index (zie Appendix D). Met behulp van dit 
analyse model zijn speeches geanalyseerd en vergeleken in drie politieke contexten: de VS, 
het VK, en Nederland. Deze contexten zijn niet zonder meer vergelijkbaar; iets wat in 
Nederland tot het elitisme hoort, hoeft daar in Engeland niet toe te behoren. Pas nadat de 
analyses zijn uitgevoerd in de eigen context, worden ze vergelijkbaar op een hoger 
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abstractieniveau. Door de resultaten van de analyses te plotten op een driehoekig veld, 
wordt duidelijk hoe ze zich ten opzichte van elkaar verhouden (zie de figuur S1). 
Hoofdstuk 3 beschrijft een analyse van zes speeches van Amerikaanse politici tijdens 
de presidentiële voorverkiezingen van 2016: Bernie Sanders, Donald Trump en Hillary 
Clinton. Het hoofdstuk maakt gebruik van een eerste versie van het analyse-model, maar de 
analyses zijn later herhaald en bevestigd in de nieuwe versie. De analyses laten zien dat 
Trump in 2016 een volledige populistische stijl heeft, Bernie Sanders heeft een gemengd 
populistische-pluralistische stijl en Hillary Clintons stijl is een mix van pluralisme en elitisme. 
De analyse laat verder zien dat Sanders en Trump elkaar alleen benaderen in hun stijl op 
Focuselement 4 Politiek: beiden zien en bedrijven ze politiek als een gevecht tegen de elite. 
Ze verschillen het meest in hun ideeën over het volk: Sanders heeft een pluralistische 
conceptie van het volk (het volk is heterogeen), en Trump een populistische (het volk is 
een). 
Figure S1 
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Hoofdstuk 4 beschrijft de eerdergenoemde semiotische analyse van populisme, elitisme, en 
pluralisme en legt uit hoe de onderliggende structuur van populisme de verschillende 
stromingen in het populisme-onderzoek met elkaar verbindt. Al deze stromingen zijn geheel 
of gedeeltelijk terug te voeren op de onderliggende structuur. Omdat de drie dimensies 
elkaar deels tegenspreken, is het onmogelijk om alle manifestaties van populisme tegelijk in 
één interne coherente definitie te vatten. Dit verklaart waarom er geen consensus is in de 
discussie over de aard van populisme. Een sluitende definitie van populisme is onmogelijk, 
want populisme is iets wezenlijks anders in verschillende dimensies. Alleen door vanuit drie 
verschillende invalshoeken naar populisme te kijken, worden alle elementen van populisme 
zichtbaar. Pas daarna kan bekeken worden in welke dimensie de desbetreffende uiting van 
populisme zich het meest afspeelt. 
Hoofdstuk 5 beschrijft het analyse-instrument gedetailleerder en past het toe in een 
analyse van drie min of meer populistische politici in drie politieke contexten. Voor de VS 
zijn de speeches van Donald Trump en Bernie Sanders uit hoofdstuk 3 vergeleken met een 
speech van Barack Obama uit 2016. De analyse laat zien dat Sanders’ politieke stijl precies 
het midden houdt tussen die van Trump en Obama: waar Trump een dominante 
populistische stijl heeft en Obama een dominante pluralistische stijl, heeft Sanders een 
gemengd pluralistische-populistische stijl. Obama’s populisme is vooral sociaal bepaald; het is 
voornamelijk anti-elitisme, wat evengoed te vangen is onder de noemer van pluralisme. Ook 
Sanders’ populisme is vooral sociaal, terwijl hij in de andere dimensies gedeeltelijk 
populistisch is. Trump is populistisch in alle drie de dimensies. Ook in het VK zijn speeches 
geanalyseerd van politici die vaak als populist worden gekarakteriseerd: Boris Johnson, 
Jeremy Corbyn en Nigel Farage (in 2016 en 2017). Opvallend is dat Corbyns stijl dicht bij die 
van Sanders komt, en Farage’s stijl dicht bij die van Trump. Johnsons stijl is van een geheel 
andere orde: hij is hoofdzakelijk een elitist, en mengt dit met populisme, vooral tijdens de 
Brexit-campagne. In Nederland zijn drie populistische politici tijdens de verkiezingen in 2017 
geanalyseerd: Geert Wilders, Thierry Baudet en Emile Roemer. Opvallend is dat alle drie 
volle populisten zijn. Emile Roemer zit wel aan de pluralistische kant van het populisme, en 
Baudet aan de elitistische kant, maar de verschillen zijn beduidend minder groot dan in de VS 
en het VK. 
Hoofdstuk 6 zoemt verder in op de politieke stijl van drie van de reeds geanalyseerde 
politici: Trump, Johnson en Baudet. Van alle drie zijn speeches geanalyseerd die verspreid 
over meerdere jaren zijn gehouden, om ook ontwikkelingen in hun stijl te kunnen zien. 
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Trumps stijl blijkt na zijn inauguratie tot president in 2016 langzaam op te schuiven van 
populisme naar gemengd populisme/elitisme in 2017/2018. Op deze manier kan hij zijn rol als 
president verenigen met zijn populistische identificatie met het volk. Hij doet dat door het 
volk onderdeel te maken van zijn succes, en ook door het volk en hemzelf als de echte elite 
te bestempelen, en zijn tegenstanders als nep elite. Een soortgelijke strategie hanteert 
Baudet, gebaseerd op analyses van speeches uit 2017, 2018 en 2019. Hijzelf is duidelijk deel 
van de echte elite, in tegenstelling tot andere politici, die niet tot de (intellectuele) elite 
behoren; zij hebben volgens Baudet “nog geen boek in hun hele leven gelezen”. Het 
Nederlandse volk is, doordat zij de erfgenamen zijn van een verheven cultuur, ook 
onderdeel van de elite, terwijl niet-westerse culturen niet tot de elite behoren. Hiermee 
verzoent hij zijn elitaire imago met zijn populistische vereniging met het volk. Johnson is, 
zoals gezegd, meer een elitist dan een populist. Hij hoeft het volk niet te verenigen met de 
elite, want hij presenteert zichzelf nooit als onderdeel van het volk. Hij is wel onderdeel van 
Engeland, een ander concept dat de elite en het volk verenigt. De populistische-elitistische 
stijlmix van deze drie politici blijkt goed samen te gaan met nationalisme en nativisme: de mix 
verenigt het volk en de elite onder één vlag.  
 Hoofdstuk 7 en een deel van hoofdstuk 8 bevat een theoretische verkenning van het 
verband tussen metaforen en politieke stijl. Niet verwonderlijk is dat de drie dimensies ook 
terug zijn te vinden in de drie doelen waarmee metaforen in het politieke discourse worden 
gebruikt. Deze drie doelen komen ook overeen met de Aristoteles’ triade ethos-logos-
pathos. Hiermee wordt een theoretisch verband gelegd tussen populisme en pathos, elitisme 
en ethos, en pluralisme en logos. Verder laat de verkenning zien dat metaforen een cruciale 
rol spelen in het populisme: populisme is de politieke vertaling van metaforische identificatie 
in taal en discourse. De populistische politicus is hierbij zelf, met zijn of haar gehele 
optreden, een metafoor voor het volk. Populisten maken op deze manier het volk direct, 
metaforisch, aanwezig in het politieke veld.  
In hoofdstuk 8 wordt onderzocht of bovenstaand verband tussen populisme en 
metaforen ook zichtbaar is in een ander metafoor gebruik door populisten ten opzichte van 
elitisten en pluralisten. Hiertoe zijn drie speeches die al waren geanalyseerd op politieke stijl 
verder geanalyseerd op metafoorgebruik. De populistische speech was van Geert Wilders, 
de speech met kenmerken van het elitisme van Boris Johnson, en de pluralistische speech 
van Barack Obama. De analyse van de speeches laat zien dat alle politici metaforen gebruiken 
die betekenis genereren in alle drie de dimensies. Daar is dus geen onderscheid in, wat is te 
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verklaren uit de circulaire relatie tussen de drie dimensies. Het overkoepelende doel van het 
metafoorgebruik in de speech is echter wel verschillend voor de drie stijlen, en in 
overeenstemming met het verband tussen populisme en pathos, elitisme en ethos, en 
pluralisme en logos. Analyse van meer speeches zou dit verband verder moeten bevestigen. 
De analyse identificeert ook een metafoor die typerend is voor populisme: de 
oorlogsmetafoor voor politiek waarbij de politieke tegenstanders als aartsvijanden worden 
afgebeeld. In elitisme en pluralisme druist deze metafoor direct tegen de politieke betekenis 
van deze stijlen in. Als er al oorlogsmetaforen worden gebruikt, zijn het geen directe 
metaforen voor politiek, maar is er sprake van een gelaagde metafoor. De oorlog verwijst 
dan naar de metafoor die de politiek uitbeeldt als een competitief spel of sport (elitisme), of 
naar de metafoor die de politiek ziet als een opdracht of uitdaging (pluralisme). 
De conclusie, in hoofdstuk 9, beziet de resultaten van de conceptuele en empirische 
analyses in het licht van de bestaande literatuur over politieke stijl, populisme en metaforen. 
Op de eerste plaats levert deze dissertatie een bijdrage aan de ontwikkeling van het politieke 
stijlconcept. Met name de drie dimensies van politieke stijl en de relatie tussen populisme, 
elitisme en pluralisme met de drie spanningen in discourse is nieuw. Ook nieuw is de 
definitie van politieke stijl als een groepsstijl, waarbij elementen van een groepsstijl worden 
gecombineerd met persoonlijke en systematische stijlelementen. Deze verdere differentiatie 
geeft de mogelijkheid om meer gedetailleerd naar stijlverschillen te kijken. De speech 
analyses wijzen verder op een mogelijk verband tussen politieke stijl en het politieke 
spectrum van links-midden-rechts. Er zijn aanwijzingen dat de populisme-pluralisme-mix 
overeenkomt met links-populisme, en de populisme-elitisme-mix met rechts-populisme. 
Speech analyses van andere politieke contexten moeten uitwijzen of dit patroon breed 
zichtbaar is. 
Aan de conceptualisering van populisme draagt deze dissertatie bij door de ontdekking 
van de onderliggende discursieve structuur van populisme. Deze structuur legt de link tussen 
verschillende stromingen in het populisme-onderzoek. Hoewel alle afzonderlijk onderdelen 
van deze structuur op zich wel bekend waren, was het onduidelijk hoe zij samenhingen. 
Deze samenhang is wat deze dissertatie bijdraagt aan het populisme-onderzoek. Dit brengt 
ook duidelijkheid in discussies tussen de verschillende stromingen in dit onderzoek, 
bijvoorbeeld met betrekking tot de vraag of het volk in het populisme homogeen is of niet. 
De analyse in deze dissertatie laat zien dat dat kan, maar niet noodzakelijk is; het volk kan 
ook verenigd zijn, zolang het maar met een mond kan spreken. 
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De dissertatie draagt verder bij aan de theorievorming rond populisme als een daad (act), 
zoals geformuleerd door Laclau (2005). Laclau defineert populisme als de retorische daad 
van samenbrengen van allerlei vormen van onvrede in de maatschappij onder de noemer van 
het volk en als één gezamenlijke aanklacht tegen de machthebbers; dit refereert aan de 
presentatie dimensie van populisme. Naast deze populistische daad, waarin de machthebbers 
een metafoor worden van alles wat er mis is in de maatschappij, en het volk een metafoor 
voor de onvrede, omvat de politiek nog twee daden: een met wortels in het pluralisme en in 
het elitisme. 
De pluralistische daad bestaat uit het ontleden van de dominante frames in de 
maatschappij, die algemeen worden geaccepteerd als waarheid, maar die ook maar een 
versie van de werkelijkheid weergeven. Deze frames zijn vaak gunstig voor bepaalde 
politieke belangen, en alleen door te laten zien dat deze frames niet waar zijn, is er 
verandering mogelijk. Deze daad is pluralistisch omdat zij terug te voeren is op de spanning 
in discourse tussen het algemene en het specifieke (genus-species). 
De elitistische daad houdt in dat mensen niet in de politiek actief zijn voor eigen 
gewin, maar om anderen te helpen. Hoewel elitisme vaak bekritiseerd wordt als precies het 
tegenovergestelde, is het idee achter elitisme altruïstisch; mensen die een betere positie in 
de samenleving hebben, zijn verplicht om de minder bedeelden te helpen door voor het 
grotere belang te werken. Het volk en de elite zijn niet noodzakelijkerwijs tegenstanders; ze 
kunnen elkaar ook helpen. De goede intentie van elitisme wordt weinig onderkend, maar 
juist dit altruïstisme is een derde onmisbare politieke daad, omdat zij de enige manier is om 
vrede te bereiken tussen individuen en groepen mensen nadat de populistische en 
pluralistische gevechten zijn gevoerd. Daarom zijn alle drie de politieke stijlen een 
noodzakelijk onderdeel van politiek; populisme evenveel als elitisme en pluralisme. 
Verder levert deze dissertatie een bijdrage door de introductie van een nieuwe 
methode voor de analyse van politieke teksten en optredens, de PEP-index. Het grote 
voordeel van de PEP-index is dat het een gedetailleerd inzicht geeft in de verschillen tussen 
politieke stijlen die op allerlei aspecten met elkaar kunnen worden vergeleken. Dit levert 
nieuwe inzichten op in politieke situaties, zoals te zien is in de samenvattingen van de 
hoofdstukken.  
Ten slotte laat deze dissertatie zien hoezeer metaforen van belang zijn voor het 
populisme. Een populist is zélf een metafoor voor het volk; een volk dat zich machteloos 
voelt omdat het niet in staat is zijn situatie te veranderen, en daar toch iets aan wil doen. Een 
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metafoor, echter, is niet in eerste instantie bedoeld om te ontleden (logos), maar te laten 
voelen (pathos). De echte betekenis van populisme is dan ook een roep om empathie en 
erkenning. Een logisch antwoord hierop is te hulp schieten, zoals een elitist zou doen. Deze 
roep proberen te begrijpen en ontleden, zoals een pluralist zou doen, is daarnaast nodig om 
te begrijpen waar deze roep om erkenning op stoelt, als de empathie niet van nature 
opkomt. Echter, een populistisch antwoord—het zelf vragen om erkenning en empathie— 
levert geen perspectief op een oplossing, maar een patstelling. Alleen door een samenspel 
van de drie politieke stijlen— populisme, elitisme en pluralisme—zijn dit soort politieke 
impasses te doorbreken.  
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Relevance 
 
Populism is on the rise as a global phenomenon, causing polarization and societal unrest. This 
dissertation provides a new perspective on this political development. Subsequently, this new 
vision on populism is used in the construction of an analysis tool for political style.  
 The tool helps to gain insight into political situations and events, such as the US 
presidential campaign of 2016. In this campaign, Donald Trump uttered right-wing populist 
rhetoric, while Bernie Sanders used a left-wing populist narrative. How can these similarities 
be assessed? The tool provides a transparent method for analyzing political discourse. 
Distinct political styles are mapped onto the same fifteen elements, which demonstrates in 
detail where the styles of politicians differ or not. In the cases of Sanders and Trump, it 
revealed Trump as more populist than Sanders. The two styles only converge in their 
attitude towards politics: both see politics as conflict. They diverge the most in their ideas 
regarding the people: in Trump’s view, the people are one, whereas Sanders views the 
people as heterogeneous.  
 The analysis tool is called the PEP-index, an abbreviation of populism, elitism, and 
pluralism29. The reason is that the tool uses a relative definition of populism: nothing is 
populist in itself, only in relation to elitism and pluralism. This is a great advantage because 
the concept of populism is contested when regarded on its own; it frequently contradicts 
itself, which is why researchers not always agree on what counts as populist and what does 
not. Based on an analysis of the language structure underlying the three concepts, this 
dissertation was able to define populism (and elitism and pluralism) according to one logical 
rule. This rule is that the shared features of two of the three concepts precisely contradict the 
third. This clear-cut relationship makes the three concepts ideal as the basis of an analysis 
instrument, as they unambiguously define what is populist and what not. The contradictions 
exist in three different dimensions (if occurring in one dimension, populism would indeed 
contradict itself), as follows: 
 
• Populism as an idea aligns with elitism (both see ‘the people’ as one entity). Together 
they oppose pluralism, which does not see the people as ‘one,’ but as multiple groups. 
 
29 In populism, the people demand power back from the corrupt elite. Elitism bestows power upon the elite, 
chosen by the people. In pluralism, groups of people share power.  
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• Populism as a social practice aligns with pluralism (both want power for the people(s)). 
Together they oppose elitism, which restricts power to the elite. 
• Populism as a rhetorical presentation stands opposite to a united pluralism-elitism; 
populism speaks directly for the people, whereas pluralism and elitism have a mediated 
relationship.  
 
An additional advantage of using this logic as the core of an analysis tool is that it can address 
more than just populism—all political styles, including the mainstream, can be assessed. This 
allowed me to use the same tool to compare Trump’s and Sanders’s populist style with that 
of Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama. The tool reveals that Clinton has a mixed pluralist-
elitist style, and Obama a pluralist one. Whereas the latter succeeds in positioning himself 
diagonally against Trump, whom Obama disregards as an elitist, Clinton often takes the 
position of an elitist herself, while she also portrays herself as part of the people, which is 
populist or pluralist. For example, she presented herself as an extremely busy politician 
working for a higher cause, apologizing for not having time to socialize with the people 
(elitist). At the same time, she depicted herself as a common woman going to the grocery 
store with her black and Latino sisters (pluralist), and she protested against the unfair 
treatment of herself as a woman (populist/pluralist). The combination of three styles within 
one style element is not plausible—logically, only two of the three styles can be combined—
and can explain why her performance was often assessed as unauthentic. 
The PEP-index also allows intercultural comparison and assessments over time; after 
evaluating political styles within their own contexts, they also become comparable on a 
higher level of abstraction. Speeches held by Trump in three different years were analyzed, 
showing that his style shifted from populism towards mixed populism-elitism. This allowed 
him to keep his populist style while embracing his elite role as president. Subsequently, 
Trump’s style was compared with mixed populist-elitist politicians in other countries: Boris 
Johnson in the UK and Thierry Baudet in the Netherlands. It revealed that the populist-elitist 
style mix often goes hand in hand with nationalism, and that it comes with an undemocratic 
tendency; the mix facilitates the construction of an “elite people”, which is not democratic.  
The analysis of Johnson’s speeches also provided insight into the Brexit process. 
Johnson’s style was much more populist during the Brexit referendum campaign than before 
and after, which can be explained by the polarizing incentives of a referendum. His style 
gradually evolved from pluralist-elitist in 2015, into populist-elitist in 2016, to fully elitist in 
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2017. The latter two are predominantly anti-pluralist styles. The assemblage of Johnson’s 
style suggests that anti-pluralism fits him better than pluralism, as his 2016 and 2017 styles 
were internally more coherent than his mixed elitist-pluralist style in 2015. In the future, 
Johnson’s style can be further explored using the PEP-index, in order to evaluate how his 
style evolves as Prime Minister negotiating Brexit and coping with the Corona crisis. Because 
the PEP-index covers all political styles, it can continuously provide relevant analyses of new 
political situations. 
 
Stakeholders 
 
Besides the general public for which this dissertation provides a new perspective on 
populism and other political developments, as described above, this work is relevant for 
three groups.  
  
People working in politics. 
 
The PEP-index offers politicians the opportunity to evaluate their own presentation, both 
independently and in relation to their opponents. The model is fit not only to analyze 
political speeches and debates, but also to reflect on various fragmented and mediatized 
political presentations, such as outfits, YouTube video’s, Twitter threads, and public 
encounters.  
Analyzing political performances with the PEP-index reveals whether or not a style is 
internally coherent. The analyses in this dissertation suggest that it is more persuasive to 
express one’s own style—be it populist, elitist, or pluralist—than to imitate styles that do 
not fit with one’s political message and identity. For a coherent political style, small details 
matter. For the one politician it may be better to use “we” when referring to the people, for 
the other “they”—both can be persuasive. For instance, in speeches surrounding the Brexit 
referendum, Nigel Farage consistently used “we” when he spoke of the people. This fitted 
with his populist identity. Boris Johnson, on the other hand, always used “they,” which 
perfectly matched his elitism. Both politicians were very successful during the Brexit 
referendum, showing that it was not their populist “we” or elitist “they” that was decisive, 
but rather the internal coherence of their styles. Words, even nuances such as pronouns, 
must match with one’s personality and ideas to construct a stable and believable political 
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identity. Rhetorical craftmanship shows itself when every word or gesture precisely fits a 
particular political identity. 
An often-debated question is whether or not mainstream politics—left, center, or 
right—should adopt a more populist discourse in order to effectively compete with populist 
parties. Generally speaking, if politicians wish to enhance their presentation, it is more 
effective to change a detail of one’s style, than to adopt a style that contradicts one’s political 
personality. All styles are constructed out of three dimensions, which are either styled in a 
personal, group, or systematic way (see chapter 2.7 and 4.5). It then follows that one can 
choose to change the style of just one dimension, by making it more personal, more social, 
or more systematic. By zooming in on the details, one can enhance one’s presentation 
without becoming internally incoherent.  
 
A politically active public. 
 
This dissertation does not, unlike many other contributions on populism, generally condemn 
populist politics as morally defective, nor does it advocate it as an effective strategy—
instead, it offers a model that can place populist manifestations within a broader perspective. 
This clarifies Chantal Mouffe’s (2018a) plea for a left-wing populism. As a scholar-activist, she 
advocates populism as an effective political strategy. Others, such as Žižek, warn that this 
strategy uses scapegoats and creates an enemy. In doing this, it equals right-wing populism 
(Žižek, 2006a). It is a discussion that engages many politically active people on the left.  
This dissertation shows that left-wing populism is principally different from right-wing 
populism; right-wing populism’s main perspective is the ideational dimension, centered 
around whether ideas are right or wrong, whereas left-wing populism’s main perspective is 
the social dimension, centered around whether social practices are fair or unfair. The 
manifestations of both may be similar, as what is fair is easily equated with what is right and 
vice versa. Additionally, both combine their particular view with the perspective of the 
people against the political class, presenting themselves as we against them—here Žižek is 
right. However, the deeper underlying structures of left- and right-wing populism are 
principally different—which supports Mouffe’s point. One can still object to scapegoating 
politics as a whole, using a we-against-them theme, but it is not essentially right-wing to do so.  
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Watchdogs over our democracy. 
 
The analysis of political styles in this dissertation puts the current populist wave in 
perspective. The discursive structure underlying political style demonstrates that no style is 
here to stay: all political styles try, in their own ways, to overcome the tensions inherent in 
discourse, all ultimately without success. It then follows that new political styles will 
inevitably evolve in reaction to the weaknesses of current styles and events. The 2020 
Corona crisis, for example, pushes many leaders to change their style in one or the other 
direction. Some may tend more towards pluralism, stressing the importance of relying on 
objective knowledge about the virus, as in the Netherlands and Germany. Others tend more 
towards elitism, prioritizing a strict adherence to government regulations, such as in Italy, 
Spain, and France. Populist leaders, like in the US, Hungary, and Brazil, currently face major 
problems with their political message because a virus is essentially a non-populist struggle; it 
naturally aligns more with pluralism and elitism, as in a pandemic there is no internal frontier 
in society between the people and the elite but an external frontier between all people and a 
virus. Nevertheless, the crisis also facilitates undemocratic measures, which can result in 
populist leaders not becoming less populist, but instead less democratic. 
The coming years will reveal if populism is here to stay as an influential democratic 
practice, or if other political styles will become more prominent. Detailed insight into the 
political styles of politicians, such as is offered in this dissertation, can help to maintain a 
healthy democratic environment. In this environment, populism, elitism, and pluralism can 
function as political styles that mostly stay on a democratic spectrum. Awareness, however, 
is needed, and a detailed analysis of political performances can help to reveal whether or not 
political styles are democratically justified, or not. 
 
Activities 
 
In order to share my findings with a broader public, I have presented my work on various 
platforms. In 2017, in New York, I presented my research at an event of The Order of the 
Prince (www.ovdp.net), an organization upholding the Dutch language and culture. In 
Edinburgh, I presented my research at an aimed at the broader public: the World Café 
(https://blogs.napier.ac.uk/popnat18/2018/05/29/schoor_masstricht_university).  
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Furthermore, since 2014 I have been publishing articles for a broad public (in Dutch) on my 
blog Aristoteles op het Binnenhof (www.aristoteles.nu) and 
(www.facebook.com/pg/aristoteles.op.het.binnenhof). 
 
In the future 
 
In the near future, I will seek to further valorize the findings of my dissertation in three 
distinct ways.  
First, I intend to partially take up my old profession as a Political Communication 
Advisor in The Hague. I will offer my advice to political stakeholders in order to help them 
assess and enhance their political performance. My goal is to enlarge politicians’ 
understanding of how to strengthen their bond with their own group of voters. This is 
important in allowing our democracy to adapt to the image-driven, presentation-centered 
political context in which it now functions. Knowledge of the deeper structures that underly 
political communication is, in my view, necessary for reinforcing democracy’s resilience 
against anti-democratic tendencies. 
Second, I will offer lunchbreak lectures to organizations such as the Communication 
Departments of Ministries, Political Parties, and non-governmental organizations. Also, I will 
publish more often for a broader public, both in my blog and in a book on politics and style. 
Besides this, I will work on a textbook for bachelor students on the topic of political style. 
Third, and most urgently, I will seek funding for the further development of the PEP-
index. Ideally, the tool will be published as a web-based program or an app. The foundation 
is already in place but needs technical support to make it more broadly accessible. This tool 
will give various stakeholders—such as students, researchers, and political communication 
professionals—the opportunity to analyze political performances in a transparent and 
standardized manner. They will be able to upload their analysis to the site and compare it 
with analyses uploaded by others. This way, the app will fuel cooperation and hopefully 
contribute to the growing knowledge of the politics of style. 
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